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Building contractors are often commissioned using unit price based contracts.  They,
nevertheless, often compete on the basis of their overall project bids and yet are paid on
the basis of these projects’ constituent item prices.
If a contractor decides these prices by way of applying an uneven mark-up to their
estimates of their costs, this is known as unbalanced bidding.
This research provides proof and explanation that different item pricing scenarios
produce different levels of reward for a contractor, whilst exposing them to different
degrees of risk.  The theory describes the three identified sources of these rewards as well
as provides the first explanation of the risks.  It has identified the three types of risk
involved and provides a model by which both the rewards as well as these risks can now
be measured given any item pricing scenario.
The research has included a study of the mainstream microeconomic techniques of
Modern Portfolio Theory, Value-at-Risk, as well as Cumulative Prospect Theory that are
all suited to making decisions that involve trading-off prospective rewards against risk.
These techniques are then incorporated into a model that serves to identify the one item
pricing combination that will produce the optimum value of utility as will be best suited
to a contractor’s risk profile.
The research has included the development of software written especially for this purpose
in Java so that this theory could be tested on a hypothetical project.  A test produced an
improvement of more than 150% on the present-value worth of the contractor’s profit
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“I believe in intuition and inspiration. Imagination is more important
than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination
embraces the entire world, stimulating progress, giving birth to
evolution. It is, strictly speaking, a real factor in scientific research.”
Albert Einstein (1931) Cosmic religion: with other opinions and
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In the construction industry, with unit price contracting, contractors compete on the basis
of their bids for whole, composite projects.  These projects comprise many hundreds or
thousands of component items, often described in detail in bills of quantities.  In the UK
method of contracting (popular across the Commonwealth countries), it is typical when
contractors compete by way of tendering, that clients will provisionally select one
contractor from all of the bids submitted to them.  This is often the lowest bidder,
although not necessarily so.  The client will then request that this contractor submit their
priced bills of quantities, as preparation for potentially awarding them the contract.  At
this stage, the contractor has to decide their prices for each unit of each of the project’s
constituent items.  This process is known as “item pricing” or “unit pricing”.
Significantly, the item prices are not subject to the same competitive restraint as the
pricing for the overall project.  Nevertheless, it is these item prices, rather than the tender
price, that will govern the contract.  These item prices will be used to determine the
monthly interim payments to the contractor as they progress; they will also be used to
determine the quantum of escalation compensation (for inflationary increases in costs);
and they will be used to value the variations to the design of the project (as is very
common).
Ordinarily, one might expect a project tender price to be generated as a summation or
aggregation of its constituent component item prices, but the reverse is also possible.  It
is, of course, also possible that the contractor can choose from many millions of different
item price combinations which all summate to the same combined tender price.  These
different pricing scenarios will deliver different benefits to the contractor.
Unbalanced bidding models are mathematical tools for use to determine the optimum unit
prices. In the past, these models have been largely focused on the optimization of the











involved.  Researchers (see Gates, 1967; Stark, 1968, 1972, 1974) have, however, often
acknowledged that there are risks but, despite this, they have made little effort to properly
incorporate these risks into their models.
Moreover, little has been done to structure these models so that they recognize the
inherent nature of the trade-off that exists between unbalanced bidding’s contributions to
these risks and that of the prospective gains.
All models (for examples, see Stark, 1968, 1972, 1974; Teicholz and Ashley, 1978;
Diekmann et al., 1982; Tong and Lu, 1992; and Christodoulou, 2008) have otherwise
given recognition to risk by constraining prices using an imposition of lower and upper
bounds to each and every item price.  Although this does not seem to have been intended,
these bounds end up becoming the single most important aspect of these models.  The
effect is that all items are priced at either their upper price limit or else their lower price
limit, with the exception of only one item.  This one remaining item price then serves to
ensure that the summation of all the priced items equals the tender price.  The effect of
these models is therefore reduced to only serving to split all the items into these two
subsets: those priced high (and assigned the high price that is to be chosen arbitrarily by
the contractor) and those priced low (and similarly, assigned the contractor’s chosen low
price).  These models are, therefore, heavily dependent on the contractor’s choice of high
and low prices and yet this does not appear to have been given much consideration when
these models were formulated.
This thesis will show that whilst it is heuristically appropriate to constrain the prices for
all items, it is not appropriate that these constraints be imposed as fixed, non-negotiable
limits.
This thesis describes a theory as regards item pricing in which the pursuit of profits and
the avoidance of risk are treated as being of equal significance.  Furthermore, it will be
shown that contractors can manage these two objectives collectively, such that they are
able to pursue the optimization of a personalised value of utility (representing a trade-off,












Despite the passage of 50 years since research on unbalanced bidding was first recorded,
unbalanced bidding models have not yet been adopted for practical use.  These models
have focussed on the maximisation of profit and have given little consideration to the
risks involved. The past research has, however, acknowledged that there are considerable
risks, but these risks have largely not been identified, let alone modelled.  These models
have also typically focussed on maximising only one or other of the benefits from item
price loading, and have not provided a comprehensive approach to address all of the
potential opportunities for improving profits.
The problem to be researched is therefore stated to be as follows:
Unbalanced bidding models have not addressed the risks of an uneven mark-up
despite this having been identified as an important consideration at the outset of
research in this field, 50 years ago.  These models have also not quantified all of
the various sources of improved profits.  Overall, unbalanced bidding models
have so-far failed to provide contractors with a meaningful or useful technique
for optimising their item pricing with respect to profit and risk.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions are formulated as follows:
(1) What are the benefits that can be derived from an uneven distribution of mark-up
amongst a project’s constituent items?
(2) Is it possible that one model could comprehensively and collectively quantity all
of these benefits?
(3) What are the risks that contractor exposes themselves to, in the event that they
price items without using a consistent mark-up?












(5) If it is possible for a contractor to quantity both the prospective profits as well as
the risks for a comprehensive range of different item price combinations, how can
a contractor choose from these to find the one best suited to them?
Subsidiary questions to be addressed include:
(1) What other unbalanced bidding models have been proposed and how have these
succeeded / failed to provide an effective solution?
(2) What has research revealed that has been conducted in other areas of
microeconomics as regards decisions that entail trading-off returns against risk?
(3) What are the ethical considerations as regards whether it is acceptable for
contractors to price items using different mark-ups and are they ethically obliged
to price all items by way of using the same mark-up?
THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
This thesis sets out to provide proof of the following three hypotheses:
(1) The uneven allocation of mark-up between component items can have a
significant effect on both the profitability and the risk of a project.
(2) Some item price combinations may be considered more efficient than others:
some such combinations will contribute the most expected profit for the same or
lesser degree of risk than other combinations.  On this basis, it is not rational for
a contractor to choose to use any prices that are not efficient.
(3) A contractor is able to identify the item prices that will deliver the best
compromise for them between risk and reward, as judged in accordance with












The intended aim of this research is as follows:
To establish a scientific basis for more-effective, better-informed item pricing by
contractors.
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this research are as follows:
(1) to extend the present theoretical foundation for component item pricing,
(2) in particular, to gain better insight into both the risks as well as the rewards
generated from item pricing, and
(3) to establish a new mathematical model that quantifies both the risks and rewards
of item pricing - to facilitate the identification of item prices that will give effect to
a compromise between the pursuit of rewards, together with the restraint required
to avoid excessive risk, as is suited to the circumstance and psychology of a
particular contractor.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The methodology for the research includes the following:
(1) A literature review of other unbalanced bidding models since their conception 50
years ago.
(2) The identification of the rewards that item pricing is able to provide.
(3) The mathematical modelling of these rewards.
(4) The identification of the risks that item pricing gives exposure to.











(6) A literature review of relevant mainstream microeconomic theory as regards
decision-making entailing trading off returns and risks.
(7) An application of a choice of technique (identified by way of this review), for
combining consideration of the rewards and risks generated by different item
pricing regimens.
(8) The development of a software system by which to implement these models.
(9) Testing this system using the data from a small hypothetical project and assessing
the results, in particular as to whether they provide proof of the research
hypotheses.
SCOPE OF THE WORK
This research is limited to consideration of the pricing executed by building contractors,
engaged in the construction industry in South Africa, who procure work by way of
tendering, and in particular, where clients have chosen to make use of bills of quantities
as part of the contract documentation.  South Africa’s construction industry has inherited
its practices from the United Kingdom and these are largely shared by many other
countries that are members of the Commonwealth of Nations.  The applicability of this
research though is also believed to apply to civil engineering work as well as other
industries such as the oil and forestry industries, which are known to use unit price based
contracts and where unbalanced bidding is also prevalent.
THESIS STRUCTURE
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 will provide background information to the
practice of item pricing, in particular as regards different techniques of “item price
loading” and also the ethical concerns with respect to unbalanced bidding.
Chapter 3 will provide a critical review of all known prior research on unbalanced











identified as having significant potential) as regards equipping contractors with practical
techniques for item pricing.
Chapter 4 will provide an analysis of the benefits that can be generated from unbalanced
bidding and it will provide a model by which these can be assessed.
Chapter 5 will propose another model (in addition to the one proposed in Chapter 4) in
which the “risks” of item pricing are identified and assessed.
Chapters 6 and 7 describe relevant mainstream microeconomic theories as regards
methods of managing situations that entail trading-off profits against risk.  In particular,
these chapters provide an introductory description of Modern Portfolio Theory and
Cumulative Prospect Theory, respectively.  These techniques provide a basis by which
the contractor can identify the pricing combination that will deliver their optimum value
of utility, representing their best, personal compromise between profit and risk.
The composite new theory as regards Component Unit Pricing is then put to the test.
Chapter 8 describes software that has been written in Java especially for the purposes of
applying this theory using the data of a small hypothetical project.   This Java software
incorporates Monte Carlo simulation that is aided by a hybrid combination of techniques,
incorporating aspects of artificial intelligence, genetic computing, and fuzzy logic.
Chapter 9 describes the results of these tests of the composite model.  It provides proof
of the research hypotheses and indicates that this line of research has the potential to be
significant to contractors and that further research is justified.
The concluding discussion is provided in Chapter 10, together with suggestions for
further research in this field.
Appendix A provides a listing of the source code of the software written to implement
the model and Appendix B shows the data that describes the small hypothetical project
that is used as the basis of the test.  Appendices C – E show various output from this test
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This chapter will provide some background to this topic before the next chapter details
the history of research in this field.  This discussion includes a consideration of the
client’s perspective on this practice, including an analysis of the view that unbalanced
bidding is unethical.
Bidding models are mathematical techniques designed for use by building contractors,
amongst others, to assist them with optimising their bid prices in competitive tenders.
This area of research has been led by that of Friedman (1956) and Gates (1959) and more
than 1000 papers have been published since then with much of the debate focussed on the
underlying mathematics.  The debate has gone on for 40 years and it is only recently that
Skitmore et al. (2007) has provided a proof that the mathematics advocated by Gates is to
be preferred over that which was instead proposed by Friedman.  However, Skitmore
(2004) warns that both methods are problematic.
This style of ‘bidding model’ is focussed on the determination of a project’s overall bid
price.  Contractors are also, however, required to submit prices for each constituent
component item of projects in such a manner that the summation of these unit prices
equates to the overall project price.  These item prices are then used as the basis by which
these contracts are then administered.
Gates (1959) was the first to identify the role of item price loading as a tendering
strategy.  This approach entails allocating different mark-ups to individual items within a
project so as to realise advantages that are not likely to be accomplished by way of
allocating a universally constant mark-up to all of a project’s items.  Further research
(see, for example, Stark,1968; Diekmann et al., 1982; Ashley and Teicholz, 1977; Tong











mathematical techniques by which to optimise this and these have become known as
unbalanced bidding models.  They are very different from what is popular known simply
as ‘bidding models’ (as described above) and they are not to be confused.
Unbalanced bidding models are typically designed for use by building or engineering
contractors and are often utilized in the oil and forestry industries (see Athey and Levin,
2001).  This study is, however, concerned primarily with the use of these models by
contractors in the construction industry although much of this research is relevant to the
full spectrum of the potential use of these models.
Common to these models (such as those advocated by Gates, 1959, 1967; Stark, 1968,
1972, 1974; Ashley and Teicholz, 1977; Teicholz and Ashley, 1978; Diekmann et al.,
1982; Cattell, 1987; and, Tong and Lu, 1992) is that their objective is to maximize the
present-day value of a project’s profit. They all entail the “loading” of the prices of some
items, and the “unloading” of the prices of other items, in this endeavour.
Many contractors are said to avail themselves of this opportunity, according to McCaffer,
(1979), Green (1986), Kaka and Price (1991) and Kenley (2003).
The effects of item price loading
For the most part, each item of work within a project has largely different characteristics
to other such items.  Some relate to work that has to be done early in the construction
schedule; others to activities scheduled later.  Many fall within different escalation
workgroups in terms of contract price adjustment provisions.  Some items have an initial
quantity attached to them in the bills of quantities that the contractor can be fully
confident will not differ from the final quantity.  Some others describe work that is
expected to vary in quantity when it is built (being measured as ‘provisional’): some of
these items may be expected to finally be allocated a higher quantity and others a lower
quantity. Some items’ final quantities are easier to estimate than others, and thus some
enjoy a higher degree of confidence as regards their variability than others.  And so on.











different proportions; most items are different in their overall character from any other
item.
Item price loading as a theory relies on this reality that most items are in many ways
unique in their character.  By allocating some items higher mark-ups than other items,
item price loading is seeking to take advantage of each item’s unique attributes.
Consider the following examples:
• If high prices are allocated to items scheduled to arise early in the contract’s project
plan, the contractor will receive larger amounts of money for the first few interim
payments which will aid their initial cash flow for the contract – a practice known as
‘front-end loading’;
• If the contractor was to allocate high prices to items that are scheduled to occur late in
the project plan and to those that fall into workgroups that have a high expected
escalation, the contractor will receive larger amounts in escalation in compensation
for inflation – perhaps more than the cost to them of escalation – but, more
importantly, most certainly more than if they were to allocate lower prices to such
items – a practice known as ‘back-end loading’;
• If a contractor was able to predict variations in the contract’s design or identify
mistakes in the measured quantities, they may take advantage by allocating high
prices to items for which they expect the quantity to be adjusted upwards and low
prices to items that they expect will be reduced – a practice known as ‘quantity error
exploitation’.
Pursuing any one of these opportunities (as examples) in isolation is intuitively very
simple.  However, the reality is a lot more complex when one considers that each single
item within a project does not only have one such characteristic, but instead, they all have
a largely unique and complex blend of many such characteristics.  Each item cannot
simply be described, for instance, as being an ‘early’ or ‘late’ item without also having to











for a different treatment as regards item price loading.  For instance, a ‘late’ item might
fall into an escalation workgroup that has a high expected rate of escalation.  In this
instance, it is not obvious whether this item should be allocated a high or low mark-up.
The objectives of front-end loading would suggest heuristically that ‘late’ items should be
allocated low prices and yet the objectives of back-end loading suggest that a ‘late’ item
in a ‘high-escalation’ workgroup should be allocated a high price.  Which of these two is,
in this instance, of greater significance?
To add further to the complexity, consider that a project typically comprises many
hundreds or thousands of items, most of which are unique in character.  Thus, when
viewed holistically, with all of the complexity that this has inherent in it, it becomes a lot
less obvious how best to pursue the advantages of item price loading.  Nevertheless, not
only does it remain obvious that these advantages remain intact regardless of this
complexity, but also, it is hypothesized that the more complex a project is, the more there
are opportunities for item price loading, and the more should be the advantages of this
practice.
The complexity of this problem becomes more intricate and demanding when one
considers that contractors are not only potentially able to enjoy greater profits from this
manipulation of their prices but that this practice typically also exposes them to
additional risk.  It is, however, possible that contractors can use unbalanced bidding as a
technique by which to reduce their risk.
2.2 ETHICS
The objective of unbalanced bidding is for a contractor to derive some advantage that
they would not enjoy from a balanced bid.  (A balanced bid is one where all item prices
are derived using the same, average, mark-up.)  This will often, but not always, occur at
the expense of the client - most probably without the client initially being aware that they
are being given this exposure.  Contractors have the advantage over clients in this regard
by having available to them their own confidential information about their estimates of a











more difficult for them to determine the existence and / or the extent of any possible
loading in any item prices.
Contractually, clients will typically, in terms of traditional building practice, provide (by
way of their professional team) a specification and design of the project that they wish to
have built.  Contractors commit themselves legally to fulfilling these requirements, but
they are left entitled to decide their own approach and technique by which they will
accomplish this.  This power of discretion that is enjoyed by contractors is significant
here from the perspective that different contractors are entitled to choose different
methods of construction that might lead to different costs of production.  Furthermore,
different contractors have different resources available to them, again with corresponding
differences in cost.  For example, one contractor might have available for a project some
plant, such as a crane, which may be very well suited to a project and in which their long-
standing investment is already ‘written-off’ in their books giving them a cost advantage
over their competitors.  Different contractors have different suppliers and sub-contractors
or at least might have different relationships with these.  Thus, different contractors will
incur different costs if they were all to build the same project, even if they were to build it
at the exact same time, with the exact same set of imposed conditions (such as the
weather).  Contractors also differ from one another by way of the techniques that they use
to estimate these costs and thus different contractors, whilst competing for the same job,
might reasonably be expected to have estimated item costs that are quite different from
one another.  Research by Beeston (1975) has shown that the variance between
contractors in individual, component, estimated item costs far exceeds the overall
variance that lies between contractor’s overall, composite, estimated project costs.
With these variances being in existence, a client might have difficulty being able to
differentiate between a balanced set of item prices and an unbalanced one.  Furthermore,
if one recognizes from the above that contractors are not all operating off the exact same
set of estimated costs, why is it ethically significant that they should be expected to
present a balanced bid?  Should contractors not be entitled to price different items with
different mark-ups if only so as simply to recognize their relative, competitive differences











cost of their crane were extremely low, perhaps for reason that it was purchased many
years ago, could it not be justified that they might apply a high mark-up to their
unusually-low cost?  Is there, indeed, any standard method by which they should feel
obliged to account for their costs, especially as regards more ambiguous issues such as
the use of depreciating assets and overheads?  If a contractor uses a method of
construction that is unique to them, that leads to different costs than other contractors,
should they account for this on the basis of these differences or on the basis of the
industry norm? How should they recoup their costs of research and development in such
efforts, and how should they account for the costs of training their staff, especially if this
has given them unique advantage by way of productivity?  Clearly, different contractor’s
situations need to allow them a freedom by which to account for their internal
expenditure in such a way that it respects their independence in an economic environment
governed by free-enterprise.
A further consideration as regards the ethics of unbalanced bidding is that a client is
given a full disclosure of a contractor’s item prices.  The contractor’s pricing is fully
transparent, to the degree that this is requested from clients.  Clients are hence given this
disclosure on their terms, which includes that they then have the opportunity by which
they can exercise the choice of outright rejecting these prices, else of insisting upon an
acceptance of the contractor’s bid on condition that these prices be renegotiated.  Clients
have these options on their terms and are able to legitimately choose to rather initiate the
same negotiations with one of the other bidders.  With these arrangements, contractors
are not in a position to force clients to have to accept their unit prices, nor are they able to
withhold information as regards these, from the client.
When a contractor submits their item prices they do so without any inherent assurance
that these prices constitute a balanced bid.  They are asked to present their prices and not
their calculations by which they have arrived at these prices.  When submitting these
prices they do so knowing the risk that they may be found to be unacceptable.  They
could be rejected as much for reason that they were derived from a peculiar cost estimate











As much as a client has no right to dictate to a contractor how they should build a project
or how they should estimate their costs, it follows that they have no right to dictate to a
contractor how they should price the project either.  The client does, however, retain the
right to reject outright any prices that a contractor submits to them.  To this end,
contractors need to consider this risk when pricing a project.
It is furthermore noteworthy that unbalancing bidding does not necessarily imply that the
resultant item prices will be extreme as to constitute pricing that is out of norm with what
is customary in practice.  It is instead to be noted that unbalanced bidding may very well
already have become the norm (Kenley, 2003), albeit that item pricing is not known to be
practiced in industry using any mathematical models that are designed to optimize this
process (see Green, 1986).  Optimisation does not imply any greater degree of loading,
especially if the objective of any such model is also to minimize the associated risks.
Kenley (2003) has questioned the morality of item price loading but nevertheless has
acknowledged it as having considerable impact as well as having widespread use. He has,
however, found that its use is with limited levels of mathematical sophistication.  Green
(1989) has likewise commented on the significant value of unbalancing, and in particular
from the practice of front-end loading. He identified (Green, 1986) extensive use of what
he called ‘individual rate loading’ and ‘front-end loading’ although he noted that, in
practice, it was conducted in an unscientific manner.  Kaka and Price (1991) have also
commented on the ‘significant’ effect of front-end loading in their efforts to account for
this practice when they forecast developers’ cashflows.
Warning
Kenley (2003) has warned of the dangers to contractors of pursuing unbalanced bidding.
This is largely founded on his experience in which some contractors’ contracts managers
have lost track of the extent or nature of their own estimators’ initial price loading.
Kenley has found that there is often poor communication internally between a
contractors’ estimators and their contracts managers.  He found that this has at times
given rise to these contracts managers enjoying a false sense of optimism early on in











prices in the bills of quantities.  This is said to sometimes give rise to the projection of
this perception of good fortune through to the end of a project.  Kenley has quoted
examples of where these initial periods of surplus cashflow have led to the vast expansion
of some contractors’ overheads to the extent that some have indulged themselves with
excessive, expensive luxuries.
He observed that problems obviously then arise later when these managers are seemingly
unable to comprehend why items built later in these projects begin to suffer from
increasing lesser profit margins to the extent that work done near the end of these projects
is typically having to be built at a loss.  His research identified numerous examples of
contractors having failed altogether and long established businesses having gone
bankrupt due to these short-comings in their cashflow management.
Discussions with Kenley have clarified that these problems should not be blamed on the
practice of unbalanced bidding (nor on other judicious ‘cash farming’ techniques that he
has identified).   Instead, it is more reasonable to blame this on poor communication
within these contractor’s management teams as well as on their poor and unsophisticated
systems which lack the ability to keep contracts management suitably informed.  Kenley
has argued that the survival of contractors is highly dependent on these sophisticated
systems and management techniques with regards to their cashflow management,
especially in an environment where this is made more challenging through the
widespread use of item price loading.
The role of the professional quantity surveyor
Kenley (2003: 233) has described the practice of item price loading as ‘ethically
questionable’, ‘dubious’ and ‘illegitimate’.  Whilst many researchers have largely steered
clear of such judgement, the opinion of Stark (1968 and 1974) is that unbalanced bidding
provides contractors with an efficiency that is healthy not only for them but for the
industry as a whole as well as for clients.  This argument appears to be founded on the
logic that the process of tendering is there to serve the purpose of ensuring that the most
efficient contractor wins, something which, upon a superficial assessment at least, would











suggest that contractors who fail to utilise item price loading will be failing to derive a
considerable profitable opportunity that is inherent within the prospective benefits of any
project. The consequence of this is then that any contractor not practicing item price
loading will be suffering an ‘opportunity cost’ - thereby effectively rendering them
uncompetitive within any environment in which item price loading has become the norm.
Another perspective on this would suggest that, although item price loading might
provide increased efficiency for contractors, it generates considerable additional ‘hidden
costs’ for clients (Kenley, 2003).  Thus whilst competition within an environment in
which unbalanced bidding may be commonplace, may result in lower tender prices, these
lower bids may not necessarily represent lower effective costs for the clients.
Nevertheless, whilst item price loading has considerable benefits to offer, it appears
illogical to expect rational contractors not to pursue this opportunity.  Once doing so, it
would appear sensible that any rational contractor would furthermore wish to refine this
process to the extent that they are able to maximise this opportunity.  It is likewise logical
that any contractors not doing the same would be rendered uncompetitive.  Thus, the
optimised practice of item price loading might become the norm.  In this scenario it
would be naive for clients to expect anything other than unbalanced bids and thus they
will have need to factor the ‘hidden costs’ that are associated with such bids into their
budgets.  The role of the quantity surveyor in protecting their client will become more
challenging as the practice of unbalanced bidding becomes more widely practiced, more
sophisticated, and more extreme.  Furthermore, sophisticated item pricing loading models
are normally designed to optimally exploit any errors in the bills of quantities caused by
the quantity surveyor and thus it may be argued that, within this scenario, it will become
more important for clients to invest in a good quantity surveyor as well as in a well
prepared bills of quantities.
A possible means by which client might protect themselves from the effects of item price
loading would be for them to insist that all bidding contractors are to submit, for
comparison, a fully priced bills of quantities.  This would facilitate that the quantity
surveyor could be able to compare bids not solely on the basis of their bottom-line tender











contractor’s priced component items is likely to generate.  The quantity surveyor would
furthermore be able to run sensitivity analyses on these priced component items, testing
for variations in item quantities and thereby should be able to highlight cases of any
quantity error exploitation.
Another method by which a quantity surveyor might be able to circumvent and / or
moderate some of the benefits of unbalanced bidding is for clients to insist that
contractors bids also incorporate a commitment as regards their cashflow drawdown
(Kenley, 2003).  Interim payments would therefore be derived from this agreed schedule
rather than from the use of item prices.  As Kenley has proposed, this might necessitate
that the client would want to pre-select the contractors who will participate in such a
tender, so as to be assured of their reputation and sound standing.  If quantity surveyors
were to advocate this practice, they would have helped remove much of the incentive for
unbalanced bidding.  By doing so, the quantity surveyor might hope for more balanced
bids, and therefore might expect to have alleviated much of the client’s risk.
Clearly, the quantity surveyor has a significant role to play to help protect clients from
being exposed to both much of the cost that they would incur from unbalanced bidding as
well as the risks that are involved.
2.3 SUMMARY
This chapter has shown that unbalanced bidding models are not to be confused with the
far more popular area of research that is described simply as ‘bidding models’.  It has
described how the research on unbalanced bidding arose as an additional strategy related
to ‘bidding models’ and how these two fields of research have never subsequently
‘overlapped’ with each other.
This background has also included a brief assessment of the impact of this practice on the
clients of construction projects and debated some of the ethical issues that are involved











Lastly, it has investigated an overview of the role of the quantity surveyor in this domain
and suggested some methods by which they might be able to protect their clients from
abuse by way of unbalanced bids.
The next chapter provides the history of research in this field and it provides a review of
all known significant unbalanced bidding models that have been proposed in the 50 years












Athey, S. and Levin, J. (2001) Information and competition in US Forest Service timber
auctions. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109, no. 2, pp. 375-417.
Ashley, D.B. and Teicholz, P.M. (1977) Pre-estimate cash flow analysis. Journal of the
Construction Division, American Society of Civil Engineers, Proc. Paper 13213,
vol. 103, no. C03, pp. 369-379.
Beeston, D.T. (1975) One statistician’s view of estimating. Chartered Surveyor, Building
and Quantity Surveying Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 49-54.
Cattell, D.W. (1987). Item price loading. PACE’87 Progress in Architecture,
Construction and Engineering proceedings, Johannesburg, July, Vol.II, Session 3,
pp. 1-20.
Diekmann, J.E., Mayer, R.H. Jr. and Stark, R.M. (1982) Coping with uncertainty in
unit price contracting. American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of the
Construction Division, vol. 108, no. C03, Sep, pp. 379-389.
Friedman, L. (1956) A competitive bidding strategy. Operations Research, vol. 4, no. 1,
Feb., pp. 104-112.
Gates, M. (1959) Aspects of competitive bidding. Annual Report, Connecticut Society of
Civil Engineers.
Gates, M. (1967) Bidding strategies and probabilities. Journal of the Construction
Division, American Society of Civil Engineers, vol. 93, no. C01, Proc paper 5159,
Mar., pp. 75-107.
Green, S.D. (1986) The unbalancing of tenders. MSc dissertation, Department of
Building, Heriot-Watt University.
Green, S.D. (1989) Tendering: optimisation and rationality. Construction Management
and Economics, vol. 7, pp. 53-63.
Kaka, A.P. and Price, A.D.F. (1991) Net cashflow models: Are they reliable?











Kenley, R. (2003) Financing Construction: Cash flows and cash farming.  London, Spon
Press.
McCaffer, R. (1979). Cash flow forecasting. Quantity Surveying, August, pp.22-26.
Skitmore, M. (2002). Predicting the probability of winning sealed bid auctions: a
comparison of models. Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 53, pp.
47-56.
Stark, R.M. (1968) Unbalanced bidding models – theory. American Society of Civil
Engineers,  Journal of the Construction Division, vol. 94, no. C02, pp. 197-209.
Stark, R.M. (1972) Unbalancing of tenders. Proceedings of the Institute of Civil
Engineers, Technical Note 59, vol. 51, pp. 391-392.
Stark, R.M. (1974) Unbalanced highway contract tendering. Operational Research
Quarterly, vol. 25, no.3, pp. 373-388.
Stark, R.M. and Rothkopt, M.H. (1979) Competitive bidding: a comprehensive
bibliography. Operations Research, vol.27, no.2, March-April, pp. 364-390.
Teicholz, P.M. and Ashley, D.B. (1978) Optimal bid prices for unit price contract.
American Society of Civil Engineers, Journal of the Construction Division, vol.
104, no. 1, March, pp. 57-67.
Tong, Y. and Lu, Y. (1992) Unbalanced bidding on contracts with variation trends in











3. OTHER UNBALANCED BIDDING MODELS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter provided some background and this chapter will review the history
of unbalanced bidding and the various models for unbalanced bidding that scientists have
formulated.  It will be shown that the science is still limited by some critical issues and
that this has not yet reached the stage where it has gained traction.  It has, surprisingly,
not yet attracted the same academic interest as ‘bidding models’ nor has any of the
research as yet given rise to being applied in practice.  Nevertheless, unbalanced bidding
is widely practiced using methods that are less scientific.
Unbalanced bidding models have attracted relatively little research compared to the
popularity of research on what are commonly known simply as ‘bidding models’.  The
latter field (having the objective of determining the optimum bid price in a closed tender
situation) has attracted over a thousand academic papers. Stark and Rothkopt (1979) had
identified over 500 titles on this topic almost 30 years ago.
The research on bidding models is thought to have started with Friedman (1956). Gates
(1959, 1967) then contributed an alternative mathematical approach and at the same time
he identified the concept of unbalanced bidding models.  He suggested that there was
most probably no more significant bidding strategy than unbalanced bidding although he
felt that this practice entailed little prospect for benefiting from mathematical
sophistication.
In practice, over the past 50 years since bidding models and unbalanced bidding models
were first identified, the former area could be said to have drawn considerable interest
from academics but far less interest from practitioners, and yet one could say the opposite
of unbalanced bidding.  Many researchers have noted (see, for example, McCaffer, 1979;











unbalanced bidding is commonplace in practice.  By contrast, however, there has been
comparatively little research done in this field.
Gates’ initial publication served largely to merely identify the practice.  Stark (1968,
1972, 1974) then approached the problem from a mathematical angle.  He advocated the
use of linear programming which then became a popular standard for much of the
subsequent research.
Currently, it is believed that there are three different, complementary approaches to
unbalanced bidding (see Cattell, 1984, 1987; Green, 1989; Cattell et al., 2004) namely,
front-end loading, individual rate loading, and back-end loading.  Very little research has
managed to combine all three so as to accomplish what is now believed to be a
comprehensive approach.  Stark’s efforts, for instance, took account only of the
combined benefits of two of these (namely, front-end loading and individual rate
loading).
Ashley and Teicholz’s research (1977), which was subsequent to Stark’s (1968, 1972,
1974), nevertheless did not build upon this, but rather, seemingly independently,
proposed a simple linear unbalancing model for the sole purpose of front-end loading.  In
this initial research of theirs, they recognised that some benefit could be derived from
individual rate loading but they concluded that it appeared too difficult to systematically
model.  Teicholz and Ashley (1978) then went on to enhance their earlier efforts in
combination with using the contribution of Stark (1974).  They proposed a more
sophisticated ‘optimal model’ (resembling that of Gates’, 1967) which, despite their
initial reservations, managed to expand on their initial effort to now include individual
rate loading.
Diekmann et al. (1982) took Stark’s (1968 and 1974) original deterministic model and,
without reference to the works of Ashley and Teicholz (1977), added a probabilistic
formulation, using quadratic programming, to take account of risk.  Their definition of
risk was, however, very limited and they ignored many of the risk factors.  They also











Diekmann et al.’s (1982) efforts however remain the most significant to-date.
Subsequent research by Tong and Lu (1992), which focused solely on individual rate
loading, failed to make any advance beyond Stark’s initial efforts.
3.2 GATES’ STRATEGY
It is believed that Marvin Gates (1959, 1967) was the first to comment on the practice of
unbalanced bidding.  Gates’ entry into this arena has largely been deemed significant
because he proposed an alternative to Friedman’s (1956) (balanced) bidding model,
subsequently coming to criticize the latter (when he became aware of it) for what he
considered to be an incorrect use of mathematics (Gates, 1970).  Friedman’s model
pioneered the concept that a contractor might apply mathematics for the purpose of
determining the probability of winning a closed tender bid.  This mathematical model
(being a ‘balanced bidding model’ by definition) entails analysis of a contractor’s
competitive environment on the basis that (a) ideally, the contractor has knowledge of
who the competitors are, or (b) that it is only known how many competitors there are, or
(c) worst of all, that it is not even known how many competitors there are.   Friedman’s
model provides a basis by which a contractor can utilize this analysis by which to
determine an optimum bid.
Gates’ efforts were largely focused on proposing an alternative mathematical formula by
which to determine this probability of winning.  The Gates versus Friedman debate has
raged on ever since, with many dozens of researchers falling largely into one or other of
these two camps (see, for example, Skitmore, 2002).  Most bidding models are derived
from either Friedman’s or Gates’ original models.  Abdel-Razek (1987) is one of those
who have provided a synopsis of the early stages of this conceptual ‘battle’; Crowley
(2000) provides a more recent assessment, and Skitmore (2002) provides a quantitative
comparison.
Whilst the principal area of interest with regards to Gates’ research has been with respect
to the method of determination of the probability of winning (and hence the
determination of an optimum project mark-up), another proposal of his went less well











bidding (Gates, 1959).  In the process he came to suggest that unbalanced bidding had
more to offer a contractor in the short-term as a strategy than any other bidding strategy
(Gates, 1959).
He proposed a simple method that addressed a contractor’s need for an accelerated
cashflow as well as a means to benefit from loading the prices of items whose item
quantities are anticipated to increase as a result of a likely variation order.  His approach
largely steered clear of any sophisticated mathematics and he went so far as to comment
that he felt that unbalanced bidding, at least in so far as the manner in which he advocated
it, was the least mathematically involved of all the bidding strategies that he was then
proposing.
Gates (1967) used the following simple 4-item project to illustrate this strategy:
Table 3.1 Gates' example of a balanced bid (Gates, 1967)
Item
No.




1 Clearing Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
2 Earth excavation Cubic yards 50,000 1.50 75,000
3 Rock excavation Cubic yards 25,000 3.00 75,000
4 Cleaning up Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
Total bid 250,000
 Gates proposed that whilst Table 3.1 above illustrates the item breakdown of a $250,000
project, as it might be without any loading, Table 3.2 below illustrates how it might
appear if its items were given the treatment of front-end loading.
Table 3.2 Gates' example of front-end loading (Gates, 1967)
Item
No.




1 Clearing Lump sum As necessary 90,000.00 90,000
2 Earth excavation Cubic yards 50,000 1.50 75,000
3 Rock excavation Cubic yards 25,000 3.00 75,000
4 Cleaning up Lump sum As necessary 10,000.00 10,000
Total bid 250,000
Gates hence showed how this project could be made to generate an additional $40,000











Gates then went on to suggest that another method of unbalanced bidding was to exploit
obvious errors in the project’s initial item quantities. He referred to this technique as
“unclassifying”.  He illustrated this with the example of a contractor, having done a field
investigation, “having reason to believe” that instead of 50,000 cubic yards of earth
excavation, there is more likely to be 70,000 cubic yards; and instead of 25,000 cubic
yards of rock excavation, there is more likely to be only 5,000 cubic yards.  He suggested
that this contractor would benefit if he were to load up the price of earth excavation, and
load down the price of rock excavation.  He illustrated this with the following example,
shown in Table 3.3 below:








1 Clearing Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
2 Earth excavation Cubic yards 50,000 1.60 80,000
3 Rock excavation Cubic yards 25,000 1.60 40,000
4 Cleaning up Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
Total bid 250,000
The rate for excavation of $1.60 was arrived at solely for reason that he proposed that
custom dictated that the rate for rock excavation could not be less than the rate for earth
excavation.  The rate was calculated as the weighted average based on the contractor’s
“best estimate” of the final quantities of the two items of excavation, as follows:
(70,000 x $1.50) + (5,000 x $3.00)  =  $1.60 per cu yard
75,000
Gates’ example drew comparison with the (unaltered) balanced bid, as shown in Table
3.4 below:
 Table 3.4 Gates' example of payment on the basis of a balanced bid (Gates, 1967)
Item
No.




1 Clearing Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
2 Earth excavation Cubic yards 70,000 1.50 105,000
3 Rock excavation Cubic yards   5,000 3.00 15,000












Gates then demonstrated the obvious benefits of his proposed “classified bid”, depicted in
Table 3.5 below:
Table 3.5 Gates' example of payment on the basis of a classified bid (Gates, 1967)
Item
No.




1 Clearing Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
2 Earth excavation Cubic yards 70,000 1.60 112,000
3 Rock excavation Cubic yards   5,000 1.60 8,000
4 Cleaning up Lump sum As necessary 50,000.00 50,000
Total bid 250,000
Gates thus showed that whilst both his examples of a balanced bid and a classified bid
comprised the same tender price of $250,000, the latter unbalanced bid would generate an
additional $30,000 for the contractor provided that his expectation of the variations to the
project’s earthworks were to prove correct.
Gates commented that there was, however, considerable risk for a contractor that his
predictions as regards variations may not be fulfilled.  Notwithstanding this caveat, he
did not propose any basis by which to measure or address this risk.
Gates’ work is believed to be important for reason of having identified unbalanced
bidding as a significant strategy.  Gates did not, however, succeed with regards to
identifying any mathematical techniques by which to accomplish the potential of this
strategy.  He also did not recognize the potential for the use of sophisticated mathematics
for this purpose (Gates, 1967).
3.3 STARK’S MODEL
Stark (1968, 1972, 1974) approached the problem largely as Gates had defined it.  Unlike
Gates, however, he recognised that there was potential for the application of more











Stark (1968) recognised that there are the following constraints that govern item pricing:
3.3.1 The bid constraint
This constraint simply ensures that all of the items’ prices add up to the tender price,





where j  = item number
J  = number of items
Qj = bill quantity of item j
P
j = bill price per unit of item j
TP = tender price
3.3.2 Unit bid constraints
Stark suggested that, for reason of “custom”, some item’s prices are governed by other
item’s prices whilst some simply need to be bounded by upper and lower bounds that are
seemingly to be arbitrarily decided upon.







Pjl ! Pj ! Pju (3.3)
where i & j  = item numbers
Pjl & Pju   = lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the price of item j
Stark suggested, as an example, that custom dictated that the excavation of hard rock
should be priced more than the excavation of soft rock, which in turn should be priced











scientific justification for this nature of constraint.  Presumably he meant only for this
constraint to prevent the situation where otherwise it would draw the attention to the
client that the contractor has manipulated his prices.
He also proposed that the upper and lower bounds would be especially useful to limit a
contractor’s risk where the contractor felt less certain of the final quantity of an item.  He
did not, however, propose any scientific basis by which to decide these bounds nor did he
suggest a scientific basis by which to identify the items to which to apply this technique.
3.3.3 Rate constraints
Stark went on to propose that a contractor may wish to ensure that their anticipated
receipts of interim progress payments remain in some proportion to the rate at which the














where m  = a month in the range between 1 and N
N = the estimated duration of the project, in months
!  = Stark’s “constant of proportionality”
Qnj  = the quantity of item j expected to be built in month n
His suggestion was that a contractor should have an “intuitive” feel for deciding an
appropriate value of ! and that perhaps he should test a range of values within some
bounded limits (also to be arbitrarily decided upon).  He indicated that a value of 1
should have the effect that interim payments should keep track with the rate of progress,
such that when, for example, 20% of the project is completed (measured in terms of value
completed, as determined by way of the project’s component item prices) then 20% of
the overall project’s value would be paid to the contractor.  Values higher than 1 should
have the effect of front-end loading (i.e. that of accelerating the payments) whilst values
of less than 1 should give cause for (a basic form of) back-end loading (i.e. that of











In effect though, the formulation of this constraint appears fundamentally flawed.  If this
constraint were to be replicated for all months m, then the only basis by which all these
constraints could be satisfied as equalities is in the event of the special case of ! being
equal to 1 and where the rate of progress, and hence the rate of interim progress
payments, of the project, was exactly linear.  Besides the impracticality of the latter
assumption, this then also negates the effective use of ! for the purpose for which Stark
intended.  Thus, it is believed that Stark failed to formulate this intention correctly.  It is
also noted that although some subsequent research (see Teicholz and Ashley, 1978 and
Diekmann et al., 1982) has made use of other aspects of Stark’s linear programme, they
have not made use of this constraint.
Stark then expressed his “basic model” as having the purpose of maximising the present
value (‘PV’) described as follows, subject to the constraints listed and described above:









where r  = discount rate of interest, in monthly terms
He described his basic model as being appropriate for those circumstances where the
final quantity of each item will exactly match the quantities depicted in the bills of
quantities and where the contractor has been exactly able to determine the scheduled rate
at which each item will be built.  He identified this as a linear programming problem that
was capable of being solved within the practical computing constraints of the time.
This basic model thus only addresses the benefit of front-end loading.  Stark then
developed a further derivative of this model for the purposes of also addressing the
benefit of quantity error exploitation and this model (described beneath) entails the
maximisation of P !V  as follows:




















 !J   = the estimated final number of items
N’  = the estimated final number of months
!Qnj      = the estimated final quantity of item j expected to be built in month n
Stark suggested that there are “some circumstances” in which it will be advantageous to
rather optimise the present worth of a project’s future profit (P !!V ), expressed as follows:
P !!V = Qnj (1+ r)
"n







where  Cj  = the “known” unit cost of item j
He did not describe which circumstances should give cause to encourage this alternative
approach.
This formulation of a project’s profit is simplistic seeing as it does not take account of
many factors that determine that a contractor’s cash outflow in respect of any item will
seldom, if ever, have a simple and continuous linear relationship with the rate at which
the item is built (see, for example, Kaka and Price, 1991; Kenley, 2003).
Stark illustrated this alternative approach by applying to his “basic model” (see equation
3.5 above).  It would appear, however, that he intended that it should also be applied to
his other model (in which he also incorporates quantity error exploitation – see equation
3.6 above).
Stark’s model was limited to only taking account of the combined benefits of cashflow
and quantity estimation errors and it was also limited with respect to its handling of risk.
Furthermore, the effect of his model is largely that items are priced at either the upper or
lower bounds that the contractor will have imposed as constraints.  The model’s ultimate
result is thus largely dependent on these arbitrary and subjective inputs, which have to be
decided without the benefit of any suggested scientific aides.
Stark did, however, agree with Gates (1967) that there was considerable risk attached to











pricing models using sensitivity analyses and thereby identify some sense of this risk.
This limited approach to risk may be due to his concern about having to design his model
so as to be suited to the limited (and expensive) computing resources available to
contractors at that stage.  His model therefore was purely deterministic in nature.
3.4 ASHLEY AND TEICHOLZ’S MODELS
Whilst Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) efforts took account of the combined benefits of
cashflow and item quantity estimation errors, Ashley and Teicholz’s (1977) subsequent
research did not build upon this, but rather, seemingly independently, proposed a simple
linear unbalancing model for the sole purpose of improving a contractor’s cashflow.  In
this initial research, they recognised that some benefit could be derived from “quantity
error exploitation” but they concluded that it appeared too difficult to model
systematically.
Interestingly, Ashley and Teicholz’s (1977) model was developed for the expressed
purposes of determining, prior to submitting the bid, the extent and manner to which the
cashflow of a project might be manipulated by means of item price loading.  They
envisaged this information would aid the decision as to whether or not to bid as well as
on what amount of bid to submit.
They recommended that, whilst having to cope with the limited amount of information
available in the initial stages of a project, a contractor should identify the following three
cashflow curves:
3.4.1 Earnings curve -
representing the value of the contractor’s “work-in-place”, derived from a schedule of
activity for the project, prepared by the contractor, priced in terms of the item prices in
the bills of quantities.
3.4.2 Payments curve -
derived from the Earnings Curve and adjusted to take account of any retention that may











continuous ‘smooth’ curve) to take account of the (typically monthly) intervals between
client’s payments as well as the delays (between when work is executed, and then
measured and then finally paid for).  This curve would therefore represent the
contractor’s cash inflow.
3.4.3 Cost curve -
representing the contractor’s cash outflow.  The cost curve should be derived from the
contractor’s estimate of his costs, matched together with his schedule of activity, and
taking account of any lead or lag between the timing of the activity and the timing of the
expected cash outflow.  This curve is also to be derived taking account of the analysis of
each item’s cost, comprising the various types of cost components (labour, materials,
plant, subcontractors’ charges, and overheads) and how each of these has a different cash
outflow lead or lag.  The cost curve may bear little or no resemblance to the earnings or
payments curves.
Ashley and Teicholz (1977) suggested that the contractor determine his nett cashflow as
being the nett difference between the payments curve and the cost curve.  They also
suggested that these differences per period be discounted back to a present value, using
two different discounting rates: one representing the contractor’s cost of borrowings,
being applied to any negative nett cashflow amounts; and the other representing his
“corporate rate of return” (being larger than his cost of borrowings) being applied to any
positive nett cashflow amounts.  They concluded that the summation of these periodic
(typically monthly) present values would identify the project’s “Nett Present Worth” –
useful as a measure of a project prior to a contractor’s commitment to a bid as well as to
its constituent item prices.
Ashley and Teicholz (1977) then advocated that a contractor measure the effect of the
front-end loading of the item prices using their suggestion of a “linear unbalancing











This linear unbalancing model results in all items scheduled for the start of a project
having their prices loaded with the factor d1 (the “Unbalance Factor”).  Subsequent items
would be allocated a corresponding lesser factor, derived from the linear equation linking
d1 at the outset of the project with d2 at the end of the project.  Various values of d1 can be
tested so as to determine the effect on the contractor’s cashflow as well as on the
project’s “Nett Present Worth”.  For each value of d1 a corresponding, compensatory
value of d2 needs to be determined.  Ashley and Teicholz (1977) suggested that d2 can be
found (by means of an iterative search using a computer) such that the overall unbalanced
bid retain the same simple cumulative value as the balanced bid, i.e. such that the total
“earnings” of the project be kept the same.
Teicholz and Ashley (1978) went on to adopt Stark’s (1974) alternative model with some
minor differences.  They proposed that this represented a more sophisticated ‘optimal
model’ which, by comparison to their initial effort (Ashley and Teicholz, 1977), now
included quantity error exploitation.
The differences in their model from Stark’s model may be summarised as follows:



















- The optimisation of profit
Although Stark had mentioned this as a possible alternative to the optimisation of a
project’s revenue, Teicholz and Ashley (1978) give no explanation why they chose only
to advocate that a contractor should pursue the maximisation of profit.
- The probability of execution
Teicholz and Ashley (1978) describe the final quantity of an item as the product of two
forecasts: the “probability of execution” and the contractor’s own estimate of the final
quantity.
Their “probability of execution” refers to the contractor’s estimate of the chance of any
particular item being built.  If a contractor believes with certainty that some quantity of a
particular item will finally have to be built as part of a project, then they would assign a
“probability of execution” for this item of 100%.  Similarly, if a contractor were of the
opinion that there is only a 50% chance of this item having to be built, then the
“probability of execution” would be 50%.
There seems no reason why the latter estimate should not inherently incorporate the
former probability.  On this basis, the “probability of execution” could be considered a
redundant factor.  For example, if a contractor were to believe that an item will not finally
have to be built, then their estimate of this item’s final quantity could simply be
expressed as being nil.
- The analysis of each item’s cost
Stark’s model (in which he seeks to optimise a project’s profit, as opposed to its revenue)
incorporates a simple forecast of each item’s cost.  This cost is inherently treated as being
directly proportional to the item’s quantity.
Teicholz and Ashley (1978) incorporate the project’s cost estimates somewhat
differently.  They break the costs down into three categories: fixed, variable and ‘interest’
(the cost of capital).  Their model seeks to optimise the present value of a project’s











Moreover, they calculate the present value of the “variable costs” of any item on the basis
that it is derived from the final quantity that the contractor estimates as appropriate for
this item.  Thus their model differs slightly from Stark’s by recognising that some items’
costs incorporate fixed costs, which will not be effected by any variations in the
quantities of these items.
- The expressed inclusion of the cost of interest
Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) model implicitly incorporates the contractor’s cost of interest
with the use of discounted cashflows.  Teicholz and Ashley (1978) instead expressly
incorporate the cost of interest and yet they advocate, in addition, the use of further
discounting.
Their approach therefore has the error of “double counting” the cost of interest, that is,
accounting for it twice when only once is correct.  It is also flawed by way of calculating
the cost of interest by treating each project in isolation.  Their calculation only includes
the cost of interest in those months when the project’s projected nett cumulative cashflow
is negative; alternatively they advocate that there is no cost of interest (that is, they only
account for interest paid and do not account for interest earned).  This approach fails to
recognise that the project being analysed is not one that is in isolation but rather that it
inevitable forms part of the contractor’s larger ‘portfolio’ of current projects.  The cost of
interest to the contractor (incorporating knowledge as to whether the contractor has to
borrow money or not) cannot therefore be determined without taking the contractor’s
overall cashflow and level of cash resources into account. One cannot consider a single
project in isolation and make the assumption that if the project has a negative cashflow
that then the contractor’s overall status, inclusive of all his projects, will be such that he
will have a negative cashflow.   One project’s negative cashflow could, for instance, be
offset by another project’s concurrent positive cashflow.  Similarly, if a contractor’s
status at one stage were such that his overall cashflow were considerably negative, they
might be highly dependent, or at very least highly desirous, of as much positive cashflow
contribution at that same stage from any new project.  A large positive cashflow
contribution from the new project would be highly valuable to them relative to a much











overall cost of interest incurred than would the latter.  If they were to assess the cost of
interest at an isolated project level, it therefore makes more sense that they account just
the same for the “cost” of interest regardless of whether, at the project level, the nett
cashflow is positive or negative.
- The dropping of Stark’s “Rate Constraints”
Teicholz and Ashley’s (1978) approach does not incorporate the need for Stark’s (1968)
“constant of proportionality” (!), which Stark had used as a loading factor to ‘dial up’ the
extent of the front-end loading.  They have instead been solely reliant on the discounting
factor (which is inherent within the method that they used by which to discount the
cashflow) by which to achieve the desired degree of pricing preference for early items.
- The “Desirability Index” alternative to the use of Linear Programming
Teicholz and Ashley (1978)  suggested that the model could be structured as either a
linear programme (as per Stark’s suggestion) or else by using a technique of ranking the
items by way of determining a “desirability index” in respect of each item.
They recognised that the effects of their linear programming model (as with Stark’s) gave
cause for all items, barring one, to be priced at either of the maximum or minimum
pricing limits assigned to each item.  Only one item would need to be assigned a price
that is not its assigned maximum or minimum limit and this item serves to ensure that the
summation of the priced component items will equate with the overall bid price.
Teicholz and Ashley (1978) therefore identified that there was no need for linear
programming if a contractor could just rank all of a project’s items in terms of their
“desirability”, in other words, in order of their priority status for being awarded or
allocated their maximum-limit price.  To start with, this approach allocates all items with
their minimum-limit price.  Next, they calculate the total for all of the items priced
accordingly (using the original item quantities in the bills of quantities).  If one then
deducts this amount from the overall bid amount, one is left with an amount which can
serve to be allocated to those items of greatest “desirability”.  Thus, starting at the item











limit price.  One then needs to make the corresponding adjustment to what becomes the
remaining balance which is still left to be allocated.  Moving down and repeating this
process to the next ranked item, and then the next, as the balance reduces one eventually
will come to the one item that is to be assigned neither its maximum nor its minimum
limit price.  This item’s price can then be calculated by using up the remaining balance,
and thus the problem (as they defined it) is solved.
Their Desirability Index (DIj) for each item is calculated as follows:
DI j =







Their “probability of execution” factor has been left out when translating their formula
here for the reason (also explained above) that, in order to be consistent with the formulae
throughout this thesis, it is considered unnecessary to have both this probability of
execution as well as the estimate of the final quantity.  Both can be described by way of
the latter variable alone.
Notice that this simplified technique of theirs no longer incorporates estimates of each
item’s cost.  Each item’s price (barring one) is effectively being decided as either the
minimum or maximum pricing limit influenced by the following three factors:
- the extent to which the item’s quantity is expected to be varied,
- the timing of the item in terms of the project’s schedule, and
- the discounting rate.
This approach inherently overcomes the “double counting” of the cost of interest
discussed above.  In effect, this alternative technique of calculation results in a new
model that is substantially different in concept from their linear programming (LP)
model.  Inter alia, this new model of theirs seeks to maximise the revenue from a project











This alternative technique also overcomes the need for the contractor to have to
incorporate into the model all of each item’s estimated fixed and variable costs.  This
would appear to be both beneficial and problematic.  It is problematic because there is
merit in identifying all of the fixed costs in a project - those which will arise regardless of
variations in the project’s item quantities.  As long as the model identifies and monitors
these fixed costs (should there be any), the model is able to ensure some protection
against the risk that in the event that an item’s quantity is reduced a proportion of its
fixed costs will not have been compensated for.  By not monitoring any item’s costs, this
alternative method of computation loses this advantage.
Besides this advantage, there is no other cause why they should need to incorporate any
costs into their LP model.  There is no logical reason why a contractor’s practice of item
pricing should be influenced by knowledge of the individual item costs.  By implication,
it is also of no benefit to the function of item pricing that the contractor should need to
have knowledge of the timing of these costs.  The contractor’s costs, as well as the timing
of these costs, will arise regardless of the item price combination chosen by the
contractor.  There is no causal-effect relationship between the benefits from item pricing,
and any individual item’s cost.  Instead, item pricing gives cause for a substantial
influence on a contractor’s revenues, and also of the timing of these revenues.
It follows that any effort to incorporate costs, as well as the timing of these costs, in any
item price loading model is a wasted effort.  The only apparent reason for Teicholz and
Ashley (1978) to have incorporated item costs (and their timing) in their model is their
express need to estimate the cost of interest.  Their model necessitated estimates of each
item’s cost of interest (and hence, by summation, they would also have estimated the
project’s total cost of interest).  It has, however, been shown above (see the earlier
discussion on “double counting” of interest) that, provided that it is to be considered as an
item pricing model, their model had, in fact, no logical need for these cost of interest
estimates.
Ashley and Teicholz’s (1977) original (cashflow planning) model was, however,










determine the attractiveness of a project to a contractor and hence to aid his decision as to
whether or not to bid, and how much to bid.  It was also said to be a device to decide
appropriate item prices.  Given that this model was therefore not solely intended as an
item pricing model, there was originally justified cause to have incorporated
consideration of each item’s cost.  In terms of Ashley and Teicholz’s (1977) intention of
being able to assess a project’s ‘attractiveness’, this requires that the contractor be able to
quantify its present worth.  This, in turn, requires that the contractor be able to forecast a
project’s nett cashflow, and hence there was the need to incorporate the estimates of each
items’ cost (and also their timing).
However, Teicholz and Ashley’s (1978) subsequent model(s) moved away from being
intended to serve this broader purpose.  These subsequent models were designed with the
express sole purpose of identifying what was intended to be ‘optimal’ item prices.  When
considering this transition in their intent of purpose, it can be argued that their LP model
no longer had need to incorporate the elaborate analysis of each item’s cost in the manner
in which it had previously done. Their simplified (desirability-index) alternative model
(to their LP model) appears to recognize that this observation is true, notwithstanding that
they presented it merely as an alternative, quicker, easier method of calculation, and not
as an alternative new model.
Overall, Teicholz and Ashley can be described as having largely abandoned their prior
“linear unbalancing model” (Ashley and Teicholz, 1977) and instead having adopted
Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) model.  Despite having improved and replaced their earlier
model, largely rendering their previous efforts as obsolete, it is their earliest model that is
still widely used in recent research (see, for instance, Kenley, 2003).
In summary, although the work of Teicholz and Ashley had the superficial appearance of
being substantially original and a significant contribution to this field of knowledge, the
effective significance of their work could rather be described as having only identified a
quicker and simpler technique of calculation (that can serve as an alternative to the need
for linear programming) for the application of Stark’s model.  It thus did not expand











3.5 DIEKMANN, MAYER AND STARK’S MODEL
Diekmann et al. (1982) took Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) original deterministic model and
added a probabilistic formulation to take account of risk.  All risks, however, were not
considered and the only risk to have been incorporated was the risk that the final item
quantities may be different from what the contractor initially anticipated.  They ignored
all other risks (including the risk of variances in all of the variables used in their model),
as if they did not exist.  What is, however, of valuable significance as the contribution
from this research is that their model facilitated that a contractor could utilize item price
loading for the purposes of not only maximizing their profit but also of controlling their
risk (albeit in the limited manner that they defined it).  They thus accomplished the
paradigm leap from all previous research (although they made no reference to the works
of Ashley and Teicholz (1977) or Teicholz and Ashley (1978)) that had, up until then,
simply identified that the practice of item price loading was a risk.  They recognized that
not only could unbalanced bidding contribute to increased risk, but that it also could be
used to manage and reduce risk.  Their model provided the framework for a technique
that provided a quantifiable means by which the practice of item price loading could be
pursued whilst “balancing” (their term) profitability against the measurement and
manipulation of a project’s risk (no matter that their definition of what constituted risk
was limited).
They ignored all risks other than the risk of a variation in item quantities and also only
loaded prices in the pursuit of the benefits of cashflow and quantity error exploitation.
They therefore ignored the pursuit of increased escalation by way of back-end loading.
Their model was also limited by their assumption that the cash inflows and outflows for
any item arise simply, without any lead or lag, at the time at which the item is built.
Their model thus incorporated the costs of each item but did so without recognizing that
the timing of the cash outflows for different items will differ substantially depending on
the nature of the item.  It can be argued (see the critique of Teicholz and Ashley’s model
above) that there is no need for this nature of item pricing model to have to incorporate
an item’s estimated costs nor by implication, the timing of these costs.  Nevertheless,











although it does so in a manner that may be regarded as simplistic.  It does not take
account that different items may have substantially different lead / lag times regarding
their associated cash outflows.  These differences in timing are caused by the various
items being composed of different proportions of the constituent types of costs.  Some
items, for instance, comprise mostly labour costs whilst others may comprise mostly the
costs of materials. To forecast any item’s cash outflow should require that one give
consideration to the item’s cost break-down into its constituent components which may
be of many different types (labour, materials, sub-contractors’ charges, etc.), each with
substantially different delays / advances between when the item is built and when each of
these costs are having to be paid for.
Whilst their model is derived from Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) model, they did not
implement Stark’s “constant of proportionality” (!) constraint.  Incidentally, this
constraint was also ignored in the subsequent work done by Ashley and Teicholz (1977).
Their model as regards the expected value of PV is given below.  Their equation has been
translated (as with all the equations throughout this thesis) to a common format in which
the same symbols are used throughout.










Qj  = the mean or expected value of Qj
and F0  = the present value of the fixed costs of the project.
Thus, Diekmann et al. (1982) have presented this model as the probabilistic equivalent of
Stark’s (1974) deterministic model.  They go further to show that, with the assumption
that the item quantities are normally distributed, the formulation of the mean and variance
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on the assumption that the covariances between the items are zero
where !
j






  is the present value of Pj
If, on the other hand, the variances in the quantities of the items are not mutually
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where ! ij  represents the covariance between the variables Qi  and Qj  for i ! j or the
variance of Q
i
 when i = j.
Diekmann et al. (1982) chose to measure risk by way of assessing the probability that the
present value of a project’s projected profit not be less than some chosen value V.  They
go on to show that, for any given value V by way of this definition, the higher the mean
µ  the lower the risk, and the lower the variance ! 2  the lower the risk.
On this basis, they choose to combine these factors in one measure of a project’s risk by





= µ ! k" 2 (3.14)
in which µ  is defined by way of equation 3.11 above and ! 2  is defined by way of either











This model can be solved as a quadratic programme seeing as it comprises an objective
function that is of a quadratic format, which is to be solved subject to linear constraints.
The linear constraints they use are the same as those identified by Stark (1968, 1972,
1974), namely those given as equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 above.
Diekmann et al. (1982) argue that the value V can be intuitively chosen by a contractor to
suit his “economic and competitive situation”, i.e. that the chosen level of V will depend
on his willingness to accept risk.
The contractor’s choice of constant value k is even more abstract in concept and more
likely to be difficult to decide on.  The constant k has the effect of shifting emphasis
between the mean µ  and the variance ! 2  as being the two sources of risk (as they have
chosen to define it).  High values of k have the effect of giving preference to minimising
the project’s projected profit variance, and hence of avoiding the pursuit of quantity error
exploitation, unless the contractor is reasonably certain of the anticipated quantity
variation.  Very low values of k , e.g. values approaching zero (bearing in mind that k is
restricted to being a positive value), will give cause for the function in equation 3.11 to
effectively resemble the function depicted in equation 3.9 in the sense that little to no
regard will be made of any item’s expected variance.
Diekmann et al. (1982) appear willing to accept that the contractor’s choice of the values
V and k is difficult and likely to be problematic.  In essence they suggest that one
experiment with different values (with there being little guidance available on this matter,
nor that there are any ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ approaches to this) judging to see what effect
different scenarios have on the resultant item prices, as well as on the mean and variance
of the expected profit.
Diekmann et al. (1982) provide an example to illustrate the favourable effect of their
model.  Unfortunately, in this example they choose to withhold imposing any upper
limits to the price of each item even though they recommend that in practice these limits
are required.  Furthermore, in the manner in which the example is captured as a quadratic











explanation is provided as to why some item’s prices are not allowed to be less than the
corresponding estimated item cost.
Without the imposition of upper price limits, this example therefore enjoys greater
freedom by which to pursue its objective.  The result is that it does not illustrate at all the
problem that arises when one imposes arbitrarily chosen upper and lower pricing limits
for each item.  What happens in the event of upper and lower pricing limits is that all
items barring one will be assigned a price corresponding to either one of these two limits.
Thus, in practice, in accordance with their recommendation (and not in accordance with
their example) it can be argued that there is no greater influence on this model than these
arbitrarily chosen limits.  Nevertheless, as with Ashley and Teicholz (1977), Teicholz and
Ashley (1978) and Stark (1968, 1972, 1974), the sophistication of this model does not
extend to addressing this critical issue.
In conclusion, one could argue that this model constituted a very significant contribution
to the science of unbalanced bidding.  It was the first model to address the management
of both the profitability to be derived from item price loading as well as the risk.
However, although Diekmann et al.’s (1982) model is of far greater mathematical
sophistication than any model that preceded it, it is believed to be flawed for reason of
the following limitations:
- the consideration that a project’s risk is solely related to the risk of variation in
each item’s quantities (with the treatment of all the other variables being in a
deterministic way),
- the unnecessary complexity of the incorporation into the model of having to
forecast a project’s cash outflow (for the purposes of optimizing a project’s profit
rather than its revenue),
- the contractor having to decide on values (without any scientific aid) for some












- the effective use of the constant k by which to ‘balance’ the risk vs. return trade-
off, where k is a very arbitrary and abstract measure of this critical decision,
- the use of two sets of constraints whereby each item’s price is simplistically a
function of other items’ prices, and also that each item’s price is constrained by
simplistic upper and lower limits (thus it suffers from the same problems as
Ashley and Teicholz’s (1977) model as well as Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974)
model), and
- the limitation to the pursuit of front-end loading and quantity error exploitation
only and hence the failure to recognize the benefits of back-end loading.
3.6 TONG AND LU’S MODEL
Tong and Lu (1992) developed a method that was focused solely on optimizing the
advantage of what they called ‘error exploitation unbalancing’ (referred to by Green
(1986) as ‘individual rate loading’ and by Cattell (1987) as ‘loading for anticipated
quantity variation orders’).  In other words, this method ignored the other benefits in the
areas of cashflow and escalation.
Tong and Lu (1992) considered two alternative models – with the same intended effect:
one using linear programming (LP) and the other using a method they called their
“minimum-maximum method”.  Their sole motivation and justification for this second
method was due to what they considered the impractical scale of the LP model.  They
were of the opinion that the Simplex Algorithm would not cope with being able to solve
an LP model of the size they were envisaging.  However, this runs contrary to current
popular computerized usage of the Simplex Algorithm (see Williams, 1993) which
manages to fairly quickly be able to solve models comprising well over a million
constraints (provided that all the variables are continuous and not integral).  This ease of
solving large LP models, incidentally, contrasts with greater difficulty in solving Mixed
Integer Linear Programmes (MILP) (where all the variables are not continuous – some
variables, by definition, being integers or binary variables) which take far longer to solve.











model is likely to be of practical concern.  In particular, the concern is typically with
regards to the number of integer and binary variables, rather than the number of
continuous variables.  In the case of Tong and Lu’s (1992) LP model (in which all the
variables are, by implication, continuous), it should not present any practical concern as
regards being quick enough.  With this being the case, there should not be need to have to
consider their ‘practical’ alternative method.
Tong and Lu’s (1992) alternative model (their ‘minimum-maximum model’ that they
proposed as quicker and easier than their LP model) resembles the ‘Desirability Index’
model from Teicholz and Ashley (1978). Teicholz and Ashley had likewise proposed
their ‘Desirability Index’ model as their alternative to their LP model. Tong and Lu
(1992), however, make no reference to the work of Teicholz and Ashley (1978).
Their ‘minimum-maximum model’ therefore did not present any advance on the model of
Teicholz and Ashley (1978).  Their alternative LP model, similarly did not present any
practical advance on the modeling technique proposed by Stark.
3.7 AFSHAR AND AMIRI’S MODEL
Recent research by Afshar and Amiri (2008) advocates using a Fuzzy Linear
Programming (FLP) approach.  This research suggests that all previous unbalanced
bidding models have “disregarded risk and uncertainty” (Afshar and Amiri, 2008: 58).
This assertion obviously fails to adequately acknowledge the efforts of Cattell (1984,
1987), and Cattell et al. (2004).  Cattell et al. (2007) even went so far as to have
advocated the use of fuzzy constraints on a linear programming model, but this is also not
acknowledged.
Afshar and Amiri’s (2008) model is built on the assumption that Stark’s (1974) LP model
serves to best define the status-quo as regards the deterministic modelling of unbalanced
bidding.  This assumption is obviously flawed, since Stark’s (1968, 1972, 1974) model
was an early effort.  Nevertheless, Afshar and Amiri’s (2008) model amounts to an FLP











Afshar and Amiri (2008) fail to recognise that many aspects of unbalanced bidding
models entail uncertainty.  They have focused in on the fuzzy characteristics of the upper
and lower price limits and quantity variations and have ignored the risks inherent in all of
the other uncertain assumptions that are being made.  For example, they have ignored that
there is considerable risk that these models can be misleading due to the uncertainty in
the discounting rates that are used in the Present Value calculations.  There is also usually
considerable uncertainty in the scheduling of the project, particularly at the early stage at
which the item pricing is being decided.
In summary, this research is believed to represent a move in the right direction.  It has
taken a proposal of the use of fuzzy modelling (made in Cattell et al., 2007) and has
applied it.  Unfortunately, this application has ignored most of the uncertainties involved
in the domain and the tests that are provided are inconclusive as regards the merits of
FLP.
3.8 CHRISTODOULOU’S MODEL
Recent research by Christodoulou (2008) has proposed minimizing the financial entropy
(disorder) of a project as a measure of some aspects of the risks involved. This research
does not, however, provide a comprehensive measure of all of the risks involved.
Christodoulou’s (2008) approach has been to adopt the model provided by Cattell et al.
(2007) (as provided in Chapter 4) and to build upon this.  He goes on to evaluate entropy
(H
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This research constitutes a novel approach but suffers from the following flaws:
- the model requires the imposition of fixed upper and lower limits on item mark-
ups, without providing any explanation of how these are to be decided and
without recognition of the importance of these as constraints,
- it treats the item costs as deterministic variables, without recognizing the
considerable uncertainty that is inherent in estimating these (see Beeston, 1975),
- it fails to recognize that the summation of the item prices must exactly equal the
project’s overall tender price, and the model presents the possibility that the item
prices may add up to less than the tender price, which would violate the typical
unit price contract,
- it assumes a normal distribution of item prices, without apparent cause,
- it assumes that these normally distributed prices are centered around prices
derived from an equal mark-up being applied to all of a project’s items – rather
than with reference to any market’s perception of these prices,
- it assumes a 10% standard deviation for these normal distributions, without
apparent cause, other than that this ‘small variance’ will have the effect of
‘safeguarding’ against ‘unreasonably high item mark-ups’ being ‘disallowed’,
- it assumes an interest rate, to be used for discounting, known with complete
confidence,
- it fails to recognize the prospective variation in item quantities and, therefore,
does not facilitate any individual rate exploitation,
- it fails to recognize escalation and therefore, does not counter-balance any font-
end loading with any back-end loading,
- it presents no solution as regards whether to give more emphasis to the pursuit of
more profit or less entropy, and












Item pricing models have commonly been designed as linear programming models.
Linear programming has the restriction that a model may only have one objective
function.  This restriction appears to have led to the practice in which early item pricing
models sought only to maximize either a project’s profit or else its revenue.  These
models consequently did not incorporate any assessment of a contractor’s risk.
Diekmann et al. (1982) chose instead to use quadratic programming and whilst this
technique again has the restriction of only one objective function, they proposed an
abstract way (facilitated by being able to use a quadratic equation as the objective
function) of pursuing a maximization of the expected profit together with a minimization
of the risk.  They effectively came to combine these two objectives with the use of a
constant (k) for which the contractor has to arbitrarily choose a value.  Different values of
k have the effect of shifting the emphasis of the objective from the maximization of profit
to the minimization of risk.
The only other method that has been found to be employed in all of these models by
which to control “the risk” is by means of the use of constraints by which to impose
arbitrarily chosen (upper and lower) limits on each item’s price.  These limits, rather than
any other factor, contribute the greatest effect to both the extent to which a project’s
profit can be maximized as well as the extent to which a project’s risk can be minimized.
However, despite the significance of these limits, it is commonly recommended that they
should be decided upon without any scientific or mathematical aid.  The use of advanced
mathematical programming to refine other aspects of item price loading therefore appears
somewhat superfluous as long as the most influential factor, is by comparison, left to be
handled relatively crudely.
In effect, the only role that the mathematical techniques have to play is to determine the
sequence by which to prioritise which items are to be allocated their upper limit price.
This sequence thus identifies the one remaining item that will fall between the set of











This one remaining item thus serves to satisfy the constraint by which the unbalanced bid
is, in summation, equal to the already-determined tender price.
Another critical and yet common shortfall of the above-described models relates to their
definition of risk.  Even in the case of Diekmann et al.’s (1982) model, the only risk
factor that was considered and modelled was the risk that the final quantity for some
items may be different from that which the contractor estimates.  No consideration is
made of the risks that are generated from ‘mis-estimates’ of the most appropriate
discounting rate, of cost estimates, of changes to the project’s schedule, nor any of the
other factors that these models simply treat as worthy of a deterministic usage.
Thus, the state-of-the-art as regards unbalanced bidding models suffer from the following
shortcomings:
- they are limited in their recognition and management of what constitutes risk,
- none provide a comprehensive (and hence balanced) technique by which to
pursue all three of the recognised methods of item price loading (namely, front-
end loading, individual rate loading and back-end loading),
- only Diekmann et al.’s (1982) model provides any means by which to
quantifiably address the risk vs. return trade-off, but this technique provides a
rather abstract device that is not capable of simple, intuitive use, and
- none provide any device by which a contractor can assess the merits and demerits
(in terms of both profit and risk) of any adjustments to the upper and lower
pricing limits of each individual item – and yet it will be shown that this set of
constraints, rather than any other factor, has the greatest influence on the effects
of unbalanced bidding.  All of the models described above also share in common
that they recommend that these limits be arbitrarily decided upon (and regarded
thereafter as fixed).  In reality, it is highly unlikely that any item should have a
maximum or minimum price beyond which a contractor would never submit a











decreased risk.  In practical terms, these limits may be regarded as more fuzzy
than fixed.
There was a lapse of 15 years (from 1992 to 2007) in which little was proposed in the
field by way of new models.  Cattell et al. (2007) provided a synopsis of the prior
research and identified the shortfalls, particularly as regards the modelling of the risks
involved.  More recent research (see Afshar and Amiri, 2008; Christodoulou, 2008) has
addressed this and become more focussed on the reduction of risk rather than the pursuit
of profit.  Thus far, no convincing models have emerged that are able to withstand
vigorous scrutiny.
The chapters that follow describe the new model that has been formulated.  Chapter 4 is
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4. MODELLING A PROJECT’S REVENUE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 has reviewed the research undertaken as regards the development of
unbalanced bidding models other than the one that is the subject of this thesis.  It
highlighted that one weakness of these other models (with the exception of the models
proposed by Diekmann et al. (1982) and the two recent efforts by Afshar and Amiri
(2008) and Christodoulou (2008)) has been their failure to use item price loading as a
mechanism by which to measure and control a project’s risk.
Diekmann et al.’s model pioneered the approach that item price loading is not only
capable of creating additional risk for the contractor, but also that it can be used to
measure and control, and even reduce, a project’s risk.  This quadratic programming
model came to combine a contractor’s objectives of both wishing to maximise his profit
and minimise his risk.  It did so by way of a single equation, using a constant (k) as the
basis of creating a balance between these two objectives.
The model that is being proposed by way of this thesis is similar to Diekmann et al.’s
model in as much as it also recognises that item price loading can be used to serve both of
a contractor’s objectives (namely, of maximising profit and minimising risk).  However,
the new model is also very different (in this regard, besides others) in the manner in
which it combines these two objectives.  This model comprises an initial modelling of the
revenue (or return) from a project quite separately from its modelling of a project’s risk.
These two sets of results are then combined: in effect implementing a use of modern
portfolio theory (Chapter 6) and cumulative prospect theory (Chapter 7).  Ultimately, the
(combined) model identifies the optimum item prices best suited to the contractor’s











On this basis, this chapter will discuss the modelling of a project’s ‘revenue’.  It will be
shown that this model accomplishes the same result, in terms of identifying the
performance of various item pricing combinations, as it would if it were instead to model
a project’s ‘profit’ or ‘return’.
This chapter describes ‘front-end loading’, ‘back-end loading‘, and then ‘individual rate
loading’ (which were all introduced briefly in Chapter 2) before it describes the new
composite model that incorporates all three of these.  It then discusses the constraints
normally applied to models in this domain and describes whether these should again be
applied in this instance.
The next chapter (Chapter 5) will discuss the modelling of a project’s risk and the chapter
thereafter (Chapter 6) will address combining the aspects of return and risk with the use
of modern portfolio theory.  Chapter 7 will then discuss cumulative prospect theory and
how indifference mapping might be used to help identify one optimum choice from the
range of efficient choices that portfolio analysis will have identified.  Chapter 8 will show
how one combined model, that uses Monte Carlo Simulation, succeeds in moderating the
opposing objectives of risk and return.  In order to make a logical progression to this
point, this chapter will explain the modelling of a project’s revenue as if the aspect of risk
were not a consideration or an issue that were to be involved.
4.2 THE RANKING OF ITEMS
The objective for any unbalanced bid is to determine the optimum distribution of a
project’s overall tender price amongst its multitude of component items.  To satisfy this
objective, one might look to maximise a project’s profit assuming that one is able to
determine such profit from each possible item price combination.  To accomplish this
suggests that one must be able to quantify the profit contribution from each item, if
assigned a particular price, such that the project’s profit will amount to a summation of
all of the contributions of profit from each of these items.  This thesis advocates that each
item’s benefit can be determined by way of its profit contribution relative to its price (and











This concept is similar to what Teicholz and Ashley (1978) referred to as each item’s
‘Desirability Index’.  This approach was advocated by Cattell (1987) and is also similar
to the approach that Tong and Lu (1992) adopted as regards their maximum-minimum
technique.  This measure of each item’s profit relative to price shall be referred to
hereafter as the Profitability Responsiveness Index (‘PRI’) and the ranking of a project’s
items in terms of this index, as the Profitability Responsiveness Item Ranking (‘PRIR’).
Having the PRI facilitates a contractor knowing whether the combined effects of any
item’s characteristics should rank as being more ‘worthy’ of being allocated a higher
price than other items.  This (PRIR) ranking of items should therefore list the items in the
sequence that they promise to reward the contractor with added profit, in response to
being allocated a higher price.  Thus, the item with the highest PRIR is the item that has
been identified as most likely to generate the best return for being allocated a unit of
currency.  If the contractor’s objectives were only that of profitability, then it is the one
item that a contractor should most wish to price as high as possible.  The PRI comprises a
summation of similar values that are derived from each of the practices of front-end
loading, individual rate loading and back-end loading.
4.3 FRONT-END LOADING
If front-end loading were to be pursued in isolation, one would desire to mark-up as high
as possible the items that are scheduled to be built early on in the project.  The objective
of this practice is for the contractor to generate as much cash as possible, as quickly as
possible.
One might make the following assumptions as the basis by which to initially simplify the
building of this model:
- that there is no practice of retention,
- that there is no practice of escalation,











- that the costs of any item j are incurred simply simultaneously with the receipt of
the interim payment for that same month, and,
- that the costs when incurred are exactly as they were estimated and are fixed (in
the sense of not being subject to inflation) at the time of the estimate.
Some of these assumptions may seem unreasonable but they are intended to serve two
purposes, namely:
- so that the model initially appears as simple as is possible, holding back on some
of the complexities so that they are added only later, once the basic model has
been formulated, and
- because it will become obvious later that some of the variables in the initial model
become irrelevant as later phases of the modelling process are introduced.  It is
therefore not necessary to have to burden any elegant simplicity of the initial
phases of the modelling process with superfluous complexity that will only later
be discarded when found to be redundant.
On this basis, considering only the purpose of pursuing front-end loading (i.e. of pursuing
the improvement of a project’s cashflow) a contractor could determine the present value
(PVj) for any item j (that shall later form the basis of the PRI for that same item) by way
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where j  = item number
n  = month number
N  = duration of project in months
r
j   = discount rate appropriate to the risk of item j
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Qj = bill quantity of item j
P
j = bill price per unit of item j
Cj = unit cost of item j
Items that are scheduled to be built early on in the project will have high values of
!
nj when n is of a low value.  For these (‘early’) items, when n tends to N, !nj is most
probably 0, or at very least of very low positive value (i.e. ! 0).  One can easily see from
this equation that these early items will generate a higher PVj than the equivalent item
scheduled to be built later in the project.  This corresponds to the principle of front-end
loading in that it clearly recognises that early items priced highly will generate
higherPVj s than later items priced similarly.
Furthermore, it obviously follows that the higher the discount rate rj the greater will be
the differential between the PVj generated by early and late items.
4.4 INDIVIDUAL RATE LOADING
As noted previously, the loading of the rates of individual items is a practice otherwise
referred to as quantity error exploitation (see Tong and Lu, 1992).  This practice amounts
to allocating high prices to items whose initial quantities in the bills of quantities are
thought likely to be increased, whilst allocating low prices to items whose billed
quantities are thought likely to decrease.
This practice arises in those forms of contract where the initial contract quantities are not
fixed as final but instead are subject to review and adjustment as the realities of the
project unfold.  An example of this would be projects let on the basis of provisional bills
of quantities.  These adjustments are typically necessitated by initial uncertainties in the
design, or by the soil and rock conditions on site being found to be different from that
which was initially expected.
This practice was first commented on by Gates (1959) and has subsequently been











1984, 1987; Tong and Lu, 1992) as something that is very common and widespread
amongst contractors.
The benefit to a contractor from individual rate loading is derived from their ability to
shift their margin onto items where, when the consequently high prices (with high
margins built in) are applied to increases in these items’ quantities, the contractor enjoys
a far greater compensation for his extra work than is reflected in his increased cost of the
added work.  Furthermore, a contractor can use the opportunity of a prediction that an
item’s final quantity will be less than its initial quantity in the bills of quantities, by
allocating such items a low price.  If the prediction is correct, the ultimate reduction in
the payment made to the contractor will be less than if they were to have priced such an
item any higher.
On the basis of the same assumptions as made above under heading 4.3 (with the obvious
exception of quantity variations) and considering only the purpose of pursuing individual
rate loading (i.e. the pursuit of the exploitation of any errors or other adjustments in the
billed quantities), a contractor could quantify the present value (PVj) for any item j (that
shall later form the basis by which to determine the PRI for that same item) by way of the
following equation:
PVj = Qj + !Qj( ) Pj "Cj( ) (4.2)
where !Qj = additional quantity of item j due to variation
Items that have a high !Qj  will generate a high PVj  especially when combined with the
allocation of a high price Pj .  Thus, any model that has the objective of maximising the
summation of thePVj ’s will give cause for high prices to be allocated to those items that
have relatively highs !Qj ’s.  The reverse is true of items that have relatively low (typically
negative) !Qj ’s and hence these items create the “funding” differential by which the












The opportunity with back-end loading is for a contractor to be over-compensated for the
inflationary increases in their expenses.  This opportunity arises in contracts that
incorporate the practice of escalation payments in terms of contract price adjustment
provisions.  In such situations an estimate is made of the contractor’s actual cost of
inflation with the objective being that they should be compensated for this added
expense.  The concept is such that the contractor should neither profit nor make a loss
from inflation but rather that any risk that comes from inflation should be passed over
from the contractor to the project’s developer.
In such contracts, contractors do not simply provide proof of their actual costs of
inflation; although historically this was done and was known as the ‘proven cost’ method
of reimbursement. Contractors’ initial estimates of their costs constitute confidential
information and whilst they are known only to them, it is not appropriate for the
developer or their professional agents to have access to this.  Neither is it appropriate for
developers or their agents to have access to knowledge of the final cost that is incurred by
the contractor. Moreover, the sheer volume of paperwork involved would render it
impractical to employ a ‘proven cost’ method of dealing with inflation.  This nature of
contract therefore incorporates the concept of ‘escalation’ by which an estimate is made
of the actual increase in the contractor’s costs.  This escalation estimate provides the
mechanism by which an amount roughly representing the actual increase in costs can be
borne by the developer, rather than the contractor. Published indices, such as those
known in South Africa as Haylett Indices (JBCC, 2005), are usually used for this
purpose.
The opportunity for back-end loading stems from the fact that the values of escalation is,
in such instances, determined from estimates based on the contractor’s gross item prices,
rather than being based on actual costs.  For instance, in South Africa the escalation
calculation is done in terms of the “Haylett” contract price adjustment provisions (JBCC,
2005), with a non-adjustable element of 15% i.e. the adjustment factor is 0.85.  This
implies that it is being assumed that a contractor’s cost is 85% of any item’s price.  Thus,











cost.  One simple way for a contractor to practice back-end loading is therefore to apply
high prices to items that are scheduled to occur late in the contract.  These high prices
will give the impression that these items have high costs and therefore they will enjoy
high levels of escalation adjustment; provided that the expectation is proven correct as
regards the increase in these indices.
Another opportunity to benefit from back-end loading is derived from the system by
which items of work are typically categorised into escalation workgroups.  This system is
structured so that inflation is monitored in each of the workgroups and indices published
specific to each of them. This method facilitates that if, for example, the cost of iron-ore
‘sky-rockets’, that the work that entails the use of this material will be adequately
compensated for.  The potential for loading arises from the ability for a contractor to
make predictions of the escalation rates in each of the workgroups.  They could allocate
higher prices to those items that fall within the workgroups that are expected to have
higher than average rates of escalation.
Both of the above two techniques could be combined.  Contractors practicing back-end
loading should ideally allocate the highest prices to those items that are scheduled for late
in the contract and also which are categorised as falling into the workgroups that are
expected to have the highest rates of escalation.  The ‘funding’ for these high prices
obviously needs to be sourced from the use elsewhere of relatively low prices, the lowest
of which should be allocated to the items that are scheduled for completion early in the
project and which furthermore are categorised into the workgroups that have the lowest
expected rates of escalation.
The following formulation describes the basis by which an item’s present value PVj can
be quantified:






















f = “Haylett” adjustment factor e.g. 0.85
!!Cnj = actual, inflated cost of item j in month n
The assumptions made to keep this formulation simple continue to include the following:
- that there is no practice of retention, and,
- that the costs of any item j are incurred simply simultaneously with the receipt of
the interim payment for that same month.
4.6 COMPLEX COMPOSITE LOADING
Equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 can be combined and is presented as Equation 4.4 below.
Equation 4.2 can be thought of as the same as Equation 4.1 with the addition that the one
assumption as regards quantities remaining fixed being addressed.  Thus, for these
purposes Equation 4.2 can be regarded as an enhanced version of Equation 4.1.  To
combine these three equations, one therefore only has to combine Equations 4.2 and 4.3.




































































(nj Qj + )Qj( ) 1+ * nj f( )Pj + ))Cnj( ),- ./ (4.6)
where !!Cnj = Cj + !Cnj
!!Cnj  = actual, inflated unit cost of item j in month n
This formulation still incorporates the assumptions that applied to equation 4.3 above.














(nj Qj + )Qj( ) 1+ * nj f( ) 1+ Rn( )Pj + ))Cnj( ) + )Rn,- ./ (4.7)
where R
n
= proportion retained in month n
!R
n
       = the amount (if any) released from the retention fund in month n
including any interest earned (if applicable)





































































It is noteworthy that item price loading can do nothing to change ! j which is the fixed
intercept regardless of Pj .  (The interest on retained funds may be marginally affected by
front-end loading, in particular, but it is suggested that this is of such small consequence
that it should be considered irrelevant.)  The focus of attention for any item price loading
model needs therefore to be on the slope ! j .
The significance of this observation is that this aspect of the overall item price loading
model can ignore all considerations of costs (as represented by Cj and !!Cj ).  This
furthermore goes to imply that the effect of having the objective of maximising a
project’s revenue will be the same as having the objective of maximising its profit.


























This composite formulation (incorporating the standard forms of unbalanced bidding, as
dealt with individually above) provides an important means to identify the relative worth
of each of the unbalanced bidding techniques.  For instance, it provides a basis by which
to determine whether ! j for a particular early item should be relatively high for reason
that it is likely to be a valuable contributor to a front-end loading strategy, or instead
relatively low for reason that back-end loading should wish to allocate it as low a price as
possible.  This single, composite formulation presents the means to measure all items,
regardless of their unique character, on the same common basis with respect to their
potential contribution to a project’s overall return.
Let ! j going forward be referred to as the Profitability Responsiveness Index (PRI j ).  It
indicates the sensitivity of an item in terms of the extent to which this item’s profit
contribution (PVj ) can be improved by way of an increase to its unit price (Pj ).  If one
ignores the issue of risk (dealt with instead in the next chapter) the item j having the
highestPRI j should be the one that has the greatest cause to be allocated the highest price.
Note that it is the relativity of the items’PRI j that is significant, not the underlying
absolute values of thePRI j s themselves.  ThePRI j s facilitate that a contractor can rank a
project’s items in order of theirPRI j values (giving him theirPRIRj relative ranking).
This ranking identifies the relative significance of a project’s items in terms of which
items will contribute the most profit for any increase in unit price.
To apply this equation (in isolation whilst ignoring for the purpose of this exercise, all
other considerations like risk – dealt with in the next chapter), contractor who have the
objective of maximising their profit should look to allocate as high a price as possible to
the item with the highestPRIRj .  Having priced this item as high as possible, they should
then look to price the item with the next highestPRIRj with the highest price possible, and











4.7 TENDER PRICE CONSTRAINT
The objective of maximising the contractor’s profit suggests that, if there were not any
constraints, the most profit (in particular, an infinite amount of profit) could be
accomplished if a contractor were free to price the item with the highestPRIRj with an
infinitely high price.  An infinitely high profit could, in fact, be accomplished by pricing
any of the items with an infinitely high price.  There are, however, obvious constraints
that govern this situation that need to be incorporated into any such mathematical model.
Clearly, it is obvious that one constraint is needed to ensure that the summation of the
priced items is the same as the project’s overall tender price.  This constraint can be





This same nature of constraint has been incorporated into the models proposed by Stark
(1968, 1972, 1974) and Diekmann et al. (1982).
4.8 PRICE RATE CONSTRAINTS
It has been commented on by Stark (1968, 1972, 1974), Diekmann et al. (1982), Teicholz
and Ashley (1978), Tong and Lu (1992), and Christodoulou (2008) that individual item
prices should be bound by constraints.







where Lj and Uj are specified lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the unit price of
item j.
Heuristics certainly support the view that some nature of constraint is needed to avoid
such extreme situations as having one single item being allocated such a high price that











to formulate the objective of these constraints is with the use of Lj and Uj  as fixed, non-
negotiable, constants.
The use of Lj and Uj as fixed constants suggests that a contractor would never consider
pricing item j at the price Lj - 0.01 or at Uj + 0.01 regardless of the merits of doing so.
This is patently unrealistic.  It is surely more practical to imagine that a contractor may
consider using a price of Lj ! a  or Uj + a  where a is a small positive number, should
there be sufficient cause for doing so.  On this basis, it is impossible to contemplate the
justification for the use of any constant values for Lj and Uj  no matter how extreme, or
how far apart, they are.
These constraints have considerable significance, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 9.
In the instances of the models formulated by Stark (1968, 1972, 1974), Diekmann et al.
(1982), Teicholz and Ashley (1978), and Tong and Lu (1992) these constraints have the
effect of almost all items being allocated prices at either their upper (Uj ) or lower ( Lj )
bound limits.
In all of these models, the researchers who formulated them all felt that contractors
should have some intuition that can guide them so as to decide the constant values
assigned to Uj  and Lj .  None of them advocated any scientific basis by which a
contractor could decide the values of Uj  and Lj and yet it is hypothesised that it is these
decisions that are the most significant, and yet the most difficult to accomplish, in any of
these item price loading strategies.
The proposed model instead advocates that there should be no need for such item price
constraints.  It is instead suggested that the underlying rationale for such constraints is
one of risk.  If an item were to be priced exceptionally high (i.e. beyond what any of the
above-mentioned models might have capped with an upper limit ofUj ) or else
exceptionally low (below what these models might have capped by way of Lj ) then, it is
argued, this would give cause for extraordinary and unacceptable levels of risk.  Such











grounds that the item pricing is unacceptable).  Another risk will be from variation orders
where an exceptionally high-priced item may be reduced in scale, or else totally
eliminated, whilst a low-priced item may be vastly increased in scale.  The next chapter
will deal with this in more detail.
4.9 SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a comprehensive basis by which to quantify an item’s potential
contribution to a project’s overall profitability.  The basis proposed incorporates all three
known effects of item price loading: namely front-end loading, individual-rate loading,
and back-end loading.
It furthermore has provided a basis by which to measure the sensitivity of a project’s
overall profitability to adjustments in each of the project’s composite item prices.  It has
proposed that this measure be referred to as each item’s Profitability Responsiveness
Index (PRIj) and it is this index that determines the relative significance of each item’s
price (when solely focussed on a project’s return and not its risk).
Notice that this model is formulated so as to maximize a project’s revenue and not its
profit.  It was been shown that the maximization of a project’s revenue accomplishes the
same effect as when the objective is instead to maximise a project’s profit. The models of
Teicholz and Ashley (1978) and Diekmann et al. (1982) are instead structured to take a
project’s costs into account and hence to maximise the profit.  It has been shown that this
is more difficult to accomplish and that there is no benefit to be derived from this added
complexity.
The research has, furthermore, found that a constraint is required, as with many previous
models, so as to ensure that all of the item’s prices add up to the project’s total tender
price.  It has, however, also been suggested that individual item price constraints should
not be incorporated into the model, even though such constraints have been popularly
advocated in all prior item price loading models.
Whilst this chapter has proposed a basis by which the revenue aspect of item pricing can
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5. MODELLING A PROJECT’S RISK
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3 it was shown that the prior research on unbalanced bidding models has been
largely focused on the optimization of the expected profits for a contractor rather than too
much consideration being given to the risks involved.  Researchers have, however, often
acknowledged these risks but, despite this, they have made little effort to properly
incorporate these risks into their models (see Stark, 1968, 1972, 1974; Diekmann et al.,
1982; Teicholz and Ashley, 1978; and Tong and Lu, 1992).
Moreover, besides the work of Diekmann et al. (1982), little has been done to structure
these models so that they recognize the inherent nature of the trade-off that exists
between unbalanced bidding’s contributions to these risks and that of the prospective
gains.  Diekmann et al.’s (1982) efforts in this regard, whilst somewhat limited from the
point of view that they only recognized one type of risk and then required that a
contractor arbitrarily decide on the value of a constant by which to shift the objective
from the maximization of profit to the minimization of risk, were nevertheless
pioneering.
As previously noted, all models have otherwise given recognition to risk by constraining
prices using an imposition of lower and upper bounds to each and every item price (see
Stark, 1968, 1972, 1974; Diekmann et al., 1982; Teicholz and Ashley, 1978; Tong and
Lu, 1992, and Christodoulou, 2008).  It has been observed that these bounds have ended
up becoming the single most important aspect of these models, with the effect that all
items are priced at either their upper price limit or else their lower price limit, with the
exception of only one item.  With these models, this one remaining item price serves to
ensure that the summation of all the priced items equals the tender price.  The effect of
these models was therefore reduced to only serving to split all the items into these two











Early unbalanced bidding models (see Stark, 1968, 1972, 1974; Diekmann et al., 1982;
Teicholz and Ashley, 1978; and Tong and Lu, 1992) did not quantify the risks that are
generated by way of unbalancing a bid, albeit that all of them have vaguely
acknowledged some of the risks and attempted to avoid them. Recent research by
Christodoulou (2008) proposed minimizing the financial entropy (disorder) of a project
as a measure of some aspects of the risk. This research does not, however, provide a
comprehensive measure of all of the risks that are involved.  Other recent research by
Afshar and Amiri (2008) also attempts to address the issue of some of the risks by way of
using a Fuzzy Linear Programming approach.
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a basis by which unbalanced bidding models
are now able to embrace risk to the same extent, and with the same priority, as that of the
expected returns.  More particularly so, the purpose is to incorporate this assessment of
risk into the model that is proposed by way of this thesis (as formulated in Chapter 8),
When a contractor is able to assess both the returns as well as the risks of alternative
pricing regimens, they can then begin to apply the principles advocated in chapters 6, 7
and 8 – namely, decide on the pricing schedule that offers them the optimum mix
between return and risk.
This chapter is structured that it first gives consideration to the identification of the risks
that are involved, then describes how the three types of risks that are identified comprise
two different forms; it then describes a Value-at-Risk method of assessing risk and
proposes that this provides a solution for combining these two forms, and then describes
how these risks can be measured in a manner that is of practical use within this domain.
5.2 THE RISKS OF ITEMS PRICING
There are many risks that are either the direct result of item pricing or that are affected by
item pricing.  These risks may be classified as: the risk of rejection; the risk of reaction;











5.2.1 The risk of rejection
A priced bills of quantities stands the risk of being rejected, particularly for reason of
being unbalanced.  If any single item price is either too high or too low it could serve to
trigger this rejection.  If any one item price is either extremely low or else extremely
high, the contractor can be almost 100% certain that the client will reject their bid. Wang
et al. (2006), Touran and Ghavamifar (2008), and Arditi and Choktibhongs (2008) show
that clients are not known to use any sophisticated methods of quantification by which to
assess bids with a view to rejecting those that might be unacceptably unbalanced.
Without any such techniques by which to assess item prices collectively, it is
hypothesized that clients instead judge bids on the basis that one or more of the
component item prices stand out as an outlier. It is assumed for the purposes of this
research that any one extreme item price may be sufficient to potentially spoil the whole
of a contractor’s bid.  It is being assumed that a bid stands to be at risk of being rejected
if only one of the item prices is as low as nil or else so high as to be several orders of
magnitude larger than what might appear to be reasonable.  Only one such price may be
sufficient to trigger the perception that the pricing of the overall project is unacceptable
and therefore to be rejected.  This assumption should be the subject of further research: it
is alternatively possible that a more sophisticated method may be appropriate, for












Figure 5.2  Risk to price relationship for a typical item
This function of risk to price is shown in Figure 5.1, resembling an inverted, skewed
normal distribution, split on the X-axis by a central range in which the risk is so small
that it is effectively nil.  Notable characteristics of this function are that the risk of
rejection at any extreme price is almost 100% and the risk around some central
“reasonable price” is infinitesimally small. The difference between this function for each
of the items, is capable of being described by way of a combination of the following four
attributes:
a. the point along the x-axis (being the mean) where the price is least likely to be
objectionable,
b. the width of the central range at which the risk is treated as effectively nil,
c. the variance (or ‘spread’ or ‘width’) of the curve outside of the central range, and
d. the extent to which the curve is asymmetric (i.e. skewed) so as to account for
increased price sensitivity as the price approaches its least value of nil.
Heuristics suggest that different items have risk curves with differences in these
characteristics such as the above-mentioned ‘spread’.  For example, items of excavation











such as painting items (see Beeston, 1975).  An item that has characteristics that are
inherently less certain, such as any of those related to earthworks, is likely to ensure that
the client is more tolerant of a wider range of prices before they are likely to reject the
overall bid.  This is shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2  Risk to price relationship for an item of relative uncertainty
On the other hand, there are some items where the contractor can be almost certain that
the client will not be accepting of any price other than one possibility, and where any
other price will likely arouse suspicions and rejection.  Examples of this include Prime
Cost and Provisional Sum items, which cannot be priced any differently than that which
is directed in the bills of quantities.  If a provisional sum item requires that (say)
R10,000.00 be set aside for an, as yet, ill-defined item of work, and if this is to include a
stated fixed percentage allocation to profit and attendance, the contractor does not in
effect have any freedom by which to price this item in any other way.  This type of











Figure 5.3  Risk to price relationship for an item of relative certainty
Various efforts have been made (see Wang et al., 2006) to develop models to assist
clients with identifying unbalanced bids.  Typically, these are dependent on comparing a
contractor’s prices against a benchmark and then concluding that if these differ by too
much, then the bid is likely unbalanced.  The problem with this approach rests largely on
their dependence on these benchmarks that are themselves potentially (and likely)
unbalanced, thus making any such comparison less than objective.  The reason for these
benchmarks being likely unbalanced is their dependence, in turn, on previous bids which
themselves are, quite possibly, unbalanced.  These models might therefore serve to assess
only whether a bid is extraordinarily unbalanced and less so serve to determine
conclusively that any bid has some (more normal) degree of unbalancing.
In practice, the use of such a model has yet to become popular.  Instead, it is almost
certain that clients (and their professional agents) will be ‘looking out’, using less formal
methods, for any item prices that appear either extraordinarily high or low.  For this
reason, two methods have become popular as techniques by which to constrain






















j = lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the price of
item j
It was noted in section 4.8 that absolute limits of this form are heuristically
inappropriate.  Instead, it was shown that prices should be bounded by limits that
are more fuzzy than fixed.






where i & j  = different item numbers
In the same way that it has been recognized that item prices are having to be
bound without referring to each other, Stark (1968) identified that the prices for
some items should be made to be the same or higher than other items.  For
example, he argued that the price for the excavation of hard-rock should logically
be more than the price for the excavation of soft-rock, else it shall be obvious that
the bid has been unbalanced.
Heuristics suggest that the risks of rejection for all of a project’s items are not strictly
additive.  It is hypothesized that it is only necessary for a single item to be rejected in
order for this to trigger a rejection of a contractor’s overall project bid.  The risk of
rejection for the project is therefore the same as that of the most objectionable item price
- in other words, the one with the highest risk of rejection.  It is suggested here that, even
if the prices for all of a project’s other items were well within the normal bounds of
expectation, that the overall bid nevertheless stands the risk of being rejected if only one











requires further research and, in particular, as regards whether it is possible that clients
may be less sensitive to low-value items than high-value items.  It is also possible that it
may be found that clients may be more sensitive to items that are frequently common in
projects than with items that are more unusual or unique to a project.  For instance, it is
hypothesised that clients may be found to be especially on the ‘look-out’ for the pricing
of brickwork and excavations and other items that many projects have in common, and
that are easily comparable between projects.
It is necessary to acknowledge here that some development environments may be more
‘ruthless’ than others.  For instance, in the public sector, clients may be more obliged to
be transparent as regards being fair to all those who bid, by imposing a high standard by
which they will reject a priced bills of quantities.   In such a situation, it is possible that
clients may not wish to negotiate any compromise on any item prices and they may be
under more political pressure of scrutiny to outright reject any loading of the bills, if this
is detected by them as being obvious.  However, in other situations, contractors could
likely anticipate that clients are less likely to reject them and more likely to respond to
‘loaded’ prices by way of insisting that these be adjusted.  If the latter environment
applies, the contractor may wish to record that the value of the ‘risk of rejection’ is
effectively as little as nil, even though they anticipate that some pricing scenarios may
nevertheless be rejected.  A nil value of rejection will be an acknowledgement that the
worst-case outcome that they anticipate will be one of being forced into a negotiation in
which they are asked to moderate the loading of some prices.
5.2.1 The risk of reaction
If an item’s price is very high, it might inspire an architect to redesign the project so as to
avoid this item.  Similarly, if an item’s price is thought to be attractively low, it might
give rise to a variation order in which the project uses more of this item.  For example, if
the price of face-brick walls is low relative to alternative finishes then the architect might
take this as an opportunity to switch finishes to take advantage of this pricing; perhaps by
giving consideration to both the initial cost as well as likely maintenance expenditure.











5.2.2 The risk of being wrong
Unbalanced bidding models incorporate many variables that require that the contractor
has to estimate, and these estimates are inevitably, to some degree, wrong.  Any such
errors obviously lead to the generation of item prices that might be different had the
contractor not been wrong.  In other words, if, at the time of pricing the bills of
quantities, a contractor could enjoy the accuracy of hindsight then their item prices are
likely to be different than those that they produced on the basis of their (imperfect)
estimates.
In particular, the item pricing model provided in Chapter 4 requires that the contractor
provide estimates for the following variables: a discounting rate; the scheduled timing of
items; any expected variation in quantity (such as if the contractor thinks that the site
contains more rock than is contained in the bills of quantities); and escalation rates (for
each workgroup).
It is interesting to observe that, although variables such as the discounting rate are
common to all items, the risk associated with the variability in estimating this rate is
different for each item.  Items scheduled at the beginning of the project are hardly
discounted whilst items scheduled at the end of the project are heavily discounted.
Furthermore, the later an item is scheduled to occur, the greater the chance that the
estimate of the rate will be wrong.
5.3 TWO FORMS OF RISK
The above-mentioned risks take one of two forms: risks that arise as a direct response to
the price in question; and those that will occur regardless.  In the former instance, the
price is the cause that gives effect to the risk, whereas with the latter form of risk, the
price does not trigger the risk and the risk conditions remain systemic regardless of the
price.  In this latter instance, even though the price may not give cause for the risk, the
extent of the risk is nevertheless a function of the price: higher prices give contractors a











These risks are hereby defined as the direct and indirect risks, respectively. The risks of
rejection and reaction are therefore direct risks: excessive prices (high or low) give rise
to high levels of such risk, whereas ‘normal’ prices may give rise to infinitesimally small
risk.    The risk of being wrong is, however, by this definition, an indirect risk: the
conditions that make the task of estimating and forecasting a challenge remain systemic
regardless of the contractor’s prices.  Nevertheless, if these conditions are especially
worse (i.e. more risky) for one item than other items, contractors will expose themselves
to more risk by giving a high price to such an item.  Loading the price of a risky item and
then, as a result of a need to fund this, correspondingly unloading the prices of less risky
items, increases the contractor’s overall risk.  For instance, if conditions are such that it is
exceedingly difficult to estimate the amount of rock excavation at a site, then the
contractor’s risk will be amplified if they allocate high prices to the items associated with
this rock excavation.
With direct risks it is suggested that the price at which this risk is least is not as much
having to be influenced by any estimate of the cost of this item as it is having to be
positioned relative to item prices that the industry in general has grown accustomed to
with respect to this nature of item.  For instance, if clients have become accustomed to
high costs of excavation (perhaps by reason of an industry-wide systemic prevalence of
front-end loading) then the bell-curve of such items should be centred around that
expectation.
5.4 VALUE-AT-RISK
What is desired is a way by which to measure all of the risk (namely, all of the above-
mentioned risks, combined) generated at each level of price for each item of a project.
With this, one will then know both the rewards that are to be expected for all of these
price levels and also the risks.  If these are structured so that they ‘interlock’ (i.e. that
they are additive) with those from other items, and if one recognises that all of the item
prices must add up to the overall bid price, then one has a basis by which to measure the











To reach this goal, one single measure of all of the risks combined is required.  However,
the above-mentioned analysis has already identified that the overall risk from any item
comprises two very different forms of risk: the one normally suited to measurement by
way of some assessment of its variance, and the other not.  To overcome the challenge of
combining these, it is proposed that a very useful, relatively new measure of risk be used
that appears to be conveniently well suited to this purpose.  This measure is known as
‘Value-at-Risk’ and is abbreviated as ‘VaR’ (Manganele and Engle, 2001).
The VaR method is said (Kolman et al., 1998) to have been developed at the J.P. Morgan
Bank (J.P. Morgan, 1994) in the late 1980s / early 1990s for the purposes of assessing the
bank’s exposure to risk on its equity positions. A report by the Global Derivates Study
Group (1993) is said to have first published the use of the phrase “Value-at-Risk”.
According to Manganele and Engle (2001: 4) the VaR measure has gone on to “become
the standard measure that financial analysts use to quantify market risk. VaR is defined
as the maximum potential change in value of a portfolio of financial instruments with a
given probability over a certain horizon.”  Typically this time horizon is only one day
and the probability used is often 1% (Benninga and Wiener, 1998).  A common form of
expressing the VaR of an investment portfolio is therefore along the lines that it has been
assessed that there is only a 1% risk that the value of a portfolio could drop by more than
(say) R1m within the next day (Jorion, 2006).  Expressed another way, one expects that
the value of this portfolio will erode by more than R1m within 24 hours, only as often as
1 day in 100.  A lot of the appeal of this method would appear to lie in the simplicity by
which risk can be expressed and comprehended (Schachter, 1997).
This method of expressing risk lends itself well for the purposes of unbalanced bidding,
rather than the more traditional methods of expressing risk in terms of variance (for the
traditional approach, see Edwards, 2001).  As an example, it facilitates that an
unbalanced bidding model might predict that there is a 50% risk being generated by way
of an item being assigned a price of R1.00 that, as a direct result of this, the contractor
might lose (say) R10,000.  Furthermore, this model might predict that if this item is
priced at R1.10 then there is a 50% risk that the contractor might lose (say) R8,000.  If











pricing, they would be well-equipped to price their items to not only maximize their
expected reward, but also to minimize their risk.
Notice that this methodology facilitates that contractors no longer need to implement the
item price constraints that are of the form of Equation 5.1.  As discussed (in Section 4.8)
these constraints have been identified as the single most important influence on almost all
previous unbalanced bidding models, and yet, as has been explained, this is heuristically
flawed.  Instead, this new methodology of addressing risk overcomes these problems and
it gives effect to a more indefinite nature of fuzzy bounds rather than the definite fixed
bounds which are problematic.
5.5 VALUING THESE RISKS
5.5.1 The risk of rejection
To implement the ideas expressed in Section 5.2.1 above, the contractor needs to estimate
the extent of their loss that they will suffer in the event that any item price of theirs leads
to a rejection of their overall bid. In addition, they need to estimate the degree of variance
by which the aforementioned normal distribution describes the likely response from the



























with the following cumulative distribution function





























By comparison, the probability density function of a skew-normal distribution is then as
follows:
f (x) = 2!(x)"(#x) (5.6)
where ! is a measure affecting the shape of the skew, and in this instance is a positive,
real number so as to skew the curve to the right.
To produce the risk function (shown in Figures 5.1 – 5.3) this equation needs to be
inverted and standardised so that the range of the risk is scaled to range from 0% to 100%
(or infinitesimally close to this, to be theoretically correct).  This can be done using the
following equation:





The variance (as described in Equation 5.6 by way of the standard deviation ! ) is a
function of two influences: one of which is item-specific, and the other which is general
to the overall project.  The item-specific variance relates to the nature of the particular
item as described by way of the different scenarios underlying the differences depicted in
Figures 5.1 – 5.3 above.  For instance, it is hypothesized that prices across the industry
for earthwork items have far greater inherent variability than the prices of, say, items of
specified ironmongery, painting of general surfaces, prime cost items or provisional
sums.  Ideally, and drawing on the exploratory work of Beeston (1975), research needs to
be done to confirm this hypothesis and variances need to be identified for different
categories of items, as reflected in the variability of item pricing between contractors,
across a wide range of projects.
The second influence on this variance is dependent on the relative competitive strength of
the winning contractor.  If the scenario is one where the tender procedure is that the client
will choose one of the bidders (typically the lowest one) and ask them to then submit the
project’s component item prices, both the client and the contractor will have knowledge
of the numerous contractors’ tender bids at the time at which they are having to decide











other contractors, then this places the client in a stronger negotiating position by which to
reject any proposed item pricing than if the lowest bid is substantially less than any other.
In an extreme situation, if the ‘winning’ contractor were to realize that their bid had been
a mistake (and hence they have submitted far too low a price, threatening perhaps to
cause them a loss if the project goes ahead on this basis), it is quite easy to imagine that
they will be highly motivated to then submit item pricing that is considerably unbalanced,
forcing the client’s hand to reject their bid.  Even if the client were not to reject this
pricing, the exceptional loading of the bid will stand to generate some additional profit
that will help make up for some of the loss.  In any event, it is not difficult to imagine that
the knowledge of all the bids is likely to influence the extent of both the contractor’s
motivation and the client’s ‘willingness-to-accept’ any unbalancing of the bid.
It is suggested that contractors conduct research on the variability of item prices, specific
to different trades across their industry.  Implicit in this variability is the knowledge that
clients have been found to have deemed these prices as acceptable.  This should
determine the standard deviation that they will apply to the analysis of the ‘Risk of
Rejection’ of all such item prices for all projects of theirs.  Furthermore, they might wish
to apply some intuition to either ‘dial this up’ or ‘dial it down’, to some overall degree for
any project in question, based on their perception of their relative competitive-strength
for reason of the spread between their (lowest) bid and that of the second lowest.
The next important aspect of this risk assessment process is the quantum of the loss that
the contractor will suffer in the event that a client does reject their prices.  Heuristics
suggest that this loss does not amount to the profit budgeted for the project.  If any
project does not go ahead, another project will take its place.  If a contractor’s pricing is
rejected, the likely consequence is that they will have to submit several more bids before
winning another one.  The cost of being rejected is proposed to therefore be
representative of the following aspects: the cost of estimating and bidding several more
projects, including all those that will be lost before the contractor is again in the position
where their bid is the lowest; and accounting for any extraordinary profit / loss that is











attractiveness of the current project as regards its use of the contractor’s resources and
how well this fits in with the contractor’s schedule of other work.
It is hypothesized that the latter issue is again a function of the spread “left on the table”
between the lowest bid and the second lowest.  If the contractor has regrets that they
should have submitted a higher bid, they might perceive the amount of the prospective
loss to be minimal.  Indeed, they may even perceive that it will be to their advantage to
lose this project, i.e. that the prospective loss from doing so is a negative one.  With
hindsight of all the bids, the contractor could perceive it to be more valuable to them not
to have “won” at this level of bid.
The value of 100% of the risk of rejection for any item is the same as for any other.  They
should all be assigned the same (Value-at-Risk) number in this regard, with the
differences between the risk on items being reflected solely by way of different mean
prices applying to different items (with this determining the position on the x-axis of the
chart for each item, i.e. the same ‘expected’ price) and the ‘width’ or variance for each
item, as explained above.
On this basis, if the contractor determines that the opportunity cost for them of losing this
project is, say, R100,000, and if they have determined that the mean price and standard
deviation for a specific item is R10.00 and R1.00, respectively, then the function for












Figure 5.4  Value-at-Risk for reason of the risk of rejection
5.5.2 The risk of reaction
The contractor has a similar need to quantify the risk of inspiring a variation order.  For
many items this risk may be nil seeing as it may not be possible for the client to redesign
the project to avoid this item, else to increase its quantity.  For other items, it may be
considerably more.
By comparison to the (above-described) ‘risk of rejection’, this ‘risk of reaction’ does not
plateau at any maximum monetary value.  The higher the price, the higher the expected











Figure 5.5  Value-at-Risk for reason of the risk of reaction
Figure 5.5 shows how, if the item is priced at less than its cost, then there is a risk
associated with the expectation that the quantity of this item may be increased by way of
a variation order.  Beyond the mean expected price, the risk becomes one of the item
being replaced with another.  On the right-hand side of this curve, as this risk ascends the
inverted, skewed and split normal distribution curve, the quantum of the monetary risk is
the loss of profit that will suffered should this item be replaced.  Further research is
required to add the sophistication of treating items as being ‘related’ to each other, rather
than treating them as all being independent.  For instance, if a high price of face-brick
walls were to threaten a switch to the alternative finish of plaster and paint, this risk
would be more if these alternative finishes were, at the same time, priced low, rather than











5.5.3 The risk of being wrong
The monetary quantum of the risk of being wrong is a function of the uncertainty in the
underlying assumptions and estimates that comprise the computation of the expected
return that is to be enjoyed from the activity of item pricing.
Equation 4.10 provides the measure of expected reward from each item j for each unit of
currency applied to its price.  As more fully explained in Chapter 4, #j describes the
‘responsiveness’ or ‘sensitivity’ of the contractor’s expected reward to any assigned
price.  Items with high #j values are, in other words, more receptive to high prices than
items with lower #j values: if a contractor is only motivated by their prospective reward
and disregarding of their risks, they will benefit more by shifting their pricing into the
items with higher #j values and away from the items that have lower-ranking #j values.
This objective is, however, made more complicated when considering that contractors are
also, at the same time, inevitably wishing to minimize their risks.
This assessment of #j is itself not something that can be done with certainty and there is a
risk associated with the variability in this estimate.  The contractor needs to consider the
underlying uncertainty in each of the following estimates that have been utilized: a
discounting rate; the scheduled timing of items; any expected variation in quantity; and
likely escalation rates (for each workgroup).
By using Monte Carlo simulation (see Chapter 8 for a detailed explanation), the
contractor can determine the Value-at-Risk by way of these factors combined.  Figure 5.6
has been produced as an example, using a spreadsheet analysis that combines the
uncertainties assuming appropriate correlation between these variances if and when these
exist. For a contractor to generate any such analysis, it is necessary that they have to
make a variety of assumptions as regards the uncertainty / variance in the above-












Figure 5.6  Value-at-Risk for reason of estimating uncertainty
Figure 5.6 has been compiled using a spreadsheet that incorporates an inversion of a
cumulative distribution function, derived from a normal distribution.
This figure shows the potential loss by ‘being wrong’ as regards estimates of all of the
variables being different from their expected (mean) values.  For instance, it is shown in
Figure 5.6 that there is a 30% probability that, if this item is priced at R10.00, the
(present-day) Value-at-Risk, for reason of uncertainty in the above variables, is around
R50,000.  In other words, it has been calculated that there is a 30% chance that the return
from having assigned a R10.00 price to this item will be R50,000 less than that which is
expected.
This risk tends to R0 as the probability tends to 100%.
Higher prices for any item result in more risk, the extent to which depends on the











Figure 5.7  VaR as a function of the price assigned to an item
When this risk is expressed in this form it gives a basis by which it can be combined with
the risks contributed by way of ‘rejection’ and ‘reaction’.
5.5.4 Illustration of the combined risks
By deciding on a rate of risk for the purposes of this analysis, the contractor can then
aggregate the three risks that will be generated by each item at each price point.  An











Figure 5.8  VaR, assuming a 30% probability, from all risks combined
5.6 DISCUSSION
Notice that the proposed model is the first to succeed in constraining prices by way of a
‘fuzzy’ nature of boundary recognizing that extreme prices might not only generate high
expected returns but also generate considerable risk.  This model succeeds in quantifying
the need for price constraints in a manner that provides contractors with a tool by which
they can weigh up the allure of high returns relative to the risks that are involved.  This is
illustrated in the results shown later in Chapter 9.
5.7 SUMMARY
This chapter has determined a new framework to recognize the risks that are generated by
way of unbalanced bidding.  It has also provided a basis by which these can be assessed,
combined and incorporated into an unbalanced bidding model.  It has found that these
risks can be classified as the risks of rejection, reaction, and of being wrong.  It has found
that these risks are of two different forms but it has proposed that the VaR measure of
risk (rather than the more usual use of some measure of variability) can be used as the











treated as additive to each other.  This summation of the risks, together with the
summation of the expected benefits (as described in Chapter 4) provides the basis by
which all pricing scenarios can then be evaluated by way of both of these scoring sheets.
In the next chapter, Modern Portfolio Theory will be discussed as one of the ways used in
mainstream microeconomics, to address occasions where someone is assessing the
relative merits of alternatives that involve different likely returns and different degrees of
risk.  This shows that a high-return / high-risk scenario is not necessarily preferable to a
low-return / low-risk scenario, or vice versa, but that all scenarios that don’t offer the
highest level of return for the degree of risk involved are not to be regarded as efficient
relative to the other alternatives and hence not to considered attractive and worth further
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6. MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 has described a method by which a contractor can model the reward that they
will enjoy from any item price scenario.  The approach incorporates the benefits that can
be derived from ‘front-end loading’, ‘back-end loading’ and ‘individual rate exploitation’
so that different item pricing combinations can be compared with a view to finding the
one combination amongst these that promises to produce the greatest profitability for the
contractor.  On this basis alone, it would logical that a contractor should seek to price a
project’s items so as to accomplish the greatest profits in the process.
This approach has been taken by all unbalanced bidding models, until Diekmann et al.
(1982) identified that contractors might also wish to price projects in such a way so as to
also reduce their risk.
All research in this field has, to date, been vague as regards what constitutes these “risks”
of item pricing and all the models that have been proposed have largely solely depended
on imposing minimum and maximum pricing limits on each of the items as the sole
technique by which to keep these limits within an (unquantified and undefined) realm of
“acceptable risk”.  The current research, however, has now assessed these risks (in
Chapter 5) and it has laid down a framework by which these risks can now be identified
as the risks of “rejection”, “reaction” and of “being wrong”.  Chapter 5 has shown a new
technique by which these risks can now be measured with respect to any particular item
pricing scenario.
Thus, we now have a situation where we can assess any item pricing scenario for both the
profitability that this is most-likely to generate, as well as the risks that will be associated
with this.  Given that a contractor can have this information on-hand, this facilitates that











risk.   It is logical that some scenarios may offer high returns and high risks, and others
low returns and low risks.  These could all be considered contenders for the best-suited
trade-off, whereas low-return, high-risk scenarios cannot be considered to be attractive as
long as there are alternatives.
This nature of choice is similar to the one that faces many investors and so it has been
decided to investigate the science of such situations, when they arise in the mainstream
environment of financial economics. Harry Markowitz has pioneered a study of Modern
Portfolio Theory which has much to contribute in this regard.  This Chapter 6 outlines
this theory and the next chapter describes another mainstream micro-economic theory
that also has much to contribute to this research - namely that of Cumulative Prospect
Theory.  These theories, combined, are then applied in Chapter 8 where software is
described that has been developed to test the resultant composite Component Unit Pricing
Theory (CUP theory) on a hypothetical project.  These results are discussed in Chapter 9.
The current chapter serves only to provide a brief overview of MPT and to explain how it
has served to provide a conceptual framework as regards scenarios that entail the
following characteristics:
- they all entail compromises between prospective returns and the risks thereof,
- these alternatives comprise combinations of constituent components that can be
assembled in varying proportions so as to influence the overall returns and risks,
and,
- the situation lends itself to the concept and identification of efficiency as regards
the ability to discard the vast majority of the possible combinations in favour of a
small (efficient) subset that are all worthy of further consideration.
MPT is a substantial field of research, that includes the mathematical modelling and
solving of these problems which was also advocated by Markowitz.  He suggested using
the Simplex Algorithm, that had been discovered shortly before MPT, in 1947, by
Dantzig (1949).  The Simplex Algorithm, which has now become a popular basis of











however, not relevant to the subject of CUP theory that is the subject of this thesis.  LP
and QP models depend on a reliance of all the constraints being of a linear form, whereas
in CUP theory, as it is formulated here, many constraints that are quadratic or of other,
more complex, forms.  Chapter 8 will explain that, instead of using the Simplex
Algorithm, as used in MPT, CUP theory uses a modified, hybrid form of Monte Carlo
simulation.  Nevertheless, MPT introduced a conceptual framework that has helped to
guide and shape CUP theory and, hence, is explained in this brief chapter.
6.2 MARKOWITZ
In 1952, Harry Markowitz wrote a paper (Markowitz, 1952) entitled “Portfolio Selection”
that proved to be seminal.  He described a new Modern Portfolio Theory (‘MPT’) that
was to give cause for him being awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize of Economics
(Markowitz, 1990).  This work provided proof of the benefits of diversification.
Prior to the widespread adoption of MPT, the prevailing approach for investors entailed
choosing investments that offered the most return for the least amount of risk.  Little, if
any, regard was given, in any formalised quantitative sense, to the combined effects of
such investments.  By comparison, Markowitz observed that different investments could
be combined - in “portfolios” – such that one could accomplish more than a simple
averaging of the constituent investments: that, when combined in a well-formulated
combination, the collective return could be more than their average and their combined
risk less than their average.
Markowitz described the benefits by highlighting the distinction between systemic and
investment-specific risks.  His work explained the theory behind the intuition that
investors benefit from spreading their trust between multiple investments in different
industries.  When one industry or share may be under threat of prevailing circumstances,
another may be booming…  Combined, if the underlying variability in the investments is
not positively correlated with each other, or if they are to some extent, negatively
correlated to each other, the investor will enjoy a less “bumpy ride” from their combined
portfolio, or in other words, a less risky one, than if they “had all their eggs in any one











even if they cannot avoid the systemic risk that an overall market has in common (across
all of the alternative financial instruments).
Figure 6.1 Efficient frontier for two alternative investments
Figure 6.1 illustrates the case of combining two unrelated investments.  Some portfolio /
mix of these two investments (shown on the (always) convex curve that links A to B) will
potentially offer a better trade-off between return and risk than either of these
investments if partaken of on their own.  One example shown is the 50/50 mix of these
two investments.  Assuming that the risks that are inherent within both these investments
are not the same, that is that they are not exactly correlated to each other, this mix of the
two together will attract less risk than if they were exactly correlated (the situation shown
by the straight, dashed, line linking A to B).  This illustrates the benefits of
diversification.  The curved line linking A to B is known as the Efficient Frontier.
When an investor has the choice of multiple investments, their options can be represented











Figure 6.2 The Efficient Frontier of portfolios of investments
Figure 6.2 illustrates this cloud, as well as the Efficient Frontier: representing a subset of
the prospective portfolios that share a special property: they offer the most return for that
amount of risk.  Any rational investor could justify choosing any one of the portfolios
that lie on this Efficient Frontier whereas it would be illogical for them to prefer any of
the other possibilities that lie within the adjoining cloud.
6.3 APPLIED TO UNIT PRICING
Item pricing also entails deciding between options, some of which have the allure of
greater prospective profits, whilst others have the attraction of less risk.  The author has
identified that the MPT perspective on this trade-off provides a remarkably useful











There is, however, an interesting distinction between the domains of investing and that of
item pricing.  In the latter instance, the contractor has no choice that they have to partake
of all the members of the set (that is, that they have no choice that the project comprises
the items specified) and they have to do so in the same proportion (i.e. that the portfolio
mix between them – in as much as this is determined by way of the item quantities - is a
dictated constraint).  However, in contrast to investments, the contractor does have choice
as regards their pricing of these items.  When the contractor is doing their unit pricing,
they are also without any control as regards the overall summation of these prices, but
they do, nevertheless, have control as regards the nature and extent to which these can be
made to be “unbalanced”.  By shifting the emphasis around between the constituent
components (by assigning them different mark-ups), the contractor can derive greater
returns from some combinations than from others; and they can also expose themselves
to more risk with some combinations than with others.  By contemplating all the
alternatives, the contractor can similarly (as do investors) discard any options (such as
any low-return, high-risk combinations) that are comparatively “inefficient”, and instead
focus their attention only on those that are “efficient”.  All of the “efficient” pricing
scenarios warrant their attention, and combined they offer a spectrum of choice ranging
from low-risk, low-return combinations through to high-return, high-risk alternatives.
Their choice of the best one of these depends on their personal attitude to risk and this
leads to Chapter 7’s discussion on Cumulative Prospect Theory.
Portfolio Theory has attracted its share of controversy (see, for instance, Bowen, 1984)
but has, despite this, become widely accepted into mainstream practice in the field of
financial investments, and most especially, equity investments.
6.4 SUMMARY
This chapter has focused only on the conceptual framework that underlies MPT and it has
avoided discussion on the mathematics and data used to solve these problems.  MPT
problems are typically solved as QP models and this nature of model is dependent on the
constraints being no more complex than being of a linear form.  The item-pricing domain
has been found to be more complex, necessitating models that are not as simple as LP or











in particular as regards the efficient frontier subset of choices, which is very useful when
conceptualizing CUP theory.  CUP theory, however, is built using different mathematical
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7. CUMULATIVE PROSPECT THEORY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 has provided a hypothesis that the use of Markowitz’s Modern Portfolio
Theory (Markowitz, 1990) in an unbalanced bidding model can ensure that contractors
can sift through all of their pricing options and identify an efficient frontier subset of
options that are preferable to all others.  These options deliver the best possible expected
return for their respective levels of risk.
In this chapter, it is advocated that Cumulative Prospect Theory (‘CPT’) can serve to
further reduce the set of efficient options to the extent that a contractor can identify, from
amongst these, the one pricing combination that will optimally suit their risk profile.
More specifically, this chapter will trace the origins of CPT through Prospect Theory and
Expected Utility Theory to show that it is rooted in Utility Theory.
As with the previous chapter’s description of MPT, this chapter serves to describe CPT
only to the extent that it is necessary within the context of CUP theory.  CPT is a
substantial field of research that has attracted its share of controversy.  Some of the
details as regards this, in particular, as regards the practicality of methods of measuring a
contractor’s risk profile are certainly relevant here, but have been excluded from the
scope of this research.  It is later proposed in the Conclusion, that further research in this
regard will be useful to further evolve CUP theory in order that it become of greater
practical value.  It is proposed that the concept of CPT is of use within CUP theory and
this has been tested, to some degree, in Chapter 8 as the formulation of CPT has been
incorporated into the software that is applied to a hypothetical project.
7.2 AN EFFICIENT FRONTIER
In the previous chapter it was suggested that Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1990)











that all offer the maximum expected profit for their respective degree of risk.  In other
words, they also offer the least possible risk for that amount of expected profit.
Underlying this application of Modern Portfolio Theory to unbalanced bidding is the
assumption that contractors are rational – that they resemble the homo economicus that is
a basic assumption made by behavioral economists (Persky, 1995).  In other words, they
are averse to taking additional risks without the prospect of an adequate increase in
reward.  This assumption helps to identify the efficient set of item pricing combinations
but it does not help with identifying any preference for any single one of these
combinations within this set.  Some contractors can rationally choose a high-return /
high-risk option, whilst others may rationally justify a preference for another choice
down at the low-return / low-risk end of the spectrum. Any choice of an efficient pricing
combination is rational, whereas the choice of any other combination is not.
MPT provides a good illustration that it is logical for contractors to wish to accomplish
pricing combinations that will give them the greatest return for the corresponding amount
of risk involved.  Any such analysis that has this objective will help to greatly focus their
attention on a subset of pricing combinations, that could be described as all being
efficient combinations.  This still leaves them, however, with a wide range of choice,
covering the full spectrum of degrees of risk to which they could be exposed.
7.3 SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE ON RISK
The concept of risk is one that appears to be difficult to comprehend, not only for
contractors, but also for decision-makers in other forms of management.  Kahneman and
Lovallo (1993) provide an intriguing analysis of typical decision-making by
management; concluding that managers’ decisions have an irrational bias towards being
bold and also overly averse to risk.  They argue that decision-makers have a tendency to
view their decisions in isolation and with too much of an inside view that is not
objectively realistic.  They argue that managers tend to be over-optimistic as regards
outcomes; for instance, as regards a cost estimate or an estimate of how long an activity
will take.  This optimism is somewhat compensated for by an irrational tendency to avoid











professional risk-taking.  Most managers, apparently, do not perceive themselves to be
‘gamblers’, but rather prefer to think of themselves being able to somehow ‘manage
themselves out’ of any exposure to risk (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Kahneman and
Lovallo (1993: 17) describe the overall phenomenon as one of “unjustified optimism and
unreasonable risk aversion”.  Within the domain of contracting and, more particularly,
that of estimating, this helps explain why estimators might be reluctant to accept an
(objective) ‘outside view’ that any estimate they have made is likely to suffer the same
problems as previous estimates of theirs have suffered in the past; that they will be as
inaccurate as they have been with other projects and that, realistically, a contractor should
have little, if any, reason for being uniquely optimistic about their current project.
Economists and psychologists have done considerable research on people’s perspective
on risk and on their perceived value of alternatives and how they make decisions relating
to these.  This field of study falls under what is known as Utility Theory.
7.4 UTILITY THEORY
The field of research in microeconomics regarding people’s perceptions of value is
described as Utility Theory. The earlier work in this field is well summarized in Fishburn
(1989).  Utility theory in general entails assessing how people rank the equivalence of
various options; such as if they prefer 4 apples to 5 bananas, or 3 apples plus a banana to
1 apple plus 4 bananas, and so on – ignoring any pricing that may be attached to these.
These studies then contribute to understanding the relative value (or utility) that people
attribute to different alternatives and they explain why people make the economic
decisions (choices) that they do as regards these goods or services.
Utility theory determines the point at which people become indifferent with regards to
alternative choices.  Perhaps, for one person, one such situation is that they are indifferent
with respect to whether they prefer 3 apples or 4 pears.  The utility that they consider
themselves deriving from either of these options is equivalent in their mind.  Notice that
these assessments of utility are not objective but rather are specific to the person who is











These assessments also take account of what is often a diminishing marginal utility; that
a person may place more value on being given an extra apple when they already have
only one such apple, than when they already have (say) 100 of them.  The same is true of
losses.
7.5 EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY
Many of these assessments entail issues of uncertainty; having to decide on situations
where there is either a possibility (but no assurance) of an income or, similarly, the
possibility of incurring a loss.  These options are often compared against certain
alternatives: known then as certainty equivalents.   For instance, a person may be
indifferent as regards whether they are given R70 or have an 80% chance of being given
R100.  In such a situation, the certainty equivalent (of the 80% chance of R100) is said to
be R70 even though the expected value in this instance is R80.  Under such
circumstances, it is said that the risk premium is 14.3% (=(R80-R70)/ R70).
These uncertain situations are widely addressed by Expected Utility Theory (see von
Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).  This theory gives recognition to people’s natural
tendency to be either risk averse or risk seeking.  Notice that Utility Theory is based on
the subjective ordinal assessment of preference; the only significance is that a person
ranked one option above, below or as the equivalent of another.  It is not popular to
attempt to measure an absolute cardinal utility (Strotz, 1953) of an option: that is, to try
to determine the objective value of utility.  Cardinal utility is a far more controversial,
and less popular, aspect of economics, as observed by John Hicks (Ahmad, 2001;
Chipman, 1995).
By testing people by presenting them with various alternative options, researchers are
able to determine their risk profile. Webster (2003) and Besley and Brigham (2007) give
examples of this.  In essence, a person’s or company’s risk profile reflects their
perception of the acceptable trade-off between risk and the reward required to
compensate them for taking this risk.  This technique can then be used to predict such
persons’ certainty equivalence of a wider variety of options.  With this knowledge one











levels of risk.  An indifference map comprises as many as an infinite series of
indifference curves.  Figure 7.1 shows an indifference map comprising three indifference
curves - each curve representing the contractor deriving the same level of utility from
alternative combinations of expected return and risk.  The theory is that a contractor
should prefer all options on curve I3 to all of those depicted on curve I2, and so on.
However, they should be indifferent as regards choosing any of the options depicted on
any one of these curves.
Figure 7.1  Indifference map, comprising 3 indifference curves, each representing a
constant level of utility
Figure 7.2 shows the indifference maps for two contractors, A and B.  In this instance,
contractor B is showing that they are less risk-averse than contractor A.  For any given
level of risk, contractor A has a greater need for a higher return than contractor B, to
compensate them for taking on this degree of risk.  Point ‘X’ shows the risk-free rate of
return that both A and B require, shared in common because there is no risk involved.











Figure 7.2  Indifference maps for two contractors, A and B.
If a contractor has had their risk profile assessed and if one then knows their indifference
map, then the knowledge of this can be combined with that of a project’s efficient frontier
(that MPT has provided).  In combination, one can then identify the single (efficient) item
pricing combination that represents the contractor’s optimal choice of pricing for a
project, giving them a greater utility than all other possible item prices (Besley and
Brigham, 2007).  This is shown in Figure 7.3, where contractor A’s optimal portfolio is
depicted as ‘M’ whereas contractor B’s optimal portfolio is ‘N’.  Notice that contractor B
will not only be deriving more return from their optimal portfolio than contractor A, but












Figure 7.3  Optimal Portfolio Selection
Willenbrock (1973) suggested that bidding models (not referring specifically to
unbalanced bidding models) could be improved with the use of Expected Utility Theory.
Liu et al. (2003) have warned though, that in practice, it may be difficult to determine a
contractor’s utility function for this purpose.  The system that has been developed
(described in Chapter 8) assumes that this utility function is measurable and that it
resembles that which is described by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  However, the
practical aspects of soliciting this function needs to be the subject of further research.
There has been considerable research done on interviewing and profiling techniques (see,
for example, Goldstein et al., 2006), aimed at measuring utility functions, but the
approach taken by Willenbrock (1973) has not as yet proven popular within the
construction industry and, arguably for this reason, there has been little suggestion so far












Expected Utility Theory has been found to deliver some results that are problematic, as
illustrated in particular by way of what economists refer to as the Allais Paradox
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and the Ellsberg Paradox (Ellsberg, 1961).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed an alternative to Expected Utility Theory –
termed Prospect Theory (‘PT’), for which Kahneman was awarded a Nobel Prize in
Economics in 2002 (Kahneman, 2002).  As psychologists, their observation was that
people tend to over-react to events with a low associated probability of occurrence and
under-react to events that are more probable.  Their argument is that people’s perspective
on the expected value of events is not in proportion to the probability of the event.  They
also observed that people’s perspective on possible gains is different to their perspective
on possible losses.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4  Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
Another observation of theirs is that people place no value - and give no consideration to











option offers a person a certain R100 plus a 30% chance of an extra R50, and another
offers them a certain R50 plus a 50/50 chance of R100, this will be assessed by this
person as being the same as comparing the following two options: the first one offering
them a certain R50 plus a 30% chance of a further R50, and the other a 50% chance of
R100.  Both of these alternatives contain a certainty of getting R50 (in the first option, in
addition to another certain R50) and so, their research shows, that people take this R50
for granted and they discard this from having any influence on their decision between
these two options.  People have been found to only give consideration to those things that
are different between their choices.
It is argued that Prospect Theory serves better (than Expected Utility Theory) to explain
why many people enjoy the risk of a lottery ticket and yet will often, at the same time,
insure themselves against losses.  In other words, many people consciously seek some
risks (such as the extreme risks of paying for a lottery ticket with almost-certain
assurance of loss) and yet they simultaneously justify the payment of an insurance
premium to give them the peace-of-mind of protection from far-less likely risks such as
those that are insurable.  People’s attitude to the uncertainty of gains is different to their
attitude as regards the uncertainty of losses.  Their findings are that people are generally
risk averse when it comes to gains but risk seeking when it comes to losses.  This is
illustrated in Figure 7.4 by way of the concave shape for gains and the convex shape for
losses.  When weighing up the choices between alternative gains, people tend to be risk
averse and place a higher proportional weight on options that are more assured.  When it
comes to losses, the opposite is true; they observed that people tend to apply a lesser
proportional weight on losses that are more likely and irrationally over-emphasise their
fear of highly-unlikely losses.  They found that the utility curve for most people is steeper
for losses than it is for gains, explaining that people have an irrational tendency to be less











7.7 CUMULATIVE PROSPECT THEORY
Prospect Theory has attracted considerable further research since its initial formulation in
1979. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) themselves identified and published an
improvement to their original theory that is called Cumulative Prospect Theory (‘CPT’).
This theory is also derived from concepts inherent within rank-dependent expected utility
theory (‘RDEU’) (Quiggin, 1982).
This improved theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) identified a four-fold nature of
behavior: risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; and risk
seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability.  Such behaviour is taken
account of by way of incorporating an additional weighting factor that is graphically
shown to resemble Figure 7.5.  Different people act on the basis that they prefer different
weights and it is this difference that determines their risk profile – that is, that describes
their attitude to different degrees of risk.  An analysis of the differences between CPT and
PT is provided by Fennema and Wakker (1997).












Individual contractors can be interviewed and presented with a series of choices that
involve varying degrees of risk.  Ideally, these questions will relate to the specific domain
of item pricing, rather than be of an abstract form such as if the questions were to relate
to various choices of lottery tickets.  As Stott (2006) has warned, one must not expect the
contractor to always be consistent in any such interview. Tversky and Kahneman (1992),
amongst others, have sought to fit various parametric-based functions to describe
subjects’ risk profiles.  Abdellaoui et al. (2007) have instead proposed a method by which
to elicit a parametric-free utility function and Stott (2006) has confirmed substantial
advantages of a parametric-free approach.  More specifically, this method entails the
elicitation of utility midpoints - where the subject is indifferent between two alternative
choices. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) noted that they consider their method very efficient at
being able to elicit a subject’s utility function across the whole domain, as a derivation
from few measurements – therefore entailing a realistically efficient interview in each
instance.
Regardless of the technique of elicitation, CPT identifies the utility V g( )  that an
individual will attribute to a circumstance where they are presented with an n-outcome
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Tversky and Kahneman (1992) suggested a parameter setting of 0.61 for r given the
prospect of a variety of gains, and 0.69 given the prospect of losses.  These values have
been implemented in the software that has been developed and that is described in
Chapter 8.  In practice, this would need to be customised to each individual contractor,
based on an interview, to take account of their unique risk profile.
Stott (2006) observed that people’s risk-taking decision-making behaviour is typically
stochastic, rather than deterministic. Stott found that people change their minds and do
not consistently make the same decisions, given the same choices.  To cater for this, Stott
advocates the addition of a stochastic choice function to the deterministic CPT function,
in order that it will perform in a stochastic manner.  Loomes and Sugden (1995) also
suggest that this nature of adjustment should be regarded as an integral part of CPT. This
has, however, not been taken account of in the software that is described in Chapter 8 and
this idea gives potential for further research.
7.8 PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
Keeney and Raiffa (1993) describe the process by which one can apply a utility function
in practice, such as one derived using Cumulative Prospect Theory, involving two
attributes: the most likely return as well as the Value-at-Risk.  In essence, one is seeking
to determine the contractor’s preference to alternatives that involve different degrees of
each of these factors.  The goal is to identify the value (the term used by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), as opposed to the term utility that is used by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944)) that the contractor will derive from a particular item pricing
combination, given that it is estimated that this combination will generate a given
expected return subject to an assessed Value-at-Risk.
The software application of CUP theory, which is described in Chapter 8, incorporates
the formulation of the value as identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).  This has not
been modified or adjusted as would be required to describe the unique personality, in
terms of their risk profile, of a particular contractor, as could be assessed by way of the











not been researched here seeing as it has been deemed to be beyond the scope of this
thesis, and this area provides opportunity for further research.
7.9 SUMMARY
Considering that a contractor has the choice of a considerable number of different pricing
combinations when deciding their item pricing, Chapter 6 had proposed a basis by which
a contractor might be able to narrow these down to a small subset that share the quality of
being efficient.  Efficiency, in this sense, refers to the characteristic of offering the
greatest amount of return for that degree of exposure to risk, or in other words, the least
exposure to risk for that amount of return.  This would help considerably to sift out all of
the many pricing options that are inherently not of a nature that one would rationally wish
to consider them, but this still leaves a spectrum of choice.  This spectrum would span
options providing low returns with low risk, all the way through to some that would
generate high returns along with high-risk - all of which could be considered attractive,
depending on one’s personal appetite for risk.
The research has therefore led to consider the mainstream microeconomic techniques for
situations that involve personal assessments of risk, and this has given rise to
consideration of Cumulative Prospect Theory as offering one of the most widely accepted
methods of addressing this.
This chapter has provided a framework, making use of Cumulative Prospect Theory, by
which a contractor could identify their optimum item pricing taking into account the
effects of item prices on both the expected return that a contractor will enjoy as well as
their risks.  This model takes account of the contractor’s appetite for risk and finds the
solution that they will find ‘most satisfying’ given recognition of their psychology as
regards tackling projects with various prospects of returns and risks.
Having outlined a framework to identify the one choice that offers the best-suited
compromise, particular to an individual’s unique attitude towards risk, the next chapter











has been written especially for this purpose.  This is then applied to the data of a
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8. SOFTWARE FOR TESTING THE MODEL
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 4 described the three benefits that contractors can derive from item pricing
(namely, improvements in cashflow, variation valuations and the value of escalation
compensation) and it provided a model by which to quantify these, given any item price
combination.
Similarly, Chapter 5 defined the three types of risk that are produced by item pricing
(namely, the risks of rejection, reaction, and of being wrong) and, again, a model was
provided to quantify these on a collective basis.
Chapter 6 then suggested that MPT has provided a framework of understanding that
facilitates that a contractor could logically discard most pricing combinations, if given
knowledge of the corresponding returns and risks that these will generate, thereby
facilitating that a contractor can focus their attention on a small subset of efficient pricing
combinations. Efficiency, in this context, is defined (by way of MPT) as the greatest
return to be had at any defined degree of risk.
This analysis would still leave a contractor with a spectrum of choice, ranging from some
pricing that gives high returns with high risk, through to pricing that has far less risk but
only offers low returns.  It is at this point that a contractor would need to assess their
appetite for risk and it was suggested, in Chapter 7, that CPT provides a popular basis by
which to make this nature of assessment.  These assessments lead to an ability to
determine a value of utility for any given pricing combination, with the opportunity then
to seek the one combination that will deliver the most value.  Given this theory, the
‘revenue’ and ‘risk’ models from Chapters 4 and 5 can be combined as a composite
model by which to determine both the return and risk, and hence also the value of utility,











The current chapter describes how this composite model is now encoded in software,
using Monte Carlo simulation, guided by a novel hybrid use of a range of techniques that
could be described as artificial intelligence, genetic computing and fuzzy logic.  This
system is able to identify the quasi-optimum item pricing scenario for a project.
The full source code for this system is listed in Appendix A.  The next chapter describes
the results of a test, using data that describes a small hypothetical project (provided as
Appendix B). Appendices C, D and E provide details of the test results and the pricing
schedule that has been identified by the model as providing the highest value for the
contractor in the instance of this project.
8.2 THE JAVA TECHNOLOGY PLATFORM
The software has been written in Java (see online at http://java.com), which is a popular,
sophisticated modern programming language, not dissimilar as regards its syntax to C
and C++, on which it is largely based.  Java is regarded as being part of the ‘C family’ of
programming languages and Microsoft’s proprietary language that is very similar to Java
is even called C# (pronounced C Sharp).  Java was developed by Sun Microsystems, and
released by them in 1995, and is now published as ‘open source’.
Java is a language that is ‘platform-independent’ in the sense that programs written in
Java will run on any hardware that supports a Java Virtual Machine (‘JVM’).  JVMs are
available for a vast range of hardware, spanning from mobile phones to supercomputers.
Java was also intended for embedded systems and is a popular choice for the control
systems of appliances such as domestic microwave ovens and heat pumps.  By
comparison, other languages (such as Visual Basic (‘VB’), C, C++ and C#) are instead
written and compiled to run on a specific choice of hardware platform.
The tests done here were run on an Apple MacBook Pro laptop computer (with a 2 GHz
Intel Core Duo processor, with 2GB of RAM), running Apple’s OS X operating system,
but the same program could be run on Windows or Linux-based machines, ranging from











that is available, can inevitably run Java programs and could easily run the program listed
in Appendix A.
The program has been written for the specific purpose of providing this test as part of this
thesis.  It has not been written with the intention of serving as ‘commercial code’ as
would be required to be suitable for an industrial ‘real-world’ deployment.  It is not
written so as to be robust enough for this purpose, nor as fast, as easy to use, as adaptable
or as easy to maintain as would be required in a commercial environment. These factors
have been deemed immaterial for the purposes of the academic exercise of this thesis.
This program is highly process-intensive and it takes around a week to run on the laptop
computer described.  This is obviously not a concern for the purposes of the academic
exercise involved here, but would be an issue commercially. There are, however, many
ways that this source code could be adapted so that the program will run very much faster
than it does now, by undertaking a process of evolutionary improvement known as ‘code
optimisation’.  It could also be made faster by simply deploying it on faster hardware and
it is of a nature that it very much lends itself to easily being able to be adapted to run on a
massively parallel-processing (‘PP’) system.  The nature of the software is such that this
PP system could be fairly easily deployed on a network of computers, each assigned to
run one or several ‘threads’ of the overall process, with these reporting back to a central
server on their progress, thereby being centrally controlled and co-ordinated by way of
settings issued to each of these threads as a guide to ensure that their processing results
will contribute positively to the overall effort.
The software implements the models which analyse both the expected rewards as well as
the risks that are generated from a range of different item prices and then combines these
to measure the contractor’s derived value of utility, using Cumulative Prospect Theory
(see Chapter 7).  This software system uses Monte Carlo Simulation (‘MCS’) (see
Section 8.3.1 below) combined with some regular intervention and guidance derived
from fuzzy logic (see Section 8.3.4 below).  It runs until it is no longer improving upon
its previously found best solution and until it determines that there is no longer a











two million iterations have been run if the system has not found adequate cause to decide
to terminate prior to this. In practice, when testing the hypothetical project, it terminates
after about one million iterations.  The two million iteration limit is implemented simply
to serve as a scope for the declaration of some arrays used for the recording (for
subsequent reporting) of the progress of this system.
8.3 OVERVIEW
Consideration should first be given to a broad overview of the manner in which the
system has been coded, before later delving down into the details.  The overall objective
of the software is to find the item price schedule for the project that produces the greatest
value of utility for the contractor.  In broad principle, this schedule needs to comprise a
choice of price for each item that, if considered in isolation, will deliver a high
contribution of value of utility; as well as an optimum combination of these prices.
The software is designed to incorporate a combination of Monte Carlo simulation,
artificial intelligence, genetic computing, and fuzzy logic.
8.3.1 Monte Carlo simulation (MCS)
MCS describes a nature of approach to computing that entails using many random
samples of data as a simulation of typically large, complex systems.  It is an approach
widely adopted in complex financial economic analyses, and as well as in the physical
sciences, mathematical sciences, and other areas of science (see Rubinstein and Kroese,
2007).  It is typically used in situations where the complexity is so great that it is
impractical or inconvenient to apply any alternative mathematical approach.
This approach is well suited when a complex model can be broken down into components
that can each, individually, be modelled, and yet where the combination of all these parts
though is such that a parametric formulation of the overall problem becomes too
complex.
The use of MCS facilitates that one can dissect the overall domain into constituent











nevertheless respects the observed interaction between these elements.  It can be made to
simulate the overall complexity very effectively.
In financial economics, it is especially well suited to issues that are, essentially,
inherently of a stochastic nature, as opposed to being of a deterministic nature (see
Glasserman, 2003).
MCS is said (Metropolis, 1987) to have been developed in the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in the 1940s, for the purposes of research, by the government of the United
States of America, into nuclear armaments.  It was first applied to the field of finance in
1964 (Hertz, 1964) and has become increasingly popular due to computer processing
power having grown exponentially.  This computing power has also become increasingly
inexpensive and accessible (see Moore, 1965).
8.3.2 Artificial intelligence (AI)
Artificial intelligence, a term first used in 1956 by John McCarthy (Crevier, 1993), refers
to a branch of computer science that has the purpose of making ‘machines’ (i.e.
computers) operate with some ‘intelligence’.   The concept is that, rather than a computer
operate entirely under direct instruction, it can be set up (i.e. programmed) so that it may
have its own awareness of its environment; that it can have an accumulated knowledge
(and continue to augment this, by itself, with further learning); and reason and decide for
itself how it should respond to its environment or any given situation.  The programmer,
in such instances, has to ‘step back’ and rather than program each response that the
system needs to make when given any input, they need to equip the system with a ‘set of
tools’ – a logic – that will facilitate that the system is able to make its own assessment of
any given ‘input’, so that it can decide for itself how it needs to respond.  Programming
in AI entails a programmer equipping a computer with a means to think for itself and
hence become, to a degree, self-sufficient.  AI systems can be thought of as having their











Some programming languages, such as LISP or Prolog, have been specifically designed
so as to be well suited to AI.  However, some degree of AI functionality can be built into
any system, and written in any programming language, such as Java (Watson, 2002).
8.3.3   Genetic computing (GP)
GP is a type of artificial intelligence where a system is made to evolve in a style similar
to biological evolution (Banzhaf et al., 1998).  Such systems seek to improve themselves
by selectively discarding some of their knowledge and characteristics (or options),
discounting these from proceeding to have any further influence on the system as it goes
forward, whilst mutating other aspects of itself.  It is a new field of computer science that
is, as yet, ill-defined (Banzhaf et al., 1998) and the program that has been developed here
is arguably of a form that fits this definition.  Nevertheless, the system in question very
much has evolutionary characteristics, it certainly does selectively discard options and
choose its ‘genetic’ make-up to take forward for further processing, and it is designed to
run in phases (or ‘waves’) that have, for the purpose of acknowledging these GP-type
characteristics, been called ‘generations’.  The results from each generation are analysed
for the purpose of determining the nature and direction of the generations that succeed it.
The system accumulates a knowledge that each generation passes on to the next one,
whilst helping set up the next generation so that it might perform better than those that
preceded it.  Each generation becomes more intelligent than its ancestors.  For more on
GP, see Holland (1992), and Davis and Mitchell (1991).
8.3.4   Fuzzy logic
Fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965) is a technique used, inter alia, in the field of artificial
intelligence to handle situations where there is imprecision and uncertainty.  It is suited to
modeling domains that are too complex to describe with deterministic, parametric
precision, but nevertheless where the characteristics of the domain are well known, albeit
with a degree of some ‘vagueness’ (see Novak et al., 1999).
Systems using fuzzy logic have become very common in the past decade, to the extent
that our modern daily living is surrounded by their influence.  They are popularly











machines, dishwashers, tumble-dryers and microwaves.  They are very well suited to
provide effective control of situations such as determining whether a tumble-dryer would
be more efficient running faster or for longer or with more heat, or should stop - given
some vague nature of input (such as a combined ‘knowledge’ of the humidity and weight
of a load of washing, given a user’s objective and description of the nature of the load).
Such situations may be difficult – perhaps, at times, for reason of the vast number of
possible alternatives to choose between – to model with absolute mathematical precision.
Nevertheless, given repeated reassessment in real-time by a system that incorporates
fuzzy logic, and the processing required becomes relatively minimal, very reliable and
effective.
The software listed in Appendix A incorporates a style of fuzzy logic in as much as it has
been designed not to be dependent on the input of exact data, nor on having to have
exactly determined functions by which all steps in the process are calculated.  For
instance, it is designed to monitor the results that it accomplishes with certain settings
and if these results are not proving to be of value as regards contributing to the
knowledgebase, it adjusts these settings (by some degree that is not having to be precise)
and tries again.  It’s own inbuilt logic then leads it to keep trying other settings,
depending on how well it is performing as regards improvements on the knowledgebase.
This process is guided by an imprecise, fuzzy logic and yet when knowledge is found that
is of value as an addition to the knowledgebase, this has not suffered in quality, as
regards its validity, for reason of any vagueness in the process that led to this discovery.
8.3.5 Hybrid
The software developed employs a hybrid of the above techniques.  It uses AI, GP and
Fuzzy Logic to guide a process of MCS.  MCS could be employed as the sole approach
but this would be a very time-consuming procedure, having to use a very large number of
tests if it were to prove effective.  However, as a rough guide to the number of iterations
that would be required, let us assume that there are in the order of 1000 items in a project
and that we would like to explore a price range for each of them that is, on average, a
range of around R20.00 with a granular accuracy of 1c.  On this basis, there would be











identify the best performing combination of these.  If one were to want to test them all,
this would amount to 2000^1000 tests (= 1.07E3301) which is an impractically large
problem to compute within a realistic timeframe, especially given that this analysis will
furthermore need to test stochastic data to take account of variability in the various risk
factors.
Instead, logic can be introduced that is founded on the knowledge of the theory as regards
unbalanced bidding, as it has been presented in the preceding chapters.  This logic is
encapsulated in a combination of AI, GP and Fuzzy Logic – and this serves to
considerably reduce the amount of testing that is required.  This logic guides the MCS
with the effect that far fewer tests (i.e. iterations) are required before the optimum (or
quasi-optimum) pricing combination is identified.
The overall objective is to identify the item price combination that will deliver the highest
possible value to the contractor.  This value assessment takes account of the contractor’s
identified risk profile as regards their attitude towards alternative propositions of reward
vs. risk – as discussed in Chapter 7.  Thus, in broad principle, the program needs to assess
the reward that is generated by way of a possible item price combination, as well as the
risks that would be attributed to this.  By way of this, the system is then able to assess the
value of utility generated from each pricing regimen and then compare these so as to
identify the one that produces the highest value for the contractor.  In essence, this
winning pricing combination will give the contractor the best combination of a relatively
high profit together with a comparatively low risk (measured in accordance with the
contractor’s perception of risk).
The challenge lies with finding a way to reduce the number of tests required to an extent
that this becomes practical in terms of the time required to process these.  The AI chosen
to facilitate this requires that it have a knowledge of the domain which, when assessed by
way of its inbuilt logic, determines that it will be ‘safe’ to exclude a proportion of all
further tests for reason that these are unlikely to produce a competitive value by
comparison to other alternatives.  This knowledge or intelligence is accumulated en-route











This knowledge is acquired at two levels, as follows:
1. Knowledge of each item, taken in isolation.  This level of
the analysis discards (/ ignores) any consideration of the role that any price
assigned to this item plays within the broader context of the overall project.
2. Knowledge of the effect on the value that will be derived
from the overall project, from various combinations of unit prices being
assigned to the project’s constituent items. Keep in mind that, overall, the
item prices are constrained by having to summate to the overall tender price
that the contractor has decided for the project.  Any price that is assigned to
any one item can be viewed as effectively amounting to a forfeiture of the
prospects of assigning these same funds to another item.  In this context,
each item can be viewed as being competitive with all the other items in the
sense that whatever pricing is assigned to one item, this amounts to a
reduction in what can then be assigned to other items.
The best pricing for a project does not simply comprise a combination of the best pricing
for each item, assuming that the latter was determined without consideration of the
project as a whole.
If any one item is taken in isolation, the best unit price for this item, if one were to ignore
risk, would be the full tender price divided by the quantity of the item, i.e. the maximum
possible price.  The higher the price, the more profit the contractor will derive.  However,
it has already been shown that item pricing needs to be moderated by the risks involved
and the risks of very high prices will outweigh the benefits that these generate by way of
profits.  Patently, it would be ridiculous if the contractor were only to give a price to one
item in a whole project, assigning this one item its maximum possible price.  Such
pricing would inevitably be treated by any client as an unacceptably unbalanced bid, and
would, almost certainly, be rejected.  Thus, if one is to consider a price relative to its
level if the pricing were decided on a balanced basis, there might be thought to be a
centrifugal force, motivated by a pursuit of profits, that drives pricing up; whilst there is a











its central / balanced state.  These two forces counterbalance each other, depending on
each individual contractor’s perception of risk, settling at some point where they consider
themselves to be getting a suitable and ample reward for taking on the risk that is
involved (at that price-point).  Any higher price would be considered to be generating too
much risk for this amount of profit, whilst any lower price would be thought to be
generating insufficient profits, even though the risk is less.
On this basis, if taken in isolation, one could identify the optimum pricing for each item.
However, the aggregation of these optimum item prices is highly unlikely to equate to the
tender price to which the contractor is already committed.
Taking an example of a situation where a process of analysis has identified that the
optimum pricing for a project’s items, if each is assessed individually in isolation,
summates to an amount that is (say) 20% more than the overall tender price.  Further
analysis would be required by which to compromise on these previously-found
‘optimum’ prices, such that they will work together in unison to produce the best overall
utility for the contractor.
The best compromise in such a situation is likely to comprise some items retaining their
‘optimum’ prices (that were found to be optimum when taken in isolation) whilst other
items will end up having their prices reduced, to varying degrees, such that together they
will satisfy the constraint by which they all summate to the tender price.
This system has the end-goal of finding the optimum combination and en-route it has the
objective of not only constantly trying to reach this goal (before too much processing
time has elapsed), but also to building up its knowledge of the domain – equipping it so
that it will become more and more knowledgeable, as it proceeds, and thereby better able
to pursue this goal at a later stage in the process.  It presumes that the more
knowledgeable it becomes, the more likely it will be that it will more quickly reach its
goal.
The system has been given the ‘attitude’ that it can embark, at some stages, to pursue











might, in the short terms, ‘stumble upon’ (for reason of its random endeavours) a pricing
combination that is likely to compare favourably with those that it has found to be the
best-suited thus far.  These phases are motivated purely because of a recognition that by
investing in the further accumulation of this improved knowledge, it will have gained
something that will serve as an asset.  It recognizes that by investing in its own ‘self-
improvement’ it will, at times, accomplish more than if it were to stick to the ‘straight
and narrow’ – focusing in solely on pricing that it has thus far found to be most
productive in producing the best overall results.  In the process, by taking a chance
testing less obvious pricing options, it might then become able to reassess its prior
‘beliefs’ as regards the price points at which best results are to be found.
For example, let us say that early tests indicate that an item is producing its best value of
utility at around a price level of R100.  The system’s knowledge, at this early stage, might
indicate that prices higher than this produce inadequate risk to compensate for the higher
profitability, whereas lower prices simply do not produce attractive-enough profits.  The
system could, at such a stage, decide to focus in solely on prices very close to R100.00
with the idea being that it can stop wasting processing time testing any other level of
price in combination with all the other item prices.  The system could be making similar
decisions at the same time, as regards each of the other items.  However, early indications
may be wrong and the system recognizes that, perhaps, in this example, better pricing
might ultimately be discovered at around (say) R120.00.  To accommodate this, the
system, in effect, records that the best pricing thus far, for this item, is obtained at around
R100.00 but at the same time, it indulges its desire for better.  It acknowledges the
prospect of a better-performing price and so it proceeds, going forward, at times testing to
see the effect of prices of around R100.00, in combination with all the other items; and at
other times, scouting out and seeing if other prices might do even better.  This nature of
the system gives cause for many discoveries and so, if for instance, the system finds that
prices of around R120.00 become even better than prices of around R100.00, it begins to
use pricing at around both these price-points for a period, until it might become
convinced that pricing around R120.00 is almost always better than pricing the item at
around R100.00.  It then fully acknowledges this new intelligence and allows the pricing











The system is designed therefore to ‘go off on tangents’ – to, at times, explore new
territory distant from where it would seem sensible to be focused, recognizing that the
overall pricing exercise is incredibly complex and that new discoveries may be made that
no parametric-driven algorithm could suggest.  A good example is where the system is
encouraged to ‘let go’ of trying too hard to find the best prices and instead, simply, rather
treat as more important, the accumulation of a better understanding of the problem at
hand.  By doing so, it expands upon its knowledgebase, getting a better understanding
that (hopefully) leads to new discoveries and, ultimately, to improved pricing.
Besides the pursuit of pricing that produces the best utility for each item, the system does
similarly as regards combinations of item prices that produce the best utility for the
project as a whole.  It pursues the hypothesis that the best pricing combination will
contain many, but not all, of the best prices for each item (produced in the event that the
item is isolated from the added constraints of being a constituent of the whole project).
Working on this basis, the system is designed to seek knowledge of good prices for each
item, in isolation, as well as good combinations of prices, as a collective whole.
8.4 THE PROGRAM
The source code, written in the Java programming language, is attached as Appendix A.
The program is written so that it reads the data (describing the project, attached as
Appendix B) from a file on disk, processes it, reports on its progress (an example of
which is attached as Appendix C), determines for itself when to stop, and then writes its
output to another file on disk (attached as Appendix D).
The program is designed to run through the following phases of operation:
8.4.1 Read input from file
Up until around line 177, the software does general preparation (such as declaring
variables) and also reads the input data into memory.  Once having read these
data, there are no further disk operations until the output is finally written to











8.4.2 Test ‘risk of error’ loop
Having read the data, the next principle phase of operation is for the system to
measure the estimating variability inherent within the project, as defined by this
data, and in accordance with the model that defines the ‘risk of being wrong’, as
explained in Chapter 5.  This process is depicted below.
for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
double[] wrongResults = new double[NUMBER_OF_TESTS];
for (i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_TESTS; i++) {
// 1. the contractor could be wrong as regards their estimate of the
appropriate discounting rate...
double simulatedDiscFactor = normrand(discFactor, discSD);
// 2. also when estimating the variance in item's quantity...
double simulatedExpectedVariation =
normrand(expectedVariation[item], varSD[item]);
// 3. also when estimating each workgroup's escalation rate...
double simulatedEscFactor =
normrand(escFactor[workGroup[item]], escSD[workGroup[item]]);
// 4. also with their scheduled timing of the project...
float[] simulatedLambda = simulateLambda(lambda[item],
confidentOfScheduledTiming[item]);
for (int month = 0; month<NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
wrongResults[i] += Math.pow(simulatedDiscFactor,
month+1) * simulatedLambda[month] * billQuantity[item] *
simulatedExpectedVariation * Math.pow(((simulatedEscFactor - 1) *
HAYLETT_FACTOR + 1),month+1) * (1.0 - rateRetention[month]);
}
}




8.4.3 Scaling risk loop
The system next embarks on a phase where it seeks to determine the extent of the
risk in each item, as well as in the project as a whole.  It dedicates the first 20,000











serves to then facilitate that the risks can be rescaled in the manner that a risk of
quantum 0 becomes the equivalent of the highest risk encountered during these
20,000 tests, whilst a risk of 1 becomes the equivalent of the least risk discovered.
Any (more extreme) risk subsequently found to translate to values outside of this
0-1 range gets effectively truncated to 0 or 1, as the case may be, which serves the
purpose adequately.  In effect, prices outside of this range never become serious
contenders for the ultimately chosen pricing of the bills of quantities anyway –
and so the value of risk assigned to these does not so much matter besides
providing recognition that the pricing is so extreme as not to warrant further
consideration.
8.4.4 Main test loop
After having rescaled the risks (to the 0-1 scale described above) the main loop is
restarted, with the potential of running two million times.  Memory arrays are
dimensioned to store some results from each of these 2m iterations (simply for the
purposes of reporting them, with a view to being able to better appreciate the
behaviour of this system).  If this loop runs this full distance, it will terminate and
treat the best result that it will have found by then as the quasi-optimum
recommendation for the contractor.  If, however, instead, the system determines
for itself that it has prior to the expiration of the full duration, that further
iterations seem unlikely to be able to improve on the best result that it has already
found, it terminates this loop, writes the results to disk and shuts down.
In the example reported on, as a stochastic test of the hypothetical project (as
described by the input data presented in Appendix B) the main loop ran around
1,150,000 number of iterations, taking 3 days before shutting down.
This main loop runs from line 241 to line 828.
This loop is run in phases called “generations” that are of 1000 iterations duration.
Each generation runs according to settings that are determined at the outset of that











decided by the previous generation on the basis of the knowledge that has been
accumulated to that stage.
The first ‘generation’, i.e. the first 1000 iterations, entails pricing being decided
randomly because as yet there is no intelligence.  These first 1000 results are
analysed and serve as the catalyst for determining the settings that will govern the
second generation, and so on.   Within the first generation, the first three iterations
are treated as special cases, designed to serve to generate data that will prove
useful for the system itself to better understand the project it has begun to process.
The first iteration tests the case of assigning to each item, the lowest prices that
the contractor has indicated as being possibly acceptable in the marketplace.
if(iteration == FIRST_TEST)
itemPrice[item] = origLoPriceGuide[item];
These obviously do not summate to the tender price but this constraint is lifted for
the duration of this iteration to facilitate this test.  The effect of this test is to
provide a measurement of the risk at the extreme edge of low prices, both for
individual items as well as for the project as a whole.
The second iteration provides a test of the highest possible prices, at the opposite
end of the scale.
else if(iteration == SECOND_TEST)
itemPrice[item] = origHiPriceGuide[item];
The third iteration tests the scenario where all items are priced with the same
mark-up, that is, a ‘balanced bid’.
else if(iteration == THIRD_TEST)
        itemPrice[item] = roundCents((float)(itemCost[item] * (1.0 + avgMarkUp)));
A balanced bid should represent a very low-risk pricing schedule and it is for this
purpose that this test is being done: to measure this degree of minimum risk.
Please note that the risk with a balanced bid is not necessary a risk of nil, for two











with respect to the price and so ‘balanced’ prices (not being nil) still attract some
of this risk; and (b) the risks of reaction and rejection are only nil within the
central range around which the market has an expectation of this price.  Most
times, a balanced price will fall within this central range.  However, if the
contractor has an abnormal cost of any item, or if the market is accustomed to
prices for an item that is commonly loaded, then interestingly, if any contractor
were to submit a balanced price, this price might appear unusual and might attract
attention.  This argument is discussed further in Section 2.2.
These first three iterations then provide an initial 0-1 scaling of the risks involved
that is then used for the duration of the balance of the first 20,000 iterations.
During this period, the greatest and least risks are recorded and these then serve to
rescale the risks to serve as a replacement of the base values of initial 0-1 scaling.
Pricing Sequence
Beyond the first generation, the items are priced according to a selection of five
different pricing sequences.  The sequencing of the pricing is very significant:
items priced early in the sequence enjoy complete freedom by which their price is
decided whereas those that are scheduled to be priced at the end of the sequence
are assigned whatever price is necessary to ensure that the constraint is satisfied
whereby all the item prices summate to the overall tender price.
The five sequencing techniques that have been adopted are as follows:
Sequences “A”, “B” and “C” – the sequences that the knowledgebase has
discovered have produced the highest value of utility thus far.  Each of these
sequences is used 1/9th of the time, i.e. 1/3rd of 1/3rd.  For this purpose, these
sequences are recorded whenever any pricing combination gives rise to one of the
best-yet values of utility.  The choice between these three is made randomly and,
because it is found that there is considerable common-knowledge that is shared
between these three, there is found to be sufficient gained from this knowledge by











if(beyondFirstGeneration && iteration % 3 == 0) {
double seed = Math.random();
int oneOf3 = seed < 0.33 ? 0 : seed > 0.66 ? 2 : 1;
sequence = oneOf3 == 0 ? "A" : oneOf3 == 1 ? "B" : "C";
for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++)
pricingSequence[item] = bestPricingSequences[item][oneOf3];
}
Sequence “D” – 1/3rd of the iterations are assigned a random sequence
accomplished by way of reshuffling the last-used sequence.
} else if (iteration % 3 == 1) {
sequence = "D";
// reshuffle the sequence of priority for pricing all items
for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
randomNumber = item +
(int)Math.floor(Math.random()*(NUMBER_OF_ITEMS - item));
int rand = pricingSequence[randomNumber];






Sequence “E” – another 1/3rd of the iterations are assigned a sequence giving
priority to those items that have been found to produce the most utility relative to
their price.  A further twist on this technique entails not pricing all the items in
this manner but instead pricing some in this manner and the remainder randomly.
The switch-over point between these two techniques is again chosen randomly.
} else {
// price an initial portion of the items in accordance with orderItemResults
and then randomly scramble the rest
int extent = (int)((NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1) * Math.random());
sequence = "E" + extent;
for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++)
pricingSequence[item] = orderItemResults[item%2 == 0 ? item / 2
: (NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1) - (item / 2)]; // rank them starting from the one
that produces the greatest utility / price
for (item = extent; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {












int rand = pricingSequence[randomNumber];






The results of the test show that all of the above techniques succeed in contributing some
improvements in the overall utility that is accomplished.  This is shown in Appendix D as
per the following extract:
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence A) to 17073.15187770346 after
1182 efforts, increasing the reward to 6015219 (a 139% improvement on the profit from
a balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to 84763(riskReaction = 5820,
riskOfBeingWrong = 28579 & riskRejection = 50363)
These various sequencing techniques are therefore all significant, not solely for the
purpose of being successful ultimately when finding the best-producing pricing schedule,
but also with soliciting the vast variety of scenarios that all contribute to the enlargement
of the knowledge-base that ultimately serves as the asset necessary for the final discovery
of the best scenario.
Tender Price Constraint
The following block of code serves as preparation for ensuring that in all scenarios, all
the items will be priced in a manner that the constraint is satisfied that they all summate
to the tender price.
float mult = 0.0F;
do {
for (int ii = NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1; ii >= 0; ii--) {
assignedMinPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] = (beyondFirstGeneration ?
(bestLowItemPrices[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0] - mult *
bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0]) :
origLoPriceGuide[pricingSequence[ii]]);
assignedMaxPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] = (beyondFirstGeneration ?












minimumPricingCommitment[ii] = (ii < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1 ?
minimumPricingCommitment[ii+1] : 0) + assignedMinPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] *
billQuantity[pricingSequence[ii]];
maximumPricingCommitment[ii] = (ii < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1 ?







} while(beyondFirstGeneration && (minimumPricingCommitment[0] > tenderPrice ||
maximumPricingCommitment[0] < tenderPrice));
In effect, this technique uses the pricing sequence that the previous block of code will
have chosen and it calculates the effects of pricing all the items, in this sequence,
assigning them the lowest prices that the contractor has indicated (as input), as well as the
highest prices – recording both of these scenarios separately.  It does this starting from
the items at the end of the sequence, working forward to the first item, and it stores these
two sets of cumulative results as it progresses through the sequence.
This knowledge will serve to moderate the pricing midway through the pricing sequence,
as soon as the effect of those prices already assigned to the initial items threatens to
violate the tender price constraint.  At some point through each sequence, the pricing will
inevitably be such that, in summation, if left to proceed without moderation, they will
either be higher or lower than the tender price.  If it is found that the pricing is heading to
be higher than the tender price, the system intercepts this scenario and, at the necessary
moment of intervention, breaks from the further pursuance of the pricing and instead
switches over to a mode in which all the remaining items in the sequence are assigned
their minimum prices (or maximum prices).  This then ensures that the tender price
constraint is satisfied and this illustrates the significance of the pricing sequencing
techniques described above.
Item Pricing
The system’s next function is to price each item for that iterative test (of which there are











looking to price them in the sequence that has already been chosen for this iterative test.
It first checks whether it is necessary to price all of the remaining items in the sequence
with their minimum or maximum prices.
if(priceAllRemainingItemsWithMinimumPrice) {
itemPrice[item] = roundCents(beyondFirstGeneration ? assignedMinPrice[item] :
origLoPriceGuide[item]);
itemPriceSD[item] = 0;
} else if(priceAllRemainingItemsWithMaximumPrice) {




Next, the system determines whether the item in question is one that produces a relatively
high level of utility (per unit price) or a relatively low level of utility.  It has been decided
to treat those that fall into the top third of items as the better ‘producers’ and those that




This knowledge is used in the next step which entails deciding on whether to experiment
by ‘loading’ or ‘unloading’ the price of the item in question.  The technique used for this
entails randomly switching between three different methods by which to make this
decision.
if(pickMethod(itemBeta[item] > (mean(itemBeta) + 0.5 * stdev(itemBeta)),
mean(pricingSchedule[item])>(origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item])/2.0F,
bestProducersOfUtility)) { // load these
loadItem = true;
direction = +1;
} else if(pickMethod2(itemBeta[item] < mean(itemBeta), mean(pricingSchedule[item]) <
(origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,















As can be seen from the above code, the first of these methods entails identifying whether
the item has an itemBeta value of more than mean(itemBeta) + 0.5 * stdev(itemBeta)
where mean(itemBeta) is the calculated mean of the itemBeta values for all the items, and
stdev(itemBeta) is the calculated standard deviation.  The second method entails
identifying the items that the system has discovered are best being allocated prices higher
than the price halfway between the low and high pricing extremes that the contractor has
provided as input for this item.  It makes this assessment based on the knowledge
accumulated in the pricingSchedule[] array, which contains the prices of the best
combinations of prices found up until that stage.  Notice that this method assumes that in
the event that one of the best producing schedules has done well on the basis of this item
having been allocated a relatively high price, then this is most-likely indicative of the fact
that this item makes good use of a high-price allocation, relative to other items.  The third
method makes use of the assessment of the bestProducersOfUtility and the
worstProducersOfUtility, as discussed above.  By randomly switching between these
methods facilitates, in the style of Fuzzy Logic, that the system need not be definitively
and consistently correct as regards any one of these assessments.  If the system is ‘wrong’
in this regard, it will only result in a waste of time processing iterations that have no
chance of contributing to any improvement in the knowledgebase, let alone provide
prospect of the best combination of prices.  This potential wastage has been monitored,
partially by way of analysing the feedback from the system (as shown in Appendix D)
and also by running this software in a ‘debugging’ mode in which each step of the
process can be thoroughly viewed and monitored.  It has been found that, collectively, all
of these methods serve well to guide the process towards the accumulation of the
necessary knowledge as well as towards the ultimate optimum.
Consider the tender price to be a ‘finite resource’ that can be distributed between a
project’s items in compliance with a set of constraints.  When testing alternative
combinations of prices, whenever any one item is assigned a test price, this assignment
imposes a further constraint to some degree on what prices can be assigned to the
remaining items.  All of the item prices need to summate to the tender price, so if the
pricing assigned to the items early on in the sequence are high prices, this will force a











In this sense, it is useful to think of the tender price as a resource that has a fixed value
and that must be spread over all of the items that are the constituent components of the
overall project.
Essentially, all of these methods strive to ensure that higher prices will be assigned to
those items that will make best use of this (finite resource), whilst funding this
assignment by way of stripping down (or ‘unloading’) the prices of those items where the
pricing is of least significance (i.e. those with the least ability to contribute a relatively
competitive return for that amount of use of the overall pricing allocation).
By the end of this step, the system has therefore split all of the items into three groups,
namely:
- those that the system will test (for the duration of that one iteration – of which
there are ultimately two million conducted) with a high price,
- those that instead will be tested with a low price, and
- those that fall between these two groups, where the system is less certain.
This split is then reassessed with each iteration.
 Loading of prices
In the next step of the process, the test prices for each item are decided.  These are chosen
stochastically given the mean and standard deviation of the range chosen to explore.  This
mean and standard deviation for each item are assigned the variable names guidePrice
and guideSD in the following extracted block of source code.  This extract is specific to
the situation where the item has been chosen to receive a (positively) loaded price.  A
very similar process applies to those items that have been chosen to receive (unloaded)
low prices.
guidePrice = pickrand(mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item]) + direction * alpha
*bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],













pricingSchedule[item][0] + direction * alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
mean(pricingSchedule[item]) + direction * alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],




 (origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F);






 (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 3,
bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F));
This code shows that the guidePrice and guideSD are chosen from a random selection of
ten different alternatives, namely:
a) mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item])+direction*alpha *bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0]
and beta * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0] * 3, respectively
where direction is +1 for loaded items, and –1 for unloaded items
alpha and beta are settings decided by the system for each generation of
tests (see below)
mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item]) is the calculated mean of the 10 prices
found, up until that stage in the process of the testing, to be those that
produced the highest value of utility for that item
bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0] is the standard deviation used in the
stochastic selection the first time that this price was identified.
b) bestItemPrices[kk][item][0] + direction * alpha * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0]
and beta * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0], respectively
where bestItemPrices[kk][item][0] is the price that has been found, up until that
stage in the process of the testing, to be the one that produced the highest
value of utility for that item
c) bestItemPrices[kk][associatedItem(item)][0]











where bestItemPrices[kk][associatedItem (item)][0] is the best price (thus far)
for a randomly chosen associated item of the item in question, where
associated items are items found to attract very similar (within R1.00 of
each other) prices.  In other words, it has been found (up until that stage in
the process) that the best prices suited to these items are very similar.  For
this reason, the system links such items as being possibly ‘related’ to each
other (i.e. sharing similar characteristics) with the benefit that any
intelligence gained on one such item may be of value if shared with the
others.  The identification of associated items is explained below.
d) bestItemPrices[kk][r][0]
and beta * bestItemPriceSD[kk][r][0], respectively
where r is a random choice of another item: indicating a wild-shot that two items
may be discovered, purely by chance, to share enough in character that the
knowledge gained on the one item has value being shared with the other
e) pricingSchedule[item][0] + direction * alpha * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0]
and beta * pricingScheduleSD[item][0], respectively
where pricingSchedule[item][0] is the price that was assigned to this item at the
time that the system discovered the most utility from any one combination
of prices
pricingScheduleSD[item][0] was the standard deviation used in the
process of discovering this price the first time that it was discovered
f) mean(pricingSchedule[item]) + direction * alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0]
and beta * pricingScheduleSD[item][0], respectively
where mean(pricingSchedule[item][0]) is the calculated mean of the prices that
were assigned to this item at the time that the system discovered the most
utility from the best three combinations of prices
g) origLoPriceGuide[item] + (2.0+direction * alpha)/4.0 * (origHiPriceGuide[item]
- origLoPriceGuide[item]) and (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 3, respectively
where origLoPriceGuide[item] is the price that the contractor provided as input
as being the lowest price that they would consider likely to be acceptable
 origHiPriceGuide[item] is, similarly, the highest price that the contractor
consider likely to be acceptable
h) mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item]) and bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0], respectively











j) (origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F and
(origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F, respectively
The following chart (Figure 8.1) shows the effectiveness of each of these techniques in
the test that has been conducted, as regards the number of times that they have identified
prices that were amongst the ten best for that item, as at that stage.  This shows that all of
these techniques all manage to contribute to the knowledgebase and are, hence, all
valuable albeit that some of the techniques are, in the instance of this test, more
productive in this regard than some others.  The techniques identified as ‘j’ and ‘d’ are
found to be the most productive, but these are relative ‘wild shot’-styles of technique
compared to the others.  Knowledge gained from this nature of technique is then, in
effect, ‘spread’ across the knowledgebase, and shared with other associated items, when
appropriate, by way of techniques such as those identified as ‘c’.  In this manner, these
different techniques can be viewed as being complementary with each other - aiding each
other to build the knowledgebase.
Figure 8.3 The relative effectiveness of the different methods of identifying the best











The items that fall into the set that lies between the ‘loaded’ and ‘unloaded’ ones, are







 (origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,
 (origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F);






1.2F * (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,
 (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F));
These items are, therefore, in effect given a random selection of eight different possible
prices.  Keep in mind that in all of these instances, the objective is to ‘drain’ these items,
assigning them low prices, at the bottom-end of their scales, so as to, in effect, ‘fund’ the
ability by which higher prices can be assigned to other prices.  The array named
bestLowItemPrices refers to the prices at the bottom-end of the scale, found to be best
suited to items, in the event that this item is serving this role of being ‘unloaded’ in the
interests of others being ‘loaded’.
The results (discussed in the next chapter) indicate that all of the above methods
contribute to the solicitation of useful intelligence.
Cross-pollination of knowledge between ‘associated’ items
The system’s artificial intelligence is designed to hypothesise that there is the prospect of
some items being similar to other items.  For instance, two billed items may be so similar
that the contractor effectively views them as being virtually identical to each other, albeit
that the Standard System of Measurement has given cause for the client’s quantity
surveyor to separate them.  In practice, items of formwork to soffits of slabs, and sides











by allowing the contractor to give input as to indication of these associated items, but the
software developed here looks to identify these situations without any such explicit input.
It is supposed that in such an instance, the contractor will have good reason to treat the
pricing of such items similarly, if not identically the same.  On this basis, the system has
been designed to share knowledge gained on any one such item, with all other items that
may be associated with it.  If the system discovers that one such item is performing best
when assigned a price of (say) R100.00, it is presumed that the system will benefit from
this intelligence being shared that all other similar prices be tested with the same, or
similar, prices.
The system is designed to search for items that may be similar and to do so whenever any
one generation hands over to the next one.  It looks for items that are becoming drawn to
prices that are within R1.00 of each other.  It supposes that if two similar items share
enough as to be performing best at (say) R50.00 and R50.80, respectively, that it will
henceforth be worthwhile considering the merits of pooling the knowledge on these two
items, such that if the one ultimately, gravitates to a price of (say) R50.32 as being its
best-performing price, the other item might benefit from sharing this knowledge, and vice
versa.
The following block of code serves to link items as being “associated” with each other:
if(ii == 0 && birthOfNextGeneration) {
for (int ai = 0; ai < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; ai++) {
for (int aj = 0; aj < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES; aj++) {
                assItem[ai][aj] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
                            assLowItem[ai][aj] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
}
            int associate = 0;
            int lowAssociate = 0;
for (int aj = 0; aj < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; aj++) {
if (((bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] >= bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0] &&
bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] < bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0]+1) || (bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <=
bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] > bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0]-1))
















bestLowItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <
bestLowItemPrices[k][aj][0]+1) || (bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <=
bestLowItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] >
bestLowItemPrices[k][aj][0]-1)) && lowAssociate < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES &&






Setting things up for the next generation
As each generation hands over to the next one, the system also looks to reassess its
settings, with the goal of making the next generation as productive of new intelligence as
is possible.  Two settings have been chosen to govern this evolutionary process: called
alpha and beta.  alpha determines the extent to which the next generation will stray away
from the range of prices being tested previously, and beta serves to determine how
narrowly focussed, or otherwise, this range of prices will be.
alpha and beta serve as multiples when determining each test price in the stochastic
manner described above.  Higher values of alpha serves to shift the ‘range of exploration’
into new territory, in the hope of new discoveries, whilst lower values serve to ensure that
the system more-so repeatedly tests the use of prices very similar to those that have been
tried before – serving to both refine the choice of the best-price (getting to the stage of
choosing the exact cent value that will serve best) as well as help find the best
combination of these prices.  This choice as regards the best combination is also one that
entails the decision as regards the sequence of the pricing process – or, in other words,
the decision as regards which items to price as priorities in advance of others, choosing to
treat some items’ pricing as being less important than others.  Those that are found to be
more important are priced early in the sequence, giving them an unrestrained freedom,
whilst those at the end of the sequence have their freedom removed and their price











The code that decides the alpha and beta values for the next generation, is as follows:
String route = "a";
if(recentImprovement || ((beta >= (stillLearning[0] / eps) && alpha >= (stillLearning[1] /






































notSoRecentImprovement = false; // reset
} else { // if we seem to be going nowhere, we now need to embark on a new regimen by




























if(pickDebug.length() > 0) {
System.out.println();
System.out.println(pickDebug); pickDebug = "";
if(bestRecentResult != bestResult)
System.out.println("Best recent result = "+bestRecentResult);
System.out.println(iteration+": Changed beta to "+beta+" & alpha to "+alpha+"
(having taken route "+route+")");




In effect, this code determines that the system gains the following characteristics in its
pursuit of greater intelligence:
- If the system has recently discovered a pricing combination that produces the
best-yet value of utility for the contractor, it retreats and elects to continue to
explore the territory defined by way of the same settings, even reducing the value
of alpha by 0.1, knowing that the logical progression in future generations will
involve incrementing alpha again, moving back over this same territory a second
time,
- If, however, the system has not found any new overall improvement in the
project’s utility, it checks to see how recently alpha and beta have led to any new











knowledge that has proven itself to be useful, it decides to change one of them
radically, so as to turn the exploration in a new direction,
- If the system has not found any new knowledge of use lately, but had done
previously, in the not too distant past, it resets alpha and beta both to 0, so as to
focus in on trying to marginally squeeze out slightly more from the knowledge
already gained,
- If no new knowledge has been learnt for a ‘long’ time (as judged by the system
itself), it randomly switches between further exploring the best knowledge already
gained (using the alpha and beta values of 0) and going back to reusing the
settings of alpha and beta that were in place at the time at which the last new
useful knowledge was gained, and
- Ultimately the system shuts down if it detects that there is little prospect of any
further improvement, in which case it then declares that the best result that it has
found must constitute a reasonable estimate of the optimum pricing combination;
it records its results to disk and closes down.
Assessing the pricing
The effectiveness of the pricing is assessed on the basis that the value of utility (unique to
this contractor) that this pricing generates.  This utility is determined on the basis of the
calculated profitability and risk for each item, as well as for the combination of items, for
each iterative test, of which two million are conducted and recorded.
8.4.5 Write output to file
The final phase of operation for the system is to write its results to a data file on disk, and
then shut down.  In the interim, as it proceeds, it reports on its progress in real-time
through the terminal interface.  An example of the former is attached as Appendix D and
an example of the latter is attached as Appendix C.
The output has been further dissected by way of a utility that has been written to strip











spreadsheet.  The test results shown in the next chapter are produced by way of that
spreadsheet analysis.
8.5 SUMMARY
This chapter has described the software that the author has written for the purposes of
implementing CUP theory and testing it on a hypothetical project.  The full source code
of this software, written in Java, is included in Appendix A whilst the data describing the
hypothetical project is included in Appendix B.  The next chapter describes the test that
has been conducted.
The software implements AI, GP and Fuzzy Logic in a manner as to guide a process of
MCS.  The manner in which the software is constructed is not suited to an industrial,
practical application but it does well to serve the purposes of this academic research.  It
is, for instance, far slower than would be required for everyday use.  Nevertheless, the
objective of this work is not to develop a commercial system and what is described here
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9. TESTING THE MODEL
This chapter describes the test done using the software that has been developed, and
described in Chapter 8.  The program is tested using the data from the hypothetical
project, as described in Appendix B.
The test provides feedback in real-time, over the course of the week that it takes to run,
and finally it presents its results by writing them to disk.
As the system progresses, the following feedback is presented so that it can be monitored:
- the iteration index (keeping in mind that it might choose to run for the full two
million iterations) – see ‘A’ below (in Figure 9.1) in the sample presented,
- the current settings of alpha and beta, being applied to the current generation of
tests – see ‘B’ below,
- any improvements in the overall level of utility that is being accomplished
(together with the corresponding values of return and risk) – see ‘C’,
- the method of sequencing used to produce any such improvement – see ‘D’,
- any occasion when an item’s price has produced utility for that item that is
amongst the ten best-yet records of utility for that item (reported on as 0-9 where
0 is indicative of the best-yet result) – see ‘E’,
- an index reference to the pricing method used to produce this good item result –
see ‘F’,
- an indication of whether this result is a function of the price being ‘loaded’ (‘+’),











Figure 9.1 Sample of output, of which more is shown in Appendix D
 A sample of this feedback is provided as Appendix D.  The total volume of data
generated in this manner is not provided seeing as it would equate to several hundred
pages if printed.
Viewing this feedback, as the system progresses, provides a fascinating insight into the
‘psychology’ of the system – how and why it takes different tacks in its endeavour to
acquire useful intelligence that should ultimately serve to identify the quasi-optimum best
price set.
Notice, for instance, from the above tiny snapshot how the utility improves when the
system switches over to the new generation after 1000 iterations (‘efforts’).  This is
indicative of the system’s largely random pricing method that it employs for the duration
of the first generation, until this generation has served to provide the first insight into the
project and how it might best be priced.  New intelligence is then adopted as from
iteration 1000, reflecting in the improved performance.
The early stages are characterised by big steps in improvement in the pricing, and the
improvements become progressively smaller, and further apart, as it finds it becomes











The psychology of the system is such that it will pursue improved knowledge at the
expense of a realistic chance of finding the best pricing combination.  It does this as an
investment in its ‘intelligence’ asset, seeing as without this, the system will be unlikely to
discover nearly as good an ultimate best pricing combination than had it discarded the
value in ‘wandering off’ to pursue ‘roads less travelled’.  For instance, very high values
of beta and alpha will, almost certainly, not produce any short-term improvement in the
overall pricing.  And yet, the system will decide to conduct many of its tests whilst using
high alpha and / or beta values, knowing that these are very effective at making new
discoveries that lead to expansions of the knowledgebase.
The expansions to the knowledgebase can be monitored, to some degree, by way of
watching the values being produced that are referenced as ‘E’, ‘F’, and ‘G’ above.  The
operator of the system can witness the productivity from each generation as regards the
discoveries of improvements in the pricing of individual items.
Figure 9.2 shows typical progress of the system in the early stages of discovery, as
measured by way of the overall utility generated from the various pricing combinations
tested.  Notice that the testing during the first generation of 1000 iterations entails pricing
chosen randomly, and thereafter, the pricing becomes influenced by way of the system’s





























Figure 9.2  The utility produced from the first 3000 iterations tested
Figure 9.3 below shows the how the system progresses as regards increasing the return
from the project, whilst seeking to bring down the risk.











Figure 9.4 shows the progress of the system in terms of the amount of new intelligence
gathered as measured by way of the number of individual item prices found to be the best
performing in the course of the prior generation (i.e. 1000 iterations).  This (stacked)
chart also shows the quality of this knowledge in terms of recognising that a price that
generates the highest utility thus far (‘0’) is better than one that generates (say) the
second-best utility this far (‘1’).  This chart is focussed in on the early performance of the
system.
Figure 9.4  The early-stages of progress towards finding the best-yet prices for each
item











Figure 9.5  The effect of alpha and beta settings (that the system chooses for itself)
on the discovery of best-yet pricing
Next, consider the individual item prices that the system has identified, as being best
suited to this project.  Notice that, with reference to the characteristics assigned to each of
these items, as outlined in Appendix B, the system has priced each of them appropriately.
No pricing falls outside of the range that the contractor indicated, as their input, as being
reasonable. The full list of item prices that the system has identified is provided as
Appendix E.
Ultimately, the system has succeeded in identifying a combination of item prices that is
expected to generate a profit with an expected mean of around 150% more than that
which would be accomplished by way of a balanced bid.  The contractor stands to make a
present-day profit that has a mean of R187,391 rather than R76,109, as shown in Figure
9.6 below (in both instances taking account of an assumption that the profits will be











Figure 9.6  Present-day value of profit, showing the benefit of the pricing identified
by the model
Figure 9.7 below shows the improvement on the contractor’s cumulative nett cashflow
using the recommended pricing, by comparison to the balanced pricing.
Figure 9.7  The effect of the unbalanced prices on the hypothetical project's nett











The unbalanced pricing has also helped to improve the contractor’s escalation
compensation.  Figure 9.8 shows that if the pricing were balanced, the contractor would
receive a mean, expected R545,128 for escalation, whereas with the recommended
pricing, this increases to R556,557.
Figure 9.8  The compensation for escalation, showing the benefit of the pricing
identified by the model
The pricing has also improved the contractor’s value of likely variations.  With balanced
pricing, as it is shown in Figure 9.9 below, they would, most likely, be paid R3,450 less
for reason of these variations (as anticipated by the contractor) whereas, with the











Figure 9.9  The compensation for contract variations, showing the benefit of the
pricing identified by the model
Notice that, as observed in Chapter 6, more profit could be accomplished if the contractor
were willing to accept more risk.  In this instance, these prices reflect the compromise
between profitability and risk that the contractor feels to be most satisfying to them.
Notice from the pricing listed in Appendix E that the system has managed to constrain
the prices to within the minimum and maximum bounds provided as input by the
contractor, with the result that the prices are likely to appear as relatively ‘normal’ by
comparison to what the contractor has observed as being prevalent in the industry.
CONCLUSION
This test successfully provides validation of the application of the model.  By using this
system, in the case of the hypothetical test, the contractor enjoys a substantial increase in
profitability without excessively exposing themselves to risk.  Furthermore, the system
gives contractors a methodology by which these dual, and opposing, objectives are
managed in accordance with their assessed attitude to risk, presenting them with a











them the opportunity to review their risk profile and choose to accept more risk or seek to
avoid such risk, and then be able to do so on a scientific basis.
The system is also of value at ensuring that projects can be priced on a consistent,
scientific and professional basis, governed by managerial parameters that can ensure that
the decision-making involved is reasoned and reliable.
This system also provides proof that ‘unbalanced bidding’ need not be excessive in order
to be significantly valuable.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, unbalanced bidding is often
criticized for reason that it is felt that it amounts to an unethical abuse of the system by a
contractor.  These tests show that unbalanced bidding can be subtle, within the bounds of
what is likely to be deemed ‘acceptable’ by all stakeholders, and yet still able to
contribute substantial benefits for contractors.  It is suggested that the nature of pricing
that this model has identified in this instance, is unlikely to be perceived by any client as
being excessively ‘loaded’.
The system that has been developed is only a prototype and could not be deployed, in its
current state, in a practical, real-world environment.  It does, however, represent a new
paradigm for item pricing.  It presents a conceptual framework – a prototype - for what











10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
WORK
This research has proposed a new approach to item pricing by building contractors.  This
approach makes use of pricing items in accordance with the market’s expectation (as
opposed to being in accordance with the contractor’s costs), whilst pricing them to give
effect to the maximum possible value of utility, taking account of both the rewards
available from this practice as well as the risks that this generates.
The research problem was stated (Chapter 1) as:
Unbalanced bidding models have not addressed the risks of an uneven mark-up
despite that this has, from the outset of research into this field 50 years ago, been
identified as a significant consideration.  These models have also not been
comprehensive as regards quantifying the various sources of improved profits and
so these have so-far failed to provide contractors with a meaningful or useful
technique for optimising their item pricing with respect to profit and risk.
The research questions were identified as being the following:
(1) What are the benefits that can be derived from an uneven distribution of mark-up
amongst a project’s constituent items?
(2) Is it possible that one model could comprehensively and collectively quantity all
of these benefits?
(3) What are the risks that contractor exposes themselves to, in the event that they
price items without using a consistent mark-up?












(5) If it is possible for a contractor to quantity both the prospective profits as well as
the risks for a comprehensive range of different item price combinations, how can
a contractor choose from these to find the one best suited to them?
The subsidiary questions necessary to inform these questions included:
(1) What other unbalanced bidding models have been proposed and how have these
succeeded / failed to provide an effective solution?
(2) What has research revealed that has been conducted in other areas of
microeconomics as regards decisions that entail trading-off returns against risk?
(3) What are the ethical considerations as regards whether it is acceptable for
contractors to price items using different mark-ups and are they ethically obliged
to price all items by way of using the same mark-up?
The hypotheses tested by the research have been:
(1) The uneven allocation of mark-up between component items can have a
significant effect on both the profitability and the risk of a project.
(2) Some item price combinations may be considered more efficient than others:
some such combinations will contribute the most expected profit for the same or
lesser degree of risk than other combinations.  On this basis, it is not rational for
a contractor to choose to use any prices that are not efficient.
(3) A contractor is able to identify the item prices that will deliver the best
compromise for them between risk and reward, as judged in accordance with
their personal attitude to risk.
In this last chapter, the findings of the above questions are presented, followed by
consideration of whether this research has proven the above hypotheses or not.
Conclusions are then drawn from the research findings, and suggestions are then made
for future research in this field.  Finally, it is assessed whether the research succeeded as












The findings with regard to the three subsidiary questions have been as follows:
(1) What other unbalanced bidding models have been proposed and how have these
succeeded / failed to provide an effective solution?
Chapter 3 reviewed all of the literature in this field, over the past 50 years, since the
beginning of research on unbalanced bidding.  It identified that the various models that
have been proposed all failed as regards…
a. providing a comprehensive method of addressing all of the various
rewards that unbalanced bidding can contribute;
b. identifying the risks that are involved;
c. measuring these risks; and
d. providing any appropriate method by which a contractor can weigh-up the
pursuit of more profit against the exposure to more risk
…thereby equipping contractors so that they are able to decide prices so as to accomplish
a meaningful trade-off between these two objectives, if both of these are treated as being
of equal importance.
(2) What has research revealed that has been conducted in other areas of
microeconomics as regards decisions that entail trading-off returns against risk?
Modern Portfolio Theory (Chapter 6) has made a substantial contribution to change the
manner in which investment portfolios are now chosen.  This entails using a technique
that identifies an Efficient Frontier subset of portfolios: those that offer more return, for
the amount of risk that they generate, than any other.
Expected Utility Theory (Chapter 7), and its progression through to the more recently
formulated Cumulative Prospect Theory, also provides a method of assessing any given











attached.  CPT provides a formulation whereby, if a person were to be interviewed so as
to ascertain their attitude to matters of risk, a more general equation can be applied so as
to identify their likely response to other matters that also involve risk.
Both of these fields provide useful frameworks that can be adopted by building
contractors faced with choosing between different item price combinations that offer
alternative rewards and risks.
(3) What are the ethical considerations as regards whether it is acceptable for
contractors to price items using different mark-ups and are they ethically obliged
to price all items by way of using the same mark-up?
It has been proposed (Chapter 2) that there is nothing that is ethically superior about bids
that are “balanced”.  Contractors have widely divergent costs and their estimates of these
costs are even more divergent.  In a hypothetical situation in which numerous contractors
were to be submitting the same tender price, if these contractors were to all submit fully
priced bills of quantities, a client may even, at times, have cause to prefer one of these
that are “unbalanced” to another that is “balanced”.  Depending on a contractor’s actual
costs and their estimates of these, it is possible that an unbalanced set of prices may be
more resemblant of the industry norm (and more acceptable to a client), than another
contractor’s set of “balanced” prices.  It has also been shown that unbalanced pricing
does not equate to “extreme” pricing or extortionate pricing.  For instance, the pricing
that the test revealed in Chapter 9 is unlikely to be interpreted as extortionate and yet it is
arguably highly unbalanced (mark-ups ranging from –9.0% to 38.4%, as shown in
Appendix E).
The findings as regards the five principle research questions have been as follows:
(1) What are the benefits that can be derived from an uneven distribution of mark-up











Prior research has revealed these to be the prospective improvements to a contractor’s
cashflow, as well as the increased valuation they will receive for any variations that are
expected in the quantities of certain items contained in the bills of quantities of the
project.  The current research has additionally identified a further benefit to be a
prospective increase in the compensation for escalation the contractor will receive.
(2) Is it possible that one model could comprehensively and collectively quantity all
of these?
A model has been formulated (Chapter 4) that does facilitate the measurement of the
revenue that can be derived from each item, and from all items in summation, given a
chosen price for each item.  This model facilitates that prices can be identified to take
advantage of a combined use of ‘front-end loading’, ‘back-end loading’ and ‘quantity
error exploitation’.
(3) What are the risks that contractor exposes themselves to, in the event that they
price items without using a consistent mark-up?
The research (Chapter 5) has formulated these risks for the first time: describing them as
the risks of ‘rejection’, ‘reaction’, and of ‘being wrong’.  Furthermore, it has found that
these risks are of two different forms: which are described as being ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’
risks.  Direct risks result from an item’s price, whilst indirect risks are systemic and will
arise regardless of a price (although indirect risks are proportional to prices).  Direct risks
are least when an item’s price is most resemblant of the industry norm, whereas indirect
risks are least when a price is nil.
(4) Is a contractor able to quantify these risks, for any specific item price
combination?
A model has been formulated that uses a Value-at-Risk method of quantifying these risks
and this has been presented in Chapter 5.  This is the first model to identify and quantify
the risks of item pricing.  This model can measure the risk generated by any item, or all











(5) If it is possible for a contractor to quantity both the prospective profits as well as
the risks for a comprehensive range of different item price combinations, how can
a contractor choose from these to find the one best suited to them?
This research has identified that it is useful to apply MPT (Chapter 6) and CPT (Chapter
7).  These are techniques that were developed in the mainstream microeconomic arena,
typically for the purposes of investment decision-making.  These techniques can be
applied to the domain of contractor’s item pricing as the theoretical basis by which to
single out one item pricing scenario that will deliver the greatest value of utility, taking
account of both the expected profit as well as the risks of a range of alternative pricing
combinations.  A software system has been developed (Chapter 8) that implements and
tests the new theory.  This system uses Monte Carlo simulation, aided by a hybrid
combination of artificial intelligence, genetic computing and fuzzy logic.
10.2 THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The research has sought to provide proof that: (1) the uneven allocation of mark-up
between component items can have a significant effect on both the profitability and the
risk of a project.  A test has been conducted on the hypothetical project described in
Appendix B.  A sample of the results from this test is shown in Appendix C, whilst
Figures 9.2 and 9.3 have illustrated the considerable range of profit, risk and utility from
different item price combinations.
The MPT method (described in Chapter 6), when combined with use of the models that
have developed to measure the returns (Chapter 4) and the risks (Chapter 5) of item
pricing, have provided proof that: (2) some item price combinations may be considered
more efficient than others: some such combinations will contribute the most expected
profit for the same or lesser degree of risk than other combinations.  On this basis, it is
not rational for a contractor to choose to use any prices that are not efficient.
The CPT method (described in Chapter 7), together with the system of implementation











item prices that will deliver the best compromise for them between risk and reward, as
judged in accordance with their personal attitude to risk.
Chapter 9 shows the results of a test done (using the hypothetical project described in
Appendix B), of which the highlights are as follows:
- a present-value profit of around 150% more from the identified pricing than from
a set of ‘balanced’ prices, whilst keeping the risk within the acceptable bounds
that were set,
- providing a basis by which more profit could be accomplished if the contractor
were to indicate that they were more tolerant of risk, and conversely, providing
the means to reign in the risk (albeit with some forfeiture of profit),
- an improvement to the cashflow to the contractor (as shown in Figure 9.7),
- an improvement to the escalation compensation that the contractor can expect to
be paid (as shown in Figure 9.8),
- an improvement to the valuation of anticipated variations (as shown in Figure
9.9),
- pricing that appears ‘reasonable’ and ‘sensible’ (as shown in Appendix E) given
the description of the project in Appendix B.
Furthermore, it is to be noted that the test results show pricing that has effectively
become bound by limits that are more fuzzy in nature than fixed.  The higher the risks that
a contractor is willing to accept, the more loaded or unbalanced the pricing will become,
giving effect to pricing that will be more removed from the pricing that would exist if the
normal (balanced) average mark-up had instead been applied equally to all items.  This
theory is heuristically preferred relative to the previous status-quo in which unbalanced
models were effectively affixing prices to exactly match either their (arbitrarily chosen)












The research has produced a new theory and model for component item pricing.  This
new theory has managed to incorporate an assessment of the risks of item pricing,
facilitating that equal emphasis can be given to both the risks as well as the returns in the
pursuit of identifying a contractor’s best-suited item price combination.
The new composite model has also achieved the effect that prices are bound by limits that
are fuzzy in nature rather than fixed, and that a centrifugal nature of force acts upon these
prices when a contractor is less concerned about risk; whilst, at other times when a
contractor may be uncomfortable with the degree of risk, a centripetal nature of force
serves to contain these prices and reign them in.
Part of the new theory is also that item prices should be referenced to the market’s
expectation of prices for such items, rather than referenced to the contractor’s specific
estimate of their cost.
The research has also shown that unbalanced bidding need not be considered as the
equivalent of extortionate or extreme bidding.  Instead, it is suggested that it is legitimate
for contractors to use sophisticated methods of unbalanced bidding, in the same way that
it has become common practice that they use sophisticated methods (such as the Critical
Path Method) for project management for their scheduling of project activities.  Indeed, it
would appear that contractors who fail to use unbalanced bidding, else who fail to do so
in a manner that is properly managed, with scientific precision, will be failing to
accomplish much of the rewards that they can derived from projects, else that they will be
exposing themselves to unnecessarily excessive risks.  Competitive forces may drive all
contractors to employ these methods.
10.4     RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There is considerable potential for further research in this field.  The intention with this











that this perspective might lead to the further research that is necessary to evolve this
science to the extent that it might become of practical value to contractors.
The many aspects that offer potential for further research include the following:
a) Refining the model and the system, and in particular, optimising the code of the
system so as to make it faster.
b) Further consideration of the determination of the appropriate utility function and
of the normalised scaling of the risks involved, including the measurement of any
contractor’s risk profile.
c) Adapting the model so as to work with whatever data are available in the real
world, looking to integrate them into construction computing systems, and testing
the significance / importance of ‘good’ vs. ’bad’ quality of data.
d) Measuring the variability prevalent in pricing in different workgroups, serving to
aid contractors with determining reasonable settings for the range of acceptable
pricing for each item.
e) Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the costs to clients of unbalanced bidding
relative to the gains that are enjoyed by contractors.  In particular, exploring the
hypothesis that the improved survival of contractors may be a cost worth bearing
by the industry.
f) Exploring the hypothesis that a widespread prevalence of unbalanced bidding may
effectively lead to lower costs to clients, as free-market forces drive contractors to
pass on their benefits to clients, and as unbalanced bidding makes contractors
more financially efficient (in terms of less dependent on capital) by comparison to
using balanced pricing.
g) Surveying the current-day prevalence of unbalanced bidding and modelling the











h) Pursuing the hypothesis that contractors might be forced to ‘follow suit’ – that
they also adopt this practice - in any economic climate in which this practice has
taken hold as being widespread.
i) Adapting this system to other industries such as oil and forestry.
j) Considering the use of Component Unit Pricing Theory as a marketing tool in the
retail sector for the optimisation of strategies that entail differentiated mark-ups
and the use of ‘loss-leaders’.
k) Exploring mathematical alternatives to the use of Monte Carlo simulation.
l) Identifying alternative contractual arrangements that can circumvent the exposure
to clients from unbalanced bidding.
m) Finding effective quantitative methods for use by professional quantity surveyors
for advising their clients on the extent and risks of unbalanced bids.
n) Adding to the debate as regards the ethics of unbalanced bidding, and in
particular, most likely, surveying those involved in the industry so as to assess the
current perception of the prevalence of this practice and whether it is considered
acceptable in ethical terms.
o) Further investigating the ethical dilemma as regards unbalanced bidding and why
it is that balanced bidding is often singled-out as being important in this regard,
and yet little regard is had to the determination of the underlying base item ‘costs’
upon which these evenly-spread mark-ups are meant to be applied.  In particular,
investigating why ‘balanced bids’ are regarded as having a magical ethical
property, despite that no two contractors’ balanced bids will be the same.
p) Pursuing the ethical paradox created when a contractor has an unusual exposure to
costs and yet may be feeling compelled to submit a ‘balanced bid’.  If they submit
a ‘balanced bid’ it might give the appearance of being unbalanced, and yet they
will need to unbalance their bid to give the appearance of a balanced bid.  Clients











highlights the paradox.  Such situations could arise when contractors have
abnormally high or low costs as might arise if they own protected proprietary
rights to alternative materials, alternative sources of materials (such as a quarry)
and / or methods of construction in which they have invested their capital.  In
other situations, they may unavoidably be exposed to excessive costs (relative to
the industry norm) due to having to make use of inappropriate plant that they will
have available at the time of construction.  They might otherwise enjoy the benefit
of less-than-normal costs if they are able to make use of old plant that has already
been ‘written off’ their books.
q) Consider the special case of subcontracting.  It is hypothesised that subcontracting
gives the main-contractor an extraordinary opportunity to reap the benefits of
Component Unit Pricing Theory.  In such instances, contractors have the sub-
contractors’ prices as their guide as regards market prices.  Nevertheless,
contractors can adjust these prices and apply an irregular mark-up before passing
these prices on to their client.
10.5   RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
This research has establish[ed] a scientific basis for more-effective, better-informed item
pricing by contractors, as was stated (Chapter 1) to be the aim.  It has (1) extend[ed] the
present theoretical foundation for component item pricing, (2) in particular, [by way of]
gain[ing] better insight into both the risks as well as the rewards generated from item
pricing.  It has also (3) establish[ed] a new mathematical model that quantifies both the
risks and rewards of item pricing - to facilitate the identification of item prices that will
give effect to a compromise between the pursuit of rewards, together with the restraint
required to avoid excessive risk, as is suited to the circumstance and psychology of a
particular contractor.  Suffice it to say that the aim of the research, together with its












This appendix provides the Java source code of the Xpload software that has been written to test of the model proposed in this thesis.
This software has not been written with the purpose of functioning commercially.  There has been little regard given to the user-
interface or to the processing speed, for instance.
   1 /**
   2  * Xpload.java
   3  * Copyright (c) 2009 - David Cattell, cattell@mac.com / dcattell@carwise.info
   4  */
   5
   6 package oxbridge.carwise.enterprise;
   7
   8 import com.sun.org.apache.bcel.internal.verifier.statics.DOUBLE_Upper;
   9 import java.util.Scanner;
  10 import java.io.File;
  11 import java.io.FileNotFoundException;
  12 import java.io.FileOutputStream;
  13 import java.io.FileDescriptor;
  14 import java.text.*;
  15
  16 public class Xpload {











  18     static int NUMBER_OF_MONTHS = 30;
  19     static final int NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES = 150;
  20     static final int LOW = 0;
  21     static final int MID = 1;
  22     static final int HIGH = 2;
  23     static final double eps = 1.0 + 1.0e-5;
  24     static final boolean splitNORMALdistribution = true;
  25     static int[][] assItem;
  26     static int[][] assLowItem;
  27     static final int lossFromRejection = 100000; // the loss the contractor will incur if
their pricing leads to the client rejecting their bid
  28     static int[] maxProjectRisk = new int[2];
  29     static int[] minProjectRisk = new int[2];
  30     static int[][][] maxItemRisk = new int[504][2][2];
  31     static int[][][] minItemRisk = new int[504][2][2];
  32
  33     /** Creates a new instance of Xpload */
  34     public Xpload() {
  35     }
  36
  37     static public void main(String[] args) {
  38         final float discountingRatePerc = 10F;  // i.e. use the discounting rate of 10%
  39         double rj = (Math.pow((double)discountingRatePerc/100.0 + 1.0,1.0/12.0))-1.0;
  40         double discFactor = (1.0/(1.0+rj));
  41         double discSD = (1.0/(1.0+ 0.2 * rj)) - discFactor;     // where 0.2 shows
that we're assuming that the standard deviation on the contractor's estimate of the
appropriate discounting rate is 20% of the rate he estimates
  42         double[] escFactor = new double[3];
  43         float HAYLETT_FACTOR = 0.85F;
  44         float WINNERS_CURSE = 0.03F;    // let us assume that the contractor's costs
are underestimated by 3% on average, seeing as they won the tender with the lowest price











  45         {
  46             double[] esc = {1, 12, 12}; // i.e. LOW = 1%(High confidence)       HIGH =
12%(Low confidence)      HIGH = 12%(High confidence)
  47             for(int i = 0; i < esc.length; i++) {
  48                 escFactor[i] = Math.pow((double)esc[i]/100.0 + 1.0,1.0/12.0);
  49             }
  50         }
  51         double[] escSD = {(escFactor[0] - 1.0) * 0.10, (escFactor[1] - 1.0) * 0.30,
(escFactor[2] - 1.0) * 0.10}; // reflecting that it is being assumed that the contractor
is much more confident of the escalation prediction for the 1st and 3rd items than the
2nd one
  52         float RETENTION = 0.10F;
  53         float RETENTION_CAP = 0.05F;
  54
  55         String dir = "/PhD_data/";
  56         String itemFileName = dir + "items.txt";
  57         String scheduleFileName = dir + "schedule.txt";
  58         numberOfItems(itemFileName);
  59         float[] itemCost = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  60         float[] origLoPriceGuide = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  61         float[] origHiPriceGuide = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  62         int[] billQuantity = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  63         float[] itemPrice = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  64         float[] itemPriceSD = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  65         float[] assignedMinPrice = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  66         float[] assignedMaxPrice = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  67         float[] expectedVariation = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  68         float[] varSD = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  69         int[] workGroup = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  70         float[] rateRetention = new float[NUMBER_OF_MONTHS];
  71         float[][] lambda = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][NUMBER_OF_MONTHS];











  73         float[] minimumPricingCommitment = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  74         float[] maximumPricingCommitment = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  75         assItem = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES];
  76         assLowItem = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES];
  77         float tenderPrice = 0;
  78         final int NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS = 2000000;
  79         double bestResult = 0;
  80         double bestRecentResult = 0;
  81         int[] pricingSequence = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
  82         int[][] bestPricingSequences = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][3];
  83         double[][][] bestItemUtility = new double[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  84         double[][][] bestInvItemUtility = new double[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  85         float[][][] bestItemPrices = new float[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  86         float[][][] bestItemPriceSD = new float[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  87         float[][][] bestLowItemPrices = new float[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  88         float[][][] bestLowItemPriceSD = new float[2][NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
  89         for (int item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
  90             pricingSequence[item] = item;   // to start with, before we reshuffle
them
  91         }
  92         int randomNumber, item, i, j;
  93         float randomPrice;
  94         float assignedPricing;
  95
  96         int[] pricingScheduleReward = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS];
  97         int[] pricingScheduleRisk = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS];
  98         float[] pricingScheduleUtility = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS];
  99         float[][] pricingSchedule = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
 100         float[][] pricingScheduleSD = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][10];
 101         int[] orderResults = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS];
 102         int[] orderItemResults = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];











 104         int iteration = 0;
 105         int GENERATION = 1000;
 106         boolean firstGeneration = true;
 107         boolean beyondFirstGeneration = false;
 108         boolean birthOfNextGeneration = false;
 109         boolean birthOfSecondGeneration = false;
 110         boolean deathOfGeneration = false;
 111         double[] maxItemReward = new double[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 112         double[] itemBeta = new double[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 113         double[] balancedItemReward = new double[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 114         int[] balancedItemRisk = new int[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 115         double balancedBidReward = 0;
 116         int balancedBidRisk = 0;
 117         int FIRST_TEST = 0;
 118         int SECOND_TEST = 1;
 119         int THIRD_TEST = 2;
 120         int REBOOT_RISK_SCALE = 20000;
 121         boolean RESCALE_RISKS = true;
 122         boolean RESCALED = false;
 123         final boolean MSR_RISK_INCREMENTALLY = false;
 124         double pvActualCost = 0;
 125
 126         // read input data from disk
 127         {
 128             float inputData[][] = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][8+NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1];
 129             inputData = readFile(itemFileName);
 130             float total = 0;
 131             for(i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; i++) {
 132                 int c = 0;
 133                 total = 0;
 134                 confidentOfScheduledTiming[i] = false;











 136                 billQuantity[j] = (int)inputData[i][c++];
 137                 expectedVariation[j] = inputData[i][c++];
 138                 varSD[j] = inputData[i][c++];
 139                 workGroup[j] = (int)inputData[i][c++];
 140                 itemCost[j] = inputData[i][c++];
 141                 origLoPriceGuide[j] = inputData[i][c++];
 142                 origHiPriceGuide[j] = inputData[i][c];
 143                 if(inputData[i][8] > 0.1)
 144                     confidentOfScheduledTiming[i] = true;
 145                 for (int month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
 146                     lambda[i][month] = inputData[i][8+month+1];
 147                     total += lambda[i][month];
 148                 }
 149                 if(total > 1.0 * eps || total < 1.0 / eps) {
 150                     double adj = 1.0 / total;
 151                     for (int month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
 152                         lambda[i][month] *= adj;
 153                     }
 154                 }
 155             }
 156         }
 157
 158         // calculate the tender price, simply as a derivation of the
origPriceGuide[] values
 159         double estimatedProjectCost = 0;
 160         for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
 161             tenderPrice += (origLoPriceGuide[item] + origHiPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0 *
billQuantity[item];
 162             estimatedProjectCost += itemCost[item] * billQuantity[item];
 163         }












 166         float min, max;
 167         boolean assessedWrongRisk = false;
 168         int NUMBER_OF_TESTS = (NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS > 10000 ? 10000 :
NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS);
 169         double[] wrongMean = new double[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 170         double[] wrongSD = new double[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 171
 172         for(j = 0; j < NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS; j++)
 173             orderResults[j] = j;
 174         for(j = 0; j < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; j++)
 175             orderItemResults[j] = j;
 176
 177         // estimate the rate of retention for each month - which is adequate to test
the efficacy of the model
 178         float retainedFunds = 0;
 179         boolean retentionStillInContention = true;
 180         for (int month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
 181             rateRetention[month] = RETENTION;
 182             float monthsRetention = 0;
 183             float monthsValuation = 0;
 184             for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
 185                 monthsValuation += lambda[item][month] * billQuantity[item] *
expectedVariation[item] * Math.pow(((escFactor[workGroup[item]] - 1) * HAYLETT_FACTOR +
1),month+1) * (origLoPriceGuide[item] + origHiPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0;
 186                 monthsRetention = rateRetention[month] * monthsValuation;
 187             }
 188             if(retainedFunds + monthsRetention > RETENTION_CAP * tenderPrice &&
retentionStillInContention) {
 189                 monthsRetention = RETENTION_CAP * tenderPrice - retainedFunds;
 190                 rateRetention[month] = monthsRetention / monthsValuation;
 191                 retentionStillInContention = false;











 193                 if(!retentionStillInContention) {
 194                     rateRetention[month] = 0;
 195                     monthsRetention = 0;
 196                 }
 197             }
 198             retainedFunds += monthsRetention;
 199         }
 200
 201         // now that we have an estimate of the rateRetention[] values...
 202         System.out.println("About to start simulation (using "+NUMBER_OF_TESTS+"
iterations) to assess the risk of being wrong");
 203         // do a Monte-Carlo simulation to assess the risk of being wrong
 204         for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
 205             double[] wrongResults = new double[NUMBER_OF_TESTS];
 206             for (i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_TESTS; i++) {
 207                 // 1. the contractor could be wrong as regards their estimate of the
appropriate discounting rate...
 208                 double simulatedDiscFactor = normrand(discFactor, discSD);
 209
 210                 // 2. also when estimating the variance in item's quantity...
 211                 double simulatedExpectedVariation = normrand(expectedVariation[item],
varSD[item]);
 212
 213                 // 3. also when estimating each workgroup's escalation rate...
 214                 double simulatedEscFactor = normrand(escFactor[workGroup[item]],
escSD[workGroup[item]]);
 215
 216                 // 4. also with their scheduled timing of the project...
 217                 float[] simulatedLambda = simulateLambda(lambda[item],
confidentOfScheduledTiming[item]);
 218











 220                     wrongResults[i] += Math.pow(simulatedDiscFactor, month+1) *
simulatedLambda[month] * billQuantity[item] * simulatedExpectedVariation *
 221                             Math.pow(((simulatedEscFactor - 1) * HAYLETT_FACTOR +
1),month+1) * (1.0 - rateRetention[month]);
 222                 }
 223             }
 224             // determine the mean and SD of the wrongResults[]
 225             wrongMean[item] = mean(wrongResults);
 226             wrongSD[item] = stdev(wrongResults);
 227         }
 228         assessedWrongRisk = true;
 229         System.out.println("Finished simulation to assess the risk of being wrong");
 230         float alpha = 0;
 231         float beta = 0;
 232         float lastUsefulBeta = 0, lastUsefulAlpha = 0;
 233         boolean recentImprovement = false, notSoRecentImprovement = false,
nowStretchingAlpha = false, nowStretchingBeta = false, lastLeg = false;
 234         int maxItemIndexTestedThusFar = 0;
 235         float[] stillLearning = {0, 0, 0};
 236         boolean invalidResult = false;
 237
 238         String pickDebug = "";
 239         String[] pickDebugAll = new String[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS];
 240         boolean ranked = false;
 241         while (iteration < NUMBER_OF_ITERATIONS && (iteration < stillLearning[2] +
100000 || recentImprovement || notSoRecentImprovement ||
 242                 beta > lastUsefulBeta + 0.2 ||
 243                 alpha > lastUsefulAlpha + 0.2)) {   // pack up when it appears that
the system is no longer still learning anything
 244             if(iteration == REBOOT_RISK_SCALE && RESCALE_RISKS && !RESCALED) {  //
then reboot











 246                 bestRecentResult = 0;
 247                 System.out.println();
 248                 System.out.println("Switched to new scale");
 249                 RESCALED = true; // so that it won't trip up again when it reaches
this stage
 250                 iteration = THIRD_TEST; // 3; // to go back to the beginning, with
some acquired knowledge though remaining intact
 251             }
 252             firstGeneration = iteration < GENERATION && !RESCALED;
 253             beyondFirstGeneration = !firstGeneration;
 254             birthOfNextGeneration = iteration % GENERATION == 0;
 255             deathOfGeneration = (iteration+1) % GENERATION == 0;
 256             birthOfSecondGeneration = iteration == GENERATION;
 257             int k = RESCALED ? 1: 0;
 258             double s = Math.random();
 259             int kk = RESCALED ? (iteration < GENERATION ? 0 : (iteration > 1000 ? 1 :
s < (double)iteration / 1000.0 ? 1 : 0)) : 0; // switch across increasingly to the new-
found intelligence on the best pricing, fading them in over the course of 1000 iterations
 260             assignedPricing = 0;
 261             String sequence;
 262
 263             if(beyondFirstGeneration && iteration % 3 == 0) {
 264                 double seed = Math.random();
 265                 int oneOfTen = (int)(seed * 10);
 266                 sequence = "A" + oneOfTen;
 267                 for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++)
 268                     pricingSequence[item] = bestPricingSequences[item][oneOfTen];
// rank them starting from the one that produces the greatest utility / price
 269             } else if (iteration % 3 == 1) {
 270                 sequence = "B";
 271                 // reshuffle the sequence of priority for pricing all items











 273                     randomNumber = item +
(int)Math.floor(Math.random()*(NUMBER_OF_ITEMS - item));
 274                     int rand = pricingSequence[randomNumber];
 275                     for(j = randomNumber; j > item; j--) {
 276                         pricingSequence[j] = pricingSequence[j-1];
 277                     }
 278                     pricingSequence[item] = rand;
 279                 }
 280             } else {
 281                 // price an initial portion of the items in accordance with
orderItemResults and then randomly scramble the rest
 282                 int extent = (int)((NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1) * Math.random());
 283                 sequence = "C" + extent;
 284                 for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++)
 285                     pricingSequence[item] = orderItemResults[item%2 == 0 ? item / 2
: (NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1) - (item / 2)];        // rank them starting from the one that
produces the greatest utility / price
 286                 for (item = extent; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) {
 287                     randomNumber = item +
(int)Math.floor(Math.random()*(NUMBER_OF_ITEMS - item));
 288                     int rand = pricingSequence[randomNumber];
 289                     for(j = randomNumber; j > item; j--) {
 290                         pricingSequence[j] = pricingSequence[j-1];
 291                     }
 292                     pricingSequence[item] = rand;
 293                 }
 294             }
 295
 296             // plan ahead and determine the commitments that lie ahead which will
later serve to ensure that the item pricing will not conflict with the tender price
 297             float mult = 0.0F;











 299                 for (int ii = NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1; ii >= 0; ii--) {
 300                     assignedMinPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] = (beyondFirstGeneration ?
(bestLowItemPrices[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0] - mult *
bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0]) : origLoPriceGuide[pricingSequence[ii]]);
 301                     assignedMaxPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] = (beyondFirstGeneration ?
(bestItemPrices[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0] + mult *
bestItemPriceSD[kk][pricingSequence[ii]][0]) : origHiPriceGuide[pricingSequence[ii]]);
 302
 303                     minimumPricingCommitment[ii] = (ii < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1 ?
minimumPricingCommitment[ii+1] : 0)
 304                     + assignedMinPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] *
billQuantity[pricingSequence[ii]];
 305                     maximumPricingCommitment[ii] = (ii < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1 ?
maximumPricingCommitment[ii+1] : 0)
 306                     + assignedMaxPrice[pricingSequence[ii]] *
billQuantity[pricingSequence[ii]];
 307                 }
 308                 if(mult == 0)
 309                     mult = 0.1F;
 310                 else
 311                     mult *= 1.1;
 312             } while(beyondFirstGeneration && (minimumPricingCommitment[0] >
tenderPrice || maximumPricingCommitment[0] < tenderPrice));
 313             boolean priceAllRemainingItemsWithMinimumPrice = false;
 314             boolean priceAllRemainingItemsWithMaximumPrice = false;
 315             int ireset = (int)(Math.random() * (NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1));
 316             int preset = (int)(Math.random() * (NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1));
 317             for (int ii = 0; ii < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; ii++) { // price all items in order
of this iteration's sequence
 318                 item = pricingSequence[ii];
 319                 if(priceAllRemainingItemsWithMinimumPrice) {












 321                     itemPriceSD[item] = 0;
 322                 } else if(priceAllRemainingItemsWithMaximumPrice) {
 323                     itemPrice[item] = roundCents(beyondFirstGeneration ?
assignedMaxPrice[item] : origHiPriceGuide[item]);
 324                     itemPriceSD[item] = 0;
 325                 } else {
 326                     if(deathOfGeneration) {
 327                         randomPrice = bestItemPrices[kk][item][0]; // give it the
price that we've found (looking at this item in isolation) produces the highest utility
 328                         itemPriceSD[item] = 0;
 329                     } else {
 330                         if(firstGeneration) {
 331                             randomPrice =  (float)normrand((origHiPriceGuide[item] +
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0, (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0);
 332                             itemPriceSD[item] = (float)((origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0);
 333                         } else {
 334                             // Analyse the ten best prices so far for this item
(taken in isolation), to serve to guide the process going forward
 335                             // If we are confident that a high price suits this item
then try one higher than before...
 336                             float guidePrice, guideSD;
 337                             boolean bestProducersOfUtility = itemRanking[item] <
(float)NUMBER_OF_ITEMS / 3F;
 338                             boolean worstProducersOfUtility = itemRanking[item] >
(float)NUMBER_OF_ITEMS * 2F/3F;
 339                             int individualItemProducesHighUtility = 0,
itemPriceInTopPerformingProjectsHigh = 0, bestItemsProducingUtility = 0, combo1 = 0,
combo2 = 0, combo3 = 0, combo4 = 0, individualItemProducesLowUtility = 0,
itemPriceInTopPerformingProjectsLow = 0, worstItemsProducingUtility = 0, combo5 = 0,












 341                             if(ii == 0 && birthOfNextGeneration) {
 342                                 // link all items that are similarly priced, giving
the opportunity that they may learn from each other
 343                                 for (int ai = 0; ai < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; ai++) {
 344                                     for (int aj = 0; aj < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES; aj++)
{
 345                                         assItem[ai][aj] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
 346                                         assLowItem[ai][aj] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
 347                                     }
 348                                     int associate = 0;
 349                                     int lowAssociate = 0;
 350                                     for (int aj = 0; aj < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; aj++) {
 351                                         if (((bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] >=
bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] < bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0]+1) ||
 352                                                 (bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <=
bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestItemPrices[kk][ai][0] > bestItemPrices[kk][aj][0]-1)) &&
 353                                                 associate < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES &&
 354                                                 ai != aj) {// priced within a $ of
each other
 355                                             assItem[ai][associate] = aj;
 356                                             associate++;
 357                                         }
 358                                         if (((bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] >=
bestLowItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <
bestLowItemPrices[k][aj][0]+1) ||
 359                                                 (bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] <=
bestLowItemPrices[kk][aj][0] && bestLowItemPrices[kk][ai][0] >
bestLowItemPrices[k][aj][0]-1)) &&
 360                                                 lowAssociate < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES
&&












 362                                             assLowItem[ai][lowAssociate] = aj;
 363                                             lowAssociate++;
 364                                         }
 365                                     }
 366                                 }
 367                                 if(beyondFirstGeneration) {
 368                                     // Let the next generation learn from its
predecessors.
 369                                     // The next generation of iterations will be
seeded on the basis that this has learnt from
 370                                     // the successes of past generations.
 371                                     // "Successes" are not only defined by way of
item price combinations that yield the best overall utility
 372                                     // but also this system is constantly on the
lookout for any cases of where any individual item's
 373                                     // price (taken in isolation) is found to
contribute to an extraordinarily high utility.
 374                                     // The genetic algorithm purposefully steers the
testing towards more and more unexpected situations
 375                                     // in the hope that some gems of knowledge will
be acquired that will contribute later when evolution
 376                                     // leads the analysis back to where it has found
the most likely domain for finding the best utility.
 377                                     // It is therefore not of concern, but rather it
is representative of the intent, that the results go
 378                                     // through a phase of getting worse before they
get better.  The system learns from taking the risks
 379                                     // whilst getting worse and takes to the extreme
until it finds no-more can be learnt from having strayed
 380                                     // this far.  It then heads back, armed with all











 381                                     // finally seeks to find the best way by which
to take advantage of all that has been learnt.
 382                                     // New settings for Beta and Alpha serve to
guide the Monte-Carlo Simulation process through the next
 383                                     // generation of iterations.
 384                                     // Beta determines the variation or "spread" of
the distribution of random numbers tested, whilst
 385                                     // Alpha determines the relative value of their
mean compared to past tests.  So, values for Alpha
 386                                     // of anything other than 0.0 causes the new
tests to be shifted away from previous tests into a territory
 387                                     // that might, to some extent, not have
previously been explored.
 388                                     // High Beta values lend themselves to the
system making "wild guesses" whilst low Beta values are
 389                                     // appropriate for when the system has honed its
knowledge to the extent that it may be more certain
 390                                     // around where to find the best results.
 391                                     // High Alpha values are used to explore new
ground far away from where previous tests have been done
 392                                     // whilst low Alpha values lend themselves to
exploring the exact same territory as before.
 393                                     String route = "a";
 394                                     if(recentImprovement ||
 395                                             ((beta >= (stillLearning[0] / eps) &&
alpha >= (stillLearning[1] / eps)) &&
 396                                             (beta < (stillLearning[0]+0.2)*eps ||
alpha < (stillLearning[1]+0.2)*eps))) {
 397                                         route += "b";
 398                                         if(recentImprovement) {
 399                                             route += "c";











 401                                             lastUsefulAlpha = alpha;
 402                                             if(alpha > 0)
 403                                                 alpha -= 0.1F;
 404                                         } else {
 405                                             route += "d";
 406                                             if(beta >= (stillLearning[0]+0.2)/eps &&
alpha >= (stillLearning[1]+0.2)/eps) {
 407                                                 route += "e";
 408                                                 if(beta > alpha)
 409                                                     beta = 0;
 410                                                 else
 411                                                     alpha = 0;
 412                                             } else if(beta >=
(stillLearning[0]+0.2)/eps) {
 413                                                 beta = 0;
 414                                                 if(alpha >=
(stillLearning[1]+0.2)/eps)
 415                                                     alpha = 0;
 416                                                 else
 417                                                     alpha += 0.1F;
 418                                                 route += "f";
 419                                             } else if(alpha >=
(stillLearning[1]+0.2)/eps) {
 420                                                 alpha = 0;
 421                                                 beta += 0.1;
 422                                                 route += "g";
 423                                             } else {
 424                                                 beta += 0.1;
 425                                                 alpha += 0.1F;
 426                                                 route += "h";
 427                                             }











 429                                     } else if(notSoRecentImprovement) {
 430                                         route += "i";
 431                                         beta = 0;
 432                                         alpha = 0;
 433                                         notSoRecentImprovement = false; // reset
 434                                     } else { // if we seem to be going nowhere, we now
need to embark on a new regimen by use to make good use of the intelligence that has
already been gathered
 435                                         route += "j";
 436                                         if(similar(beta, lastUsefulBeta) &&
similar(alpha, lastUsefulAlpha)) {
 437                                             route += "k";
 438                                             beta = 0.1F;
 439                                             alpha = 0.0F;
 440                                         } else if (Math.random() < 0.5) {
 441                                             route += "l";
 442                                             beta = 0;
 443                                             alpha = 0;
 444                                         } else {
 445                                             route += "l";
 446                                             beta = lastUsefulBeta;
 447                                             alpha = lastUsefulAlpha;
 448                                         }
 449                                     }
 450                                     beta = roundOff(beta);
 451                                     alpha = roundOff(alpha);
 452                                     if(pickDebug.length() > 0) {
 453                                         System.out.println();
 454                                         System.out.println(pickDebug); pickDebug = "";
 455                                     }
 456                                     if(bestRecentResult != bestResult)












 458                                     System.out.println(iteration+": Changed beta to
"+beta+" & alpha to "+alpha+" (having taken route "+route+")");
 459                                     recentImprovement = false;  // reset every
generation, regardless
 460                                     bestRecentResult = 0;
 461                                 }
 462                             }
 463
 464                             boolean loadItem = false;
 465                             double direction = 0;
 466                             boolean reset = ii == 0 || ii == ireset; // gives effect
to a (possible) scrambling of the pickers with every new set of itemPrices
 467                             scramblePickMethod(reset);
 468
 469                             if(pickMethod(itemBeta[item] > (mean(itemBeta) + 0.5 *
stdev(itemBeta)),
 470                                     mean(pricingSchedule[item]) >
(origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,
 471                                     bestProducersOfUtility)) {  // load these
 472                                 loadItem = true;
 473                                 direction = +1;
 474                             } else if(pickMethod2(itemBeta[item] < mean(itemBeta),
 475                                     mean(pricingSchedule[item]) <
(origHiPriceGuide[item] + origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,
 476                                     worstProducersOfUtility)) { // unload these
(i.e. drain these to provide funding for the loading)
 477                                 loadItem = true;
 478                                 direction = -1;
 479                             }
 480











best combination of the best item prices already found
 482                                 scramblePicker(ii == 0 || ii == preset); // shake it up
 483                                 boolean load = itemRanking[item] <=
(float)NUMBER_OF_ITEMS / 2F;
 484                                 guidePrice = pickrand(load ?
bestItemPrices[kk][item][0] : bestLowItemPrices[kk][item][0]/* + direction * alpha *
bestLowItemPriceSD[item][0]*/,
 485                                         load ?
bestItemPrices[kk][associatedItem(item)][0] : bestLowItemPrices[kk][associatedLowItem(item)][0],
 486                                         pricingSchedule[item][0]/* + direction *
alpha * bestItemPriceSD[item][0]*/);
 487                                 guideSD = 0;
 488                             } else {
 489                                 scramblePicker(ii == 0 || ii == preset);
 490                                 if(loadItem) {
 491                                     int ra = (int)(Math.random() * (NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-
1));
 492                                     if(direction > 0) {
 493                                         guidePrice =
pickrand(mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item]) + direction * alpha * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 494                                                 bestItemPrices[kk][item][0] +
direction * alpha * bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 495
bestItemPrices[kk][associatedItem(item)][0],
 496                                                 bestItemPrices[kk][ra][0],
 497                                                 pricingSchedule[item][0] + direction
* alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 498                                                 mean(pricingSchedule[item]) +
direction * alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 499                                                 origLoPriceGuide[item] +
(2.0+direction * alpha)/4.0 * (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]),











 501                                                 mean(pricingSchedule[item]),
 502                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] +
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F);    // wild shot
 503                                         guideSD = (float)(beta *
pick(bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0] * 3,
 504                                                 bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 505
bestItemPriceSD[kk][associatedItem(item)][0],
 506                                                 bestItemPriceSD[kk][ra][0],
 507                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 508                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 509                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 3,
 510                                                 bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 511                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 512                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F));
 513                                     } else {
 514                                         guidePrice =
pickrand(mean(bestLowItemPrices[kk][item]) + direction * alpha *
bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 515                                                 bestLowItemPrices[kk][item][0] +
direction * alpha * bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 516
bestLowItemPrices[kk][associatedLowItem(item)][0],
 517                                                 bestLowItemPrices[kk][ra][0],
 518                                                 pricingSchedule[item][0] + direction
* alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 519                                                 mean(pricingSchedule[item]) +
direction * alpha * pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 520                                                 origLoPriceGuide[item] +











 521                                                 mean(bestLowItemPrices[kk][item]),
 522                                                 mean(pricingSchedule[item]),
 523                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] +
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F);    // wild shot
 524                                         guideSD = (float)(beta *
pick(bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][item][0] * 3,
 525                                                 bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 526
bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][associatedLowItem(item)][0],
 527                                                 bestLowItemPriceSD[kk][ra][0],
 528                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 529                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 530                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 3,
 531                                                 bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 532                                                 pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 533                                                 (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F));
 534                                     }
 535                                 } else {    // until I can think of something better
to do with the others, perhaps just leave them at their original settings, barring
widening up the variance slightly (in an effort to increase the possibility of finding
something new)
 536                                     guidePrice = pickrand(bestItemPrices[kk][item][0],
 537                                             bestItemPrices[kk][associatedItem(item)][0],
 538
bestLowItemPrices[kk][associatedLowItem(item)][0],
 539                                             pricingSchedule[item][0],
 540                                             mean(pricingSchedule[item]),
 541                                             mean(bestItemPrices[kk][item]),












 543                                             (origHiPriceGuide[item] +
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F);    // wild shot






 547                                             pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 548                                             pricingScheduleSD[item][0],
 549                                             bestItemPriceSD[kk][item][0],
 550                                             1.2F * (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F,
 551                                             (origHiPriceGuide[item] -
origLoPriceGuide[item]) / 2.0F));
 552                                 }
 553                             }
 554                             pickDebugAll[item] = (direction > 0 ? "+" : direction <
0 ? "-" : " ") + stick;
 555                             itemPriceSD[item] = guideSD;
 556                             randomPrice =  (float)normrand(guidePrice, guideSD);
 557                             if(randomPrice <= 0) {
 558                                 if(guidePrice > 0)
 559                                     randomPrice = guidePrice;
 560                                 else
 561                                     randomPrice = 0;
 562                             }
 563                         }
 564                     }
 565                     min = ii+1 < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS ? minimumPricingCommitment[ii+1] :
0;












 567                     if(iteration == FIRST_TEST)
 568                         itemPrice[item] = origLoPriceGuide[item]; // to induce a
record of each item's max risk
 569                     else if(iteration == SECOND_TEST)
 570                         itemPrice[item] = origHiPriceGuide[item]; // to induce a
record of each item's max risk
 571                     else {
 572                         if(assignedPricing + billQuantity[item] * randomPrice <
tenderPrice - min &&
 573                                 assignedPricing + billQuantity[item] * randomPrice >
tenderPrice - max) {
 574                             if(iteration == THIRD_TEST)
 575                                 itemPrice[item] = roundCents((float)(itemCost[item] *
(1.0 + avgMarkUp)));  // to induce a record of the project's least risk
 576                             else
 577                                 itemPrice[item] = roundCents(randomPrice);
 578                         } else if(assignedPricing + billQuantity[item] * randomPrice <
tenderPrice - max) {
 579                             itemPrice[item] = roundCents((tenderPrice - max -
assignedPricing) / billQuantity[item]);
 580                             priceAllRemainingItemsWithMaximumPrice = true;
 581                         } else {
 582                             itemPrice[item] = roundCents((tenderPrice - min -
assignedPricing) / billQuantity[item]);
 583                             priceAllRemainingItemsWithMinimumPrice = true;
 584                         }
 585                     }
 586                 }
 587                 assignedPricing += itemPrice[item] * billQuantity[item];
 588             }











assignedPricing < tenderPrice / eps)) {
 590                 System.out.println("ERROR: assignedPricing = "+assignedPricing+"
relative to tenderPrice = "+tenderPrice);
 591                 invalidResult = true;
 592             }
 593             double itemReward, reward = 0, riskRejection, riskReaction = 0,
riskOfBeingWrong = 0, result = 0, maxRiskRejection = 0;
 594
 595             if(!invalidResult) {
 596                 try {
 597                     String SEP = ", ";
 598                     String CR = "\r\n";
 599                     FileOutputStream flog = new FileOutputStream("dummy", true);
 600                     flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "inflowFactors.txt");
 601                     FileOutputStream flog2 = new FileOutputStream("dummy", true);
 602                     flog2 = openFlog(flog2, dir + "outflows.txt");
 603                     FileOutputStream flog3 = new FileOutputStream("dummy", true);
 604                     flog3 = openFlog(flog3, dir + "escalation.txt");
 605                     for (item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) { // evaluate the
effect of this pricing schedule
 606                         String line = ""+item, line2 = ""+item;
 607                         itemReward = 0;
 608                         double itemRetention = 0, retention, monthsReward = 0,
monthsCost, itemsCost = 0, escalation = 0;
 609                         for(int month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
 610                             monthsReward = itemPrice[item] * lambda[item][month] *
billQuantity[item] * expectedVariation[item] * Math.pow(((escFactor[workGroup[item]] - 1)
* HAYLETT_FACTOR + 1),month+1);
 611                             monthsCost = (itemCost[item] * (1.0 + WINNERS_CURSE)) *
lambda[item][month] * billQuantity[item] * expectedVariation[item] *
Math.pow(escFactor[workGroup[item]],month+1);











 613                             // If I wanted to add interest to the funds in the
retention fund, this is the place to add it
 614                             itemRetention += retention;
 615                             if(month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS-1)
 616                                 monthsReward -= retention;
 617                             else
 618                                 monthsReward += itemRetention; // release the
retention from the fund in the last month
 619                             itemReward += Math.pow(discFactor, month+1) *
monthsReward;
 620                             itemsCost += Math.pow(discFactor, month+1) * monthsCost;
 621                             line += SEP + monthsReward / itemPrice[item];
 622                             line2 += SEP + monthsCost;
 623                             escalation += lambda[item][month] * billQuantity[item] *
expectedVariation[item] * (Math.pow(((escFactor[workGroup[item]] - 1) *
HAYLETT_FACTOR)+1,month+1) - 1);
 624                         }
 625                         line +=CR;
 626                         line2 +=CR;
 627                         String line3 = "" + item + SEP + escalation + CR;
 628                         if(iteration == FIRST_TEST) {
 629                             writeLine(flog, line);
 630                             writeLine(flog2, line2);
 631                             writeLine(flog3, line3);
 632                         }
 633                         reward += itemReward;
 634                         itemBeta[item] = itemReward / (itemPrice[item] *
billQuantity[item]); // so each item's itemBeta should remain constant regardless of the
test price
 635                         float SD = (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origLoPriceGuide[item]) /
2F;












 637                         double risk = normdist(itemPrice[item], origMeanPrice, SD);
 638                         double riskMax = normdist(origMeanPrice, origMeanPrice, SD); //
the least risk will arise at the origGuidePrice
 639                         riskRejection = (riskMax - risk) * (double)lossFromRejection /
riskMax; // to inverse it and standardize it
 640                         if(riskRejection > maxRiskRejection)
 641                             maxRiskRejection = riskRejection;
 642                         double lossFromReaction = itemsCost - itemReward;
 643                         if(iteration == 0 && !RESCALED) // only do it once
 644                             pvActualCost += itemsCost;
 645                         riskReaction += Math.abs((riskMax - risk) *
(double)lossFromReaction / riskMax);
 646                         riskOfBeingWrong += (wrongMean[item] - norminv(0.48,
wrongMean[item], wrongSD[item])) * itemPrice[item]; // where 0.3 is the probability
assigned to the VaR assessment
 647                         int iRisk = (int)(Math.abs((riskMax - risk) *
(double)lossFromReaction / riskMax) + (wrongMean[item] - norminv(0.48, wrongMean[item],
wrongSD[item])) * itemPrice[item] + riskRejection);
 648                         if(iteration <= THIRD_TEST) {
 649                             balancedItemReward[item] = itemReward;
 650                             balancedItemRisk[item] = iRisk;
 651                         }
 652                         double itemResult = utilityFunction(itemReward -
balancedItemReward[item], iRisk - (MSR_RISK_INCREMENTALLY ? balancedItemRisk[item] : 0),
item, !RESCALED, itemPrice[item] == 0, iteration == FIRST_TEST, iteration == SECOND_TEST,
iteration == THIRD_TEST);// / (itemPrice[item] * billQuantity[item]);
 653                         if((Double.isNaN(maxItemReward[item]) || maxItemReward[item]
== 0) && itemPrice[item] > 0) {
 654                             float high = origHiPriceGuide[item];//origMeanPrice + 2.0F
* (origHiPriceGuide[item] - origMeanPrice);












 656                         }
 657                         double invItemResult = itemPrice[item] > 0 ?
utilityFunction(iteration > THIRD_TEST ? maxItemReward[item] - itemReward /*-
balancedItemReward[item]*/ : 0, iRisk - (MSR_RISK_INCREMENTALLY ? balancedItemRisk[item]
: 0), item, true, !RESCALED, itemPrice[item] == 0, iteration == FIRST_TEST, iteration ==
SECOND_TEST, iteration == THIRD_TEST) / (itemPrice[item] * billQuantity[item]) : 0;
 658
 659                         if(item > maxItemIndexTestedThusFar && iteration >=
THIRD_TEST)
 660                             maxItemIndexTestedThusFar = item;
 661                         if(!Double.isNaN(invItemResult) && invItemResult != 0 &&
(invItemResult > bestInvItemUtility[k][item][9] || bestLowItemPrices[k][item][9] == 0)) {
 662                             boolean knownAlready = false, bubbleUp = false,
betterThanBefore = false;
 663                             int jj = 0;
 664                             while(jj < 10 && bestLowItemPrices[k][item][jj] > 0 &&
!knownAlready) {
 665                                 if(itemPrice[item] == bestLowItemPrices[k][item][jj])
 666                                     knownAlready = true;
 667                                 jj++;
 668                             }
 669                             if(knownAlready && invItemResult >
bestInvItemUtility[k][item][jj-1])
 670                                 betterThanBefore = true;
 671                             if((!knownAlready || betterThanBefore) && iteration >
THIRD_TEST) {
 672                                 int bubble = 9;
 673                                 while(bubble > 0 && ((invItemResult >
bestInvItemUtility[k][item][bubble-1]) || bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble-1] == 0)) {












 675                                         bubbleUp = true;
 676                                     if(!knownAlready || bubbleUp) {
 677                                         bestInvItemUtility[k][item][bubble] =
bestInvItemUtility[k][item][bubble-1];
 678                                         bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble] =
bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble-1];
 679                                         bestLowItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble] =
bestLowItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble-1];
 680                                     }
 681                                     bubble--;
 682                                 }
 683                                 bestInvItemUtility[k][item][bubble] = invItemResult;
 684                                 if(beyondFirstGeneration &&
bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble] != itemPrice[item]) {
 685                                     System.out.print("-"+bubble);
 686                                     pickDebug += pickDebugAll[item];
 687                                 }
 688                                 if(bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble] !=
itemPrice[item] && stillLearning(bubble)) {   // see the effects of moving along a lot faster
 689                                     stillLearning[0] = beta; stillLearning[1] =
alpha; stillLearning[2] = iteration;}
 690                                 bestLowItemPrices[k][item][bubble] =
itemPrice[item];
 691                                 bestLowItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble] =
itemPriceSD[item];
 692                             }
 693                         }
 694                         if(!Double.isNaN(itemResult) && itemResult != 0 && (itemResult
> bestItemUtility[k][item][9] || bestItemPrices[k][item][9] == 0)) {
 695                             boolean knownAlready = false, bubbleUp = false,
betterThanBefore = false;











 697                             while(jj < 10 && bestItemPrices[k][item][jj] != 0 &&
!knownAlready) {
 698                                 if(itemPrice[item] == bestItemPrices[k][item][jj])
 699                                     knownAlready = true;
 700                                 jj++;
 701                             }
 702                             if(knownAlready && itemResult >
bestItemUtility[k][item][jj-1])
 703                                 betterThanBefore = true;
 704                             if((!knownAlready || betterThanBefore) && iteration >
THIRD_TEST) {
 705                                 int bubble = 9;
 706                                 while(bubble > 0 && ((itemResult >
bestItemUtility[k][item][bubble-1]) || bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble-1] == 0)) {
 707                                     if(bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble] ==
itemPrice[item])
 708                                         bubbleUp = true;
 709                                     if(!knownAlready || bubbleUp) {
 710                                         bestItemUtility[k][item][bubble] =
bestItemUtility[k][item][bubble-1];
 711                                         bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble] =
bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble-1];
 712                                         bestItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble] =
bestItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble-1];
 713                                     }
 714                                     bubble--;
 715                                 }
 716                                 bestItemUtility[k][item][bubble] = itemResult;
 717                                 if(beyondFirstGeneration &&
bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble] != itemPrice[item]) {
 718                                     System.out.print("+"+bubble);











 720                                 }
 721                                 if(bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble] != itemPrice[item]
&& stillLearning(bubble)) {   // see the effects of moving along a lot faster
 722                                     stillLearning[0] = beta; stillLearning[1] =
alpha; stillLearning[2] = iteration;}
 723                                 bestItemPrices[k][item][bubble] = itemPrice[item];
 724                                 bestItemPriceSD[k][item][bubble] =
itemPriceSD[item];
 725                             }
 726                         }
 727
 728                         if(!ranked && iteration >= THIRD_TEST && !RESCALED) {
 729                             int oldPos = 0, newPos = 0;
 730                             for(i = maxItemIndexTestedThusFar; i >= 0; i--) {
 731                                 if(itemBeta[item] >= itemBeta[orderItemResults[i]] ||
itemBeta[orderItemResults[i]] == 0)
 732                                     newPos = i;
 733                                 if(orderItemResults[i] == item)
 734                                     oldPos = i;
 735                             }
 736                             if(newPos != oldPos) {
 737                                 int add = 1;
 738                                 if(newPos > oldPos)
 739                                     add = -1;
 740                                 i = oldPos;
 741                                 while(i >= 0 && i < (maxItemIndexTestedThusFar+1)-(add
== 1 ? 0 : -1) && i != newPos) {
 742                                     orderItemResults[i] = orderItemResults[i-add];
 743                                     i -= add;
 744                                 }
 745                                 orderItemResults[newPos] = item;











 747                             if(maxItemIndexTestedThusFar == NUMBER_OF_ITEMS-1) {
 748                                 for(i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; i++)
 749                                     itemRanking[orderItemResults[i]] = i;
 750                             }
 751                         }
 752                     }
 753                     closeFlog(flog);
 754                 } catch(java.io.IOException ioe) {
 755                     ioe.printStackTrace();
 756                 }
 757                 if(iteration >= THIRD_TEST)
 758                     ranked = true;
 759                 if(iteration <= THIRD_TEST) {
 760                     balancedBidReward = reward;
 761                     balancedBidRisk = (int)(riskReaction + riskOfBeingWrong +
maxRiskRejection);
 762                 }
 763                 result = utilityFunction(reward - balancedBidReward, (int)(riskReaction +
riskOfBeingWrong + maxRiskRejection - (MSR_RISK_INCREMENTALLY ? balancedBidRisk : 0)),
!RESCALED, iteration == FIRST_TEST, iteration == SECOND_TEST, iteration == THIRD_TEST);
// in accordance with whatever the formula is
 764
 765                 pricingScheduleReward[iteration] = Math.round(Math.round(reward));
 766                 pricingScheduleRisk[iteration] = Math.round(Math.round(riskReaction +
riskOfBeingWrong + maxRiskRejection));
 767                 pricingScheduleUtility[iteration] = (float)result;
 768                 if(result > bestResult || bestResult == 0) {
 769                     double prevBest = bestResult;
 770                     bestResult = result;
 771                     bestRecentResult = bestResult;
 772                     if(pickDebug.length() > 0) {











 774                         System.out.println(pickDebug); pickDebug = "";
 775                     }
 776                     int improve = Math.round((float)((reward - balancedBidReward) /
(balancedBidReward - pvActualCost)) * 100F);
 777                     System.out.println("Improvement (due to item pricing priority
sequence " + sequence + ") to "+bestResult+" after "+iteration+" efforts, increasing the
reward to "+(int)reward+" (a "+improve+"% improvement on the profit from a balanced bid)
whilst reducing the total risk to "+(int)(riskReaction + riskOfBeingWrong +
maxRiskRejection)+"(riskReaction = "+(int)riskReaction+", riskOfBeingWrong =
"+(int)riskOfBeingWrong+" & riskRejection = "+(int)maxRiskRejection+")");
 778                     if(beyondFirstGeneration) {
 779                         if((int)Math.round(result) > (int)Math.round(prevBest)) {
 780                             recentImprovement = true;
 781                             notSoRecentImprovement = true;
 782                         }
 783                         if(!deathOfGeneration) {
 784                             stillLearning[0] = beta; stillLearning[1] = alpha;
 785                         }
 786                         stillLearning[2] = iteration;
 787                     }
 788                 } else {
 789                     if(result > bestRecentResult || bestRecentResult == 0)
 790                         bestRecentResult = result;
 791                 }
 792
 793                 // Slot the new results into the position that it accomplishes in
the order of descending utility
 794                 int newPos = 0;
 795                 i = 0;
 796                 while(i <= iteration && (float)result <
pricingScheduleUtility[orderResults[i]]) {











 798                     i++;
 799                 }
 800                 for(i = iteration; i > newPos; i--)
 801                     orderResults[i] = orderResults[i-1];
 802                 orderResults[newPos] = iteration;
 803
 804                 if(newPos < 10) {
 805                     int bubble = 9;
 806                     while(bubble > 0 && ((result >
pricingScheduleUtility[orderResults[bubble-1]]) ||
pricingScheduleUtility[orderResults[bubble-1]] == 0)) {
 807                         for(i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; i++) {
 808                             pricingSchedule[i][bubble] = pricingSchedule[i][bubble-
1];
 809                             pricingScheduleSD[i][bubble] =
pricingScheduleSD[i][bubble-1];
 810                             if(newPos < 3 && bubble < 3)
 811                                 bestPricingSequences[i][bubble] =
bestPricingSequences[i][bubble-1];
 812                         }
 813                         bubble--;
 814                     }
 815                     for(i = 0; i < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; i++) {
 816                         pricingSchedule[i][bubble] = itemPrice[i];
 817                         pricingScheduleSD[i][bubble] = itemPriceSD[i];
 818                         if(bubble < 3)
 819                             bestPricingSequences[i][bubble] = pricingSequence[i];
 820                     }
 821                 }
 822                 invalidResult = false; // reset
 823                 iteration++;











 825             if(iteration < 51000 ? iteration % 10000 == 0 : iteration % 50000 == 0)
 826                 writeResults(dir, iteration, bestItemPrices, bestItemUtility,
bestLowItemPrices, pricingSchedule, pricingScheduleReward, pricingScheduleRisk,
pricingScheduleUtility, orderResults);
 827         }
 828     }
 829
 830     static String customFormat(String pattern, double value) {
 831         DecimalFormat myFormatter = new DecimalFormat(pattern);
 832         String output = myFormatter.format(value);
 833         return(output);
 834     }
 835
 836     static String DecOneFormat(double value) {
 837         return customFormat("#0.#", value);
 838     }
 839
 840     private static void writeResults(String dir, int iteration, float[][][] bestItemPrices,
double[][][] bestItemUtility, float[][][] bestLowItemPrices, float[][] pricingSchedule, int[]
pricingScheduleReward, int[] pricingScheduleRisk, float[] pricingScheduleUtility, int[]
orderResults) {
 841         try {
 842             String SEP = ", ";
 843             String CR = "\r\n";
 844             FileOutputStream flog = new FileOutputStream("dummy", true);
 845
 846             // write the best item prices to disk
 847             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "bestPrices0hi_" + iteration + ".txt");
 848             int it = 0;
 849             String line = ""+it;
 850             for(int i = 0; i < 10; i++)











 852             line +=CR;
 853             writeLine(flog, line);
 854
 855             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "bestPrices0util_" + iteration + ".txt");
 856             line = ""+it;
 857             for(int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
 858                 line += SEP+DecOneFormat(bestItemUtility[1][it][i]);
 859             line +=CR;
 860             writeLine(flog, line);
 861
 862             // write the best item prices to disk
 863             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "bestPrices1lo_" + iteration + ".txt");
 864             for(int item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) { // loop through all
the items
 865                 line = ""+item;
 866                 for(int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
 867                     line += SEP+bestLowItemPrices[1][item][i];
 868                 line +=CR;
 869                 writeLine(flog, line);
 870             }
 871
 872             // write the best schedule of prices to disk
 873             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "bestPrices_" + iteration + ".txt");
 874             for(int item = 0; item < NUMBER_OF_ITEMS; item++) { // loop through all
the items
 875                 line = ""+item;
 876                 for(int sch = 0; sch < 10; sch++)
 877                     line += SEP+pricingSchedule[item][sch];
 878                 line +=CR;
 879                 writeLine(flog, line);












 882             // write all the results from all of the tested alternative pricing
schedules
 883             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "bestResults_" + iteration + ".txt");
 884             for(int res = 0; res < iteration; res++)  // loop through all the results
 885                 writeLine(flog, ""+res+SEP+
 886                         pricingScheduleReward[orderResults[res]]+SEP+
 887                         pricingScheduleRisk[orderResults[res]]+SEP+
 888                         pricingScheduleUtility[orderResults[res]]+CR);
 889
 890             // write all the results from all of the tested alternative pricing
schedules
 891             flog = openFlog(flog, dir + "results_" + iteration + ".txt");
 892             for(int res = 0; res < iteration; res++)  // loop through all the results
 893                 writeLine(flog, ""+res+SEP+
 894                         pricingScheduleReward[res]+SEP+
 895                         pricingScheduleRisk[res]+SEP+
 896                         pricingScheduleUtility[res]+CR);
 897
 898             closeFlog(flog);
 899         } catch(java.io.IOException ioe) {
 900             ioe.printStackTrace();
 901         }
 902     }
 903
 904     private static float roundCents(float price) {
 905         int times100 = Math.round(price * 100);
 906         return (float)times100 / 100F;
 907     }
 908
 909     private static boolean stillLearning(int bubbles) {
 910         if(bubbles == 0)











 912         return false;
 913     }
 914     private static int associatedItem(int item) {
 915         return assItem(item, assItem);
 916     }
 917     private static int associatedLowItem(int item) {
 918         return assItem(item, assLowItem);
 919     }
 920     private static int assItem(int item, int aI[][]) {
 921         int associatedItems = 0, i = 0, assocItem = item;
 922         if(aI[0][0] > 0) {
 923             while (associatedItems < NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES && aI[item][associatedItems]
< Integer.MAX_VALUE) {
 924                 associatedItems++;
 925             }
 926             i = (int)Math.round(Math.random() * associatedItems);
 927             if(i == NUMBER_OF_ASSOCIATES)
 928                 i--;
 929             assocItem = aI[item][i];
 930         }
 931         if(assocItem == Integer.MAX_VALUE) // there are no other items with a similar
price
 932             assocItem = item;
 933         return assocItem;
 934     }
 935
 936     private static double utilityFunction(double reward, int risk, boolean preReset, boolean
loTest, boolean hiTest, boolean balTest) {
 937         return utilityFunction(reward, risk, 999, false, preReset, false, loTest, hiTest,
balTest);












 940     private static double utilityFunction(double reward, int risk, int item, boolean preReset,
boolean zeroPrice, boolean loTest, boolean hiTest, boolean balTest) {
 941         return utilityFunction(reward, risk, item, false, preReset, zeroPrice, loTest,
hiTest, balTest);
 942     }
 943
 944     private static double utilityFunction(double reward, int risk, int item, boolean low, boolean
preReset, boolean zeroPrice, boolean loTest, boolean hiTest, boolean balTest) {
 945         boolean itemOnly = item <= NUMBER_OF_ITEMS;
 946         int i = low ? 0 : 1;
 947         int ii = preReset ? 0 : 1;
 948         boolean postReset = !preReset;
 949         if (item > NUMBER_OF_ITEMS) {
 950             if(loTest || hiTest)
 951                 maxProjectRisk[0] = risk;
 952             if(balTest) {
 953                 minProjectRisk[0] = risk;
 954                 if(preReset) {
 955                     minProjectRisk[1] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
 956                     maxProjectRisk[1] = Integer.MIN_VALUE;
 957                 }
 958             } else if(preReset) {
 959                 if(risk < minProjectRisk[1])
 960                     minProjectRisk[1] = risk;
 961                 if(risk > maxProjectRisk[1])
 962                     maxProjectRisk[1] = risk;
 963             }
 964         } else if(loTest || hiTest)
 965             maxItemRisk[item][i][0] = risk;
 966         else if(balTest) {
 967             minItemRisk[item][i][0] = risk;











 969                 minItemRisk[item][i][1] = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
 970                 maxItemRisk[item][i][1] = Integer.MIN_VALUE;
 971             }
 972         } else if(preReset) {
 973             if(risk < minItemRisk[item][i][1])
 974                 minItemRisk[item][i][1] = risk;
 975             if(risk > maxItemRisk[item][i][1])
 976                 maxItemRisk[item][i][1] = risk;
 977         }
 978
 979         int maxRisk = itemOnly ? maxItemRisk[item][i][ii] : maxProjectRisk[ii];
 980         int minRisk = 0;//itemOnly ? minItemRisk[item][i][ii] : minProjectRisk[ii];
 981         double riskRating = Math.min(1, Math.max(0, 1.0 - (double)(risk - minRisk) /
(maxRisk - minRisk))); // is 0 when the risk is greatest and 1 when the risk is least,
and linear inbetween
 982         double weight = Wplus(riskRating);
 983         if (reward < 0) // in the event of a loss
 984             weight = 1 - Wminus(1 - riskRating);
 985         return weight * util(reward);
 986     }
 987
 988     private static double Wplus(double t) {
 989         return weight(t, 0.61);    // as per Tversky & Kahneman (1992)'s original
assessment
 990     }
 991
 992     private static double Wminus(double t) {
 993         return weight(t, 0.69);    // as per Tversky & Kahneman (1992)'s original
assessment
 994     }
 995











 997         return Math.pow(a, b) / Math.pow(Math.pow(a, b) + Math.pow(1.0-a, b), 1.0 /
b);
 998     }
 999
1000     private static double util(double y) {
1001         double CPT_alpha  = 0.88;    // as per Tversky & Kahneman (1992)'s original
assessment
1002         double CPT_beta   = 0.88;       // as per Tversky & Kahneman (1992)'s original
assessment, obviously potentially different from CPT_alpha
1003         double CPT_lambda = 2.25;   // ditto
1004         double lambda = 1.0;
1005         double factor = CPT_alpha;
1006         if (y == 0)
1007             return y;
1008         else if(y < 0) {
1009             factor = CPT_beta;
1010             lambda = -CPT_lambda;
1011         }
1012         double b = Math.abs(y);
1013         if (factor > 0)
1014             b = lambda * Math.pow(b, factor);
1015         else {
1016             if (CPT_beta == 0)
1017                 b = lambda * Math.log(b);
1018             else
1019                 b = lambda * (1 - Math.pow(b + 1.0, factor));
1020         }
1021         return b;
1022     }
1023
1024     private static float roundOff(float a) {











1026         return (float)b / 10;
1027     }
1028
1029     private static boolean similar(double a, double b) {
1030         // to see if two values are materially the same, at the level of cents
1031         long inta = Math.round(a * 100); // to convert to cents
1032         long intb = Math.round(b * 100);
1033         if(a == b)
1034             return true;
1035         return false;
1036     }
1037
1038     private static float[] simulateLambda(float[] itemLambda, boolean confident) {
1039         float centralTime = 0;
1040         float simulatedcentralTime;
1041         float[] weeklySchedule = new float[itemLambda.length * 4];
1042         float[] newWeeklySchedule = new float[weeklySchedule.length];
1043         float[] simulatedLambda = new float[NUMBER_OF_MONTHS];
1044         int started = 0, ended = 0;
1045         boolean activityStarted = false;
1046         for(int month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
1047             centralTime += (month + 1) * itemLambda[month];
1048             for(int week = 0; week < 4; week++) { // assume a simple 4-week month,
each month
1049                 int wk = month * 4 + week;
1050                 weeklySchedule[wk] = itemLambda[month] / 4.0F;  // assume a simple
even spread over the 4 weeks in the month
1051                 if(!activityStarted && itemLambda[month] > 0) {
1052                     started = wk;
1053                     activityStarted = true;
1054                 }











1056                     ended = wk;
1057             }
1058         }
1059         if(confident)
1060             simulatedcentralTime = (float)normrand(centralTime, 0.05 * centralTime);
// a 5% SD being assumed for the timing of items where the contractor is confident of
their timing
1061         else
1062             simulatedcentralTime = (float)normrand(centralTime, 0.20 * centralTime);
// a 20% SD being assumed for the timing of items where the contractor is not confident
of their timing
1063
1064         float delay = (simulatedcentralTime - centralTime) * 4.0F;
1065         double sigma = 0;
1066         int firstActiveMonth = 0;
1067         int lastActiveMonth = 0;
1068         boolean alreadyActive = false;
1069         double potentialEffectOfOne = 0;
1070         double oldCentreOfGravity = 0;
1071         double interimNewCentreOfGravity = 0;
1072         started = Math.max(Math.round((float)started + delay), 0);
1073         ended = Math.min(Math.round((float)ended + delay), NUMBER_OF_MONTHS * 4 - 1);
1074         int month = 0;
1075         for(int week = 0; week <= ended; week++) {
1076             int corresponding = week;
1077             corresponding = Math.min(Math.max(Math.round((float)corresponding - delay),
0), weeklySchedule.length - 1); // constrained to avoid computing errors
1078             if(week >= started)
1079                 newWeeklySchedule[week] = weeklySchedule[corresponding];
1080             simulatedLambda[month] += newWeeklySchedule[week];
1081             if((week+1) % 4 == 0 || week == ended) {











1083                 interimNewCentreOfGravity += (1.0 + month) * simulatedLambda[month];
1084                 sigma += simulatedLambda[month];
1085                 if(simulatedLambda[month] > 0) {
1086                     if(!alreadyActive) {
1087                         firstActiveMonth = month;
1088                         alreadyActive = true;
1089                     }
1090                     lastActiveMonth = month;
1091                 }
1092                 month++;
1093             }
1094         }
1095         potentialEffectOfOne = firstActiveMonth - lastActiveMonth; // the effect on
unadjusted of adding one unit to the first month of activity and taking this away from
the last month of activity
1096         double desiredNewCentreOfGravity = Math.min(Math.max(oldCentreOfGravity *
simulatedcentralTime / centralTime, 0), NUMBER_OF_MONTHS);
1097         double factorOfOne = (desiredNewCentreOfGravity - interimNewCentreOfGravity) /
potentialEffectOfOne;
1098         simulatedLambda[firstActiveMonth] += factorOfOne;       // addth a fraction
of the 'one'...
1099         simulatedLambda[lastActiveMonth] -= factorOfOne;        // ...and taketh it
away (to restore the balance)
1100         int i = firstActiveMonth;
1101         float kitty = 0;
1102         while(simulatedLambda[i] < 0) {
1103             kitty = -simulatedLambda[i];
1104             simulatedLambda[i] = 0;
1105             i++;
1106         }
1107         while(kitty > 0) {











1109             simulatedLambda[i] -= tail;
1110             kitty -= tail;
1111             i++;
1112         }
1113         float newSigma = 0;
1114         for(month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
1115             newSigma += simulatedLambda[month];
1116         }
1117         float newNewSigma = 0;
1118         boolean fix = false;
1119         for(month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++) {
1120             simulatedLambda[month] /= newSigma;
1121             if(Float.isNaN(simulatedLambda[month]))
1122                 fix = true;
1123             newNewSigma += simulatedLambda[month];
1124         }
1125         if(fix) {
1126             for(month = 0; month < NUMBER_OF_MONTHS; month++)
1127                 simulatedLambda[month] = 0;
1128             if(desiredNewCentreOfGravity >= NUMBER_OF_MONTHS)
1129                 simulatedLambda[NUMBER_OF_MONTHS-1] = 1;
1130             else
1131                 simulatedLambda[0] = 1;
1132         }
1133
1134         if(newNewSigma >  1.0 * eps || newNewSigma < 1.0 / eps)
1135             System.out.println("ERROR: newNewSigma = "+newNewSigma);
1136
1137         for(i = 0; i < simulatedLambda.length; i++)
1138             if(Float.isNaN(simulatedLambda[i]))













1141         return simulatedLambda;
1142     }
1143
1144     static double r = 0, rr = 0;
1145     static boolean scramble = false;
1146     private static void scramblePicker(boolean reset) {
1147         // rescrambles the pickers 50% of the time
1148         scramble = reset; // test scrambling it every time it is reset
1149         if(reset)
1150             scramble = Math.random() < 0.5;
1151     }
1152
1153     static boolean scrambleMethod = false;
1154     private static void scramblePickMethod(boolean reset) {
1155         // rescrambles the pickers 50% of the time
1156         if(reset)
1157             scrambleMethod = Math.random() < 0.5;
1158     }
1159     static boolean wildCard1 = false, wildCard2 = false;
1160     private static boolean pickMethod(boolean method1, boolean method2, boolean method3) {
1161         // takes a random pick of these 3 methods (and all possible combinations of
these)
1162         if(scrambleMethod) {
1163             r = Math.random();
1164             wildCard1 = r < 0.05;
1165             wildCard2 = r > 0.95;
1166         }
1167         if (wildCard1)
1168             return true;    // very occasionally, pick any item at random to test with
a loaded price, in case it may be discovered to be a gem











1170             return method1; // because it's Hobson's choice, so why waste processing
time deciding it?
1171         return picky(method1, method2, method3);
1172     }
1173
1174     private static boolean pickMethod2(boolean method1, boolean method2, boolean method3) {
1175         // keep the pick of the methods the same as the previous pickMethod(),
regardless of any possible scramble
1176         if (wildCard2)
1177             return true;    // very occasionally, pick any item at random to test with
an unloaded price, in case it may be discovered to be a gem
1178         if(method1 == method2 == method3)
1179             return method1; // because it's Hobson's choice, so why waste processing
time deciding it?
1180         return picky(method1, method2, method3);
1181     }
1182
1183     private static boolean picky(boolean method1, boolean method2, boolean method3) {
1184         // to serve pickMethod() and pickMethod2()
1185         boolean[] combinations = {method1, method2, method3, method1 && method2,
method1 && method2 && method3, method1 && method3, method2 && method3};
1186         int i = 1;
1187         while(i <= combinations.length) {
1188             if(r < (double)i * 1.0 / combinations.length)
1189                 return combinations[i-1];
1190             i++;
1191         }
1192         return false;  // should never reach here
1193     }
1194
1195     private static float pickrand(double...choices) {











1197         if(scramble)    // retains the same choice of the set provided, unless
scramblePicker() has been run and it has decided (with even odds) to rescramble the
choice
1198             rr = Math.random();
1199         return pixie(choices);
1200     }
1201
1202     private static float pick(double...choices) {
1203         // returns a random pick of the choices provided, adopting the same pick of
this set as done with any previous pick
1204         return pixie(choices);
1205     }
1206
1207     static String R = "abcdefghijk";
1208     static char stick;
1209     private static float pixie(double[] choices) {
1210         // serves pickrand() and pick()
1211         int i = 1;
1212         while(i <= choices.length) {
1213             if(rr < (double)i * 1.0 / choices.length) {
1214                 stick = R.charAt(i-1);
1215                 return (float)choices[i-1];
1216             }
1217             i++;
1218         }
1219         return -1;
1220     }
1221
1222     private static double min(double[] array) {
1223         // Returns the smallest of a series of numbers
1224         double min = Double.MAX_VALUE;











1226             if(array[i] < min)
1227                 min = array[i];
1228         }
1229         return min;
1230     }
1231
1232     private static double max(double[] array) {
1233         // Returns the largest of a series of numbers
1234         double max = Double.MIN_VALUE;
1235         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++) {
1236             if(array[i] > max)
1237                 max = array[i];
1238         }
1239         return max;
1240     }
1241
1242     private static int count(float[] array) {
1243         // Returns the size of the array
1244         double total = 0;
1245         int i = array.length-1;
1246         while(i >= 0) {
1247             total += array[i];
1248             if(total > 0)
1249                 return i+1;
1250             i--;
1251         }
1252         return 0;
1253     }
1254
1255     private static int count(double[] array) {
1256         // Returns the size of the array











1258         int i = array.length-1;
1259         while(i >= 0) {
1260             total += array[i];
1261             if(total > 0)
1262                 return i+1;
1263             i--;
1264         }
1265         return 0;
1266     }
1267
1268     private static int count(double[][] array) {
1269         // Returns the number of non-zero elements in the array
1270         int count = 0;
1271         int i = array[0].length-1;
1272         while(i >= 0) {
1273             int j = array.length-1;
1274             while(j >= 0) {
1275                 if(array[j][i] != 0)
1276                     count++;
1277                 j--;
1278             }
1279             i--;
1280         }
1281         return count;
1282     }
1283
1284     private static float mean(float[][] array) {
1285         // Returns the mean of a series of numbers passed in a fully-populated 2D
array
1286         double total = 0;
1287         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)











1289                 total += array[i][j];
1290         return (float)(total / (array.length * array[0].length));
1291     }
1292
1293     private static double mean(double[][] array) {
1294         // Returns the mean of a series of numbers passed in a fully-populated 2D
array
1295         double total = 0;
1296         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
1297             for(int j = 0; j < array[0].length; j++)
1298                 total += array[i][j];
1299         return total / (array.length * array[0].length);
1300     }
1301
1302     private static float mean(float[] array) {
1303         // Returns the mean of a series of numbers passed in a sparsely-populated 1D
array
1304         double total = 0;
1305         int size = count(array);
1306         for(int i = 0; i < size; i++)
1307             total += array[i];
1308         return (float)(total / size);
1309     }
1310
1311     private static double mean(double[] array) {
1312         // Returns the mean of a series of numbers passed in a sparsely-populated 1D
array
1313         double total = 0;
1314         int size = count(array);
1315         for(int i = 0; i < size; i++)
1316             total += array[i];











1318     }
1319
1320     private static double sqsum(float[] array) {
1321         // Returns the summation of the square value of a series of numbers
1322         double squareSum = 0;
1323         int size = count(array);
1324         for(int i = 0; i < size; i++)
1325             squareSum += Math.pow(array[i], 2);
1326         return squareSum;
1327     }
1328
1329     private static double sqsum(double[] array) {
1330         // Returns the summation of the square value of a series of numbers
1331         double squareSum = 0;
1332         int size = count(array);
1333         for(int i = 0; i < size; i++)
1334             squareSum += Math.pow(array[i], 2);
1335         return squareSum;
1336     }
1337
1338     private static double sqsum(double[][] array) {
1339         // Returns the summation of the square value of a series of numbers
1340         double squareSum = 0;
1341         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
1342             for(int j = 0; j < array[0].length; j++)
1343                 squareSum += Math.pow(array[i][j], 2);
1344         return squareSum;
1345     }
1346
1347     private static double sum(float[] array) {
1348         // Returns the summation of a series of numbers passed in an array











1350         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
1351             sum += array[i];
1352         return sum;
1353     }
1354
1355     private static double sum(double[] array) {
1356         // Returns the summation of a series of numbers passed in an array
1357         double sum = 0;
1358         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
1359             sum += array[i];
1360         return sum;
1361     }
1362
1363     private static double sum(double[][] array) {
1364         // Returns the summation of a series of numbers passed in an array
1365         double sum = 0;
1366         for(int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
1367             for(int j = 0; j < array[0].length; j++)
1368                 sum += array[i][j];
1369         return sum;
1370     }
1371
1372     private static double scalar(float[] array) {
1373         return 1/(double)(count(array)-1);
1374     }
1375
1376     private static double scalar(double[] array) {
1377         return 1/(double)(count(array)-1);
1378     }
1379
1380     private static double scalar(double[][] array) {











1382     }
1383
1384     private static double var(float[] array) {
1385         // Returns the variance of a series of numbers passed in an array
1386         return (scalar(array)*(sqsum(array) - (Math.pow(sum(array), 2)/count(array))));
1387     }
1388
1389     private static double var(double[] array) {
1390         // Returns the variance of a series of numbers passed in an array
1391         return (scalar(array)*(sqsum(array) - (Math.pow(sum(array), 2)/count(array))));
1392     }
1393
1394     private static double var(double[][] array) {
1395         // Returns the variance of a series of numbers passed in an array
1396         return (scalar(array)*(sqsum(array) - (Math.pow(sum(array), 2)/count(array))));
1397     }
1398
1399     private static double stdev(float[] array) {
1400         // Returns the standard deviation of the series of numbers passed in an
array
1401         return Math.sqrt(var(array));
1402     }
1403
1404     private static double stdev(double[] array) {
1405         // Returns the standard deviation of the series of numbers passed in an
array
1406         return Math.sqrt(var(array));
1407     }
1408
1409     private static double stdev(double[][] array) {











1411         return Math.sqrt(var(array));
1412     }
1413
1414     private static float normrandHiLo(double lo, double hi) {
1415         // Returns a random value that is normally distributed
1416         double mean = (hi + lo) / 2.0;
1417         double stdev = (hi - lo) / 2.0;
1418         return (float)normrand(mean, stdev);
1419     }
1420
1421     private static double normrand(double mean, double stdev) {
1422         // Returns a random value that is normally distributed
1423         return mean + stdev*Math.sqrt(-
1*Math.log(Math.random()))*Math.sin(2*Math.PI*Math.random());
1424     }
1425
1426     private static double normsrand() {
1427         // Returns a standard random value that is normally distributed (that has a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one)
1428         return normrand(0.0, 1.0);
1429     }
1430
1431     private static double normsdist(double z) {
1432         // Returns the standard normal cumulative distribution (has a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one)
1433         return normdist(z, 0.0F, 1.0F);
1434     }
1435
1436     private static double normdist(double z, double mean, double spread) {
1437         double y;
1438         double stdev;











distribution, we assume that 50% of the spread specified is "flat" - where there is no
risk whatsoever regardless of the price
1440         if(splitNORMALdistribution) {
1441             double flat = flatPortion * spread;
1442             stdev = spread - flat;
1443             if(z > mean - flat && z < mean + flat)
1444                 y = (1.0/(stdev*Math.sqrt(2.0*Math.PI)));
1445             else {
1446                 double zmean;
1447                 if(z < mean)
1448                     zmean = z - mean + flat;
1449                 else
1450                     zmean = z - mean - flat;
1451                 y = (1.0/(stdev*Math.sqrt(2.0*Math.PI)))*Math.pow(10.0, (-
Math.pow(zmean,2)/(2.0*Math.pow(stdev,2)))); // complying to a normal distribution
1452             }
1453         } else {
1454             stdev = spread;
1455             y = (1.0/(stdev*Math.sqrt(2.0*Math.PI)))*Math.pow(10.0, (-Math.pow(z -
mean,2)/(2.0*Math.pow(stdev,2)))); // complying to a normal distribution
1456         }
1457         return y;
1458     }
1459
1460     private static double norminv(double probability, double mean, double stdev) {
1461         // Returns the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution for the
specified mean and standard deviation
1462         // See
https://secure.codeproject.com/script/Forums/View.aspx?fid=326859&msg=2624087
1463         double p = probability;
1464         if(probability >= 0.5)











1466         double t = Math.sqrt(Math.log(1.0/Math.pow(p, 2)));
1467         double c_0 = 2.515517;
1468         double c_1 = 0.802853;
1469         double c_2 = 0.010328;
1470         double d_1 = 1.432788;
1471         double d_2 = 0.189269;
1472         double d_3 = 0.001308;
1473
1474         double X = t - (c_0 + c_1*t + c_2*Math.pow(t,2)) / (1.0 + d_1*t +
d_2*Math.pow(t,2) + d_3*Math.pow(t,3));
1475
1476         X = - X; // negate X
1477         if(probability >= 0.5)
1478             X = - X; // negate X
1479
1480         X *= stdev;
1481         X += mean;
1482
1483         return X; // Producing results roughly consistent with Excel
1484     }
1485
1486     private static void writeLine(FileOutputStream flog, String line) throws
java.io.IOException {
1487         byte b[] = line.getBytes();
1488         flog.write(b);
1489     }
1490
1491     private static void closeFlog(FileOutputStream flog) throws java.io.IOException {
1492         flushFlog(flog);
1493         flog.close();












1496     private static FileOutputStream openFlog(FileOutputStream flog, String name) throws
java.io.IOException {
1497         flushFlog(flog);
1498         File fileName = new File(name);
1499         fileName.delete();
1500         return new FileOutputStream(fileName, true);
1501     }
1502
1503     private static void flushFlog(FileOutputStream flog) throws java.io.IOException {
1504         FileDescriptor desc = flog.getFD();
1505         desc.sync();  // because flush only means that a high-level buffer gets
cleared but the data often can still sit in a system buffer without being written to the
actual disk surface.  Sync'ing should ensure that the system buffers get flushed and the
data written to disk.  Even when it's requested, it doesn't always happen without error
though.
1506         flog.flush();
1507     }
1508
1509     private static void numberOfItems(String fileName) {
1510         try {
1511             Scanner scanner = new Scanner(new File(fileName));
1512             scanner.useDelimiter(System.getProperty("line.separator"));
1513             int big = 0;
1514             int lineCounter = 0;
1515             while(scanner.hasNext()) {
1516                 big = index(scanner.next())+1;
1517                 int bigger = Math.max(big, lineCounter);
1518                 if(bigger > NUMBER_OF_ITEMS)
1519                     NUMBER_OF_ITEMS = bigger;
1520             }
1521             scanner.close();











1523             ioe.printStackTrace();
1524         }
1525     }
1526
1527     private static int index(String line) {
1528         Scanner lineScanner = new Scanner(line);
1529         lineScanner.useDelimiter("\\s*,\\s*");
1530         int index = lineScanner.nextInt();
1531         return index;
1532     }
1533
1534     private static float[][] readFile(String fileName) {
1535         final int COL = 8;
1536         float[][] array = new float[NUMBER_OF_ITEMS][COL+NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1];
1537         float[] values = new float[COL+NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1];
1538         try {
1539             Scanner scanner = new Scanner(new File(fileName));
1540             scanner.useDelimiter(System.getProperty("line.separator"));
1541             int index = 0;
1542             while(scanner.hasNext()) {
1543                 values = parseLine(scanner.next(), index);
1544                 for (int i = 0; i < COL+NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1; i++)
1545                     array[index][i] = values[i];
1546                 index++;
1547             }
1548             scanner.close();
1549         } catch(java.io.IOException ioe) {
1550             ioe.printStackTrace();
1551         }
1552         return array;












1555     private static float[] parseLine(String line, int in) {
1556         float[] values = new float[8+NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1];
1557         String[] segments = new String[NUMBER_OF_MONTHS+1];
1558         if(line.endsWith("\r"))
1559             line = line.substring(0, line.length()-1);
1560         Scanner lineScanner = new Scanner(line);
1561         lineScanner.useDelimiter("\\s*,\\s*");
1562         values[0] = lineScanner.nextInt(); // index
1563         values[1] = lineScanner.nextInt(); // qnty
1564         values[2] = lineScanner.nextFloat(); // variance
1565         values[3] = lineScanner.nextFloat(); // varSD
1566         String wrkGrp = lineScanner.next();
1567         if(wrkGrp.equals("LOW"))
1568             values[4] = LOW;
1569         else if(wrkGrp.equals("HIGH"))
1570             values[4] = HIGH;
1571         else
1572             values[4] = MID;
1573         values[5] = lineScanner.nextFloat(); // cost
1574         values[6] = lineScanner.nextFloat(); // loPrice
1575         values[7] = lineScanner.nextFloat(); // hiPrice
1576         int i = 0;
1577         while(lineScanner.hasNext()) {
1578             segments[i++] = lineScanner.next();
1579         }
1580         boolean confident = segments[0].equals("true");
1581         if(confident)
1582             values[8] = 1;
1583         else
1584             values[8] = 0;
1585         int j = 1;











1587             String[] sides = segments[j].split("=");
1588             float rhs = Float.parseFloat(sides[1]);
1589             String lhs = sides[0];
1590             if(lhs.indexOf("-") >= 0) {
1591                 String[] mons = lhs.split("-");
1592                 for(int m = Integer.parseInt(mons[0]); m <= Integer.parseInt(mons[1]);
m++)
1593                     values[9+m] = rhs;
1594             } else
1595                 values[9+Integer.parseInt(lhs)] = rhs;
1596             j++;
1597         }
1598         return values;















APPENDIX B. HYPOTHETICAL PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
This appendix serves to describe the hypothetical project developed to serve as input data
for the Xpload software.  This project has been designed to serve as a test of the model
proposed in this thesis.  It includes a spectrum of artificial items created with a view to
testing to examine how the model reacts to each of their circumstances.  Typically, each
item is designed to be similar to many other items and yet different in one regard.  This
facilitates the test to see how the model treats each of these items.  The objective is,
therefore, not only to see how the model handles the collective, overall project, but also
how it prices each of the constituent items in the process.
There are 504 items (referenced as items 0 –503) in the project and they are read by the
software from a data file named “items.txt”.
This hypothetical project is not intended to resemble any particular real-world project nor
is it intended to emulate any practical project that is likely to be encountered in the real
world.  It is, rather, specifically designed to serve to test robustness of the model to












This file contains the following fields of data for each of the 504 items that comprise the
overall hypothetical project:
Item Number (e.g. 0)
A unique reference to each item, in the range 0 to 503.
Item Quantity in the Bills of Quantities (e.g. 100)
All items have been given the arbitrary quantity of 100.  This represents the quantity
prepared by the Quantity Surveyor as would be presented in the project’s Bills of
Quantities.  These are often subject to variation during the course of the project.
Expected Variation (e.g. 1.3)
A value of 1.0 for this field would represent no variation from the Item Quantity whilst a
value of 1.1, for example, would represent the volume of work increasing by 10%.
Similarly, a value of 0.9 would represent a 10% decrease in the quantum of this item.
Standard Deviation in the estimate of this variation (e.g. 0.06)
This field gives the contractor an opportunity to indicate their confidence in their estimate
of the aforementioned expected quantity variation.  Three alternative scenarios are tested:
0.0 representing absolute confidence; 0.06 representing a moderate degree of confidence;
and 0.15 representing a lesser-degree of confidence.  The quantum of these degrees of
confidence is not important and the purpose of this exercise is to test how the model will
react to situations where there are simply differences, to some degree, in the extent to
which the contractor has confidence in their estimate.
Nature of Workgroup (e.g. HIGH)
This field provides the opportunity to indicate whether the item in question is contained
in a workgroup that has an expectation of high or low rates of escalation, with two
possibilities of confidence in the estimates of these rates.  A value of ‘LOW’ is used to











standard deviation of 0.1%); ‘MID’ is used to describe a workgroup with a mean
expectation of a 12% rate of escalation, with a low rate of confidence reflecting in a
relatively high 3.6% standard deviation); and ‘HIGH’ is used to describe a workgroup
that also has a 12% rate of escalation where the confidence in this is, however, high
(represented by a standard deviation of 1.2%).  These values are hard-coded into the
software.
As with the above-mentioned Standard Deviation, the quantum of these rates of
escalation is not intended to being significant.  The purpose of this hypothetical project is
instead to test whether the model responds to differences in escalation rates between
items in a manner that is heuristically consistent with the model’s underlying hypotheses.
Estimated Unit Cost (e.g. 110)
The model uses the estimated item unit costs for the purpose of determining the value of
the ‘loss of reaction’ (see page 89 for an explanation).
Low Market-Price (e.g. 100)
The model requires that the contractor provide an indication of the likely reaction from
the client to prices for this nature of item.  Heuristics suggest that, for each item, there is
a range of prices that are likely to be acceptable in the sense of not likely provoking any
‘reaction’ or ‘rejection’ from the client.  For this purpose a client is defined as ‘reacting’
if the item price is such that it serves to induce them to redesign the project so as to either
increase or decrease the quantity of this item.  For instance, a client may adopt a view
that an especially low price for an item represents an opportunity for them to redesign
their project such that they take advantage of making increased use of this item.  An
example is if the price of one possible “finish” for a particular element is very low, the
client may choose to switch the specification from alternative, more highly-priced
finishes to this one.
Similarly, ‘rejection’ is defined as the situation where a client may be so outraged by the
contractor’s pricing that they close negotiations with this contractor in favour of rather











to the contractor of losing out on this opportunity. See pages 86-87 for an explanation of
this opportunity cost.
This Low price is defined as the price-point at which there is roughly a 16% chance that a
lesser price will be acceptable (by the above definition).
High Market-Price (e.g. 150)
Similarly, the model requires an indication of the upper-end range of acceptable pricing.
If an item is too highly priced, this price could lead to a ‘reaction’ from the client.  For
instance, a client may adopt a view that an especially high price for an item represents an
opportunity for them to redesign their project in order that they replace this item with
another of a lesser price.  If, for example, the price of one finish is considered especially
high, the client may wish to go ahead with the project but change the specifications so
that an alternative, lesser-priced finish is used instead.
A client could also ‘reject’ a high price and close negotiations with this contractor.
This High price is defined as the price-point at which there is roughly a 16% chance that
a higher price will be acceptable (by the above definition).
Scheduling Confidence (e.g. true)
The next (boolean) field provides the contractor with the opportunity to provide
indication of their view on whether they have a sense of confidence or not with regard to
the scheduled timing for this item.  This is used to assess the ‘risk of being wrong’.  If
they are confident (i.e. their input is ‘true’) then the effect is for the software to assess
this risk by way of applying a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 5% of the
weighted-average ‘central time’ for that item.  If they are instead not confident (i.e. the
input is ‘false’) then it is assumed that the standard deviation is 20%, calculated on the
same basis.  This simple 2-way categorisation of all items is intended to test whether the
model performs well in taking account of this nature of risk, in effect steering the pricing
allocation away from risky items and rather placing higher prices on less risky items –












The next combination of fields for each item serve to describe the scheduled timing of the
item, entered as fractions of 1.0 where 1.0 represents 100% of the quantity of the item
being built.  For instance, if a contractor envisages building an item at such a time that
50% of it is complete in month 3 and 50% in month 4 then they could provide this as
input in this file by way of the following segment of input:
3-4=0.5
Alternatively, the parser (written as part of the Xpload software) will also accept this
input entered using the following syntax:
3=0.5, 4=0.5
The scheduling has predominantly been captured to indicate whether items are scheduled
for early within a 30-month long schedule, in the middle of that project, or in the last 10
months of the project.  Item price loading normally entails the “front-end loading” of
items that are scheduled for early in the project, whilst “back-end loading” entails
applying high prices to items that are expected to have a high escalation rate that are
scheduled for late in the project.  These processes are explained on pages 58-60 and 62-
64, respectively.













0, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
1, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
2, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
3, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 110, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
4, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
5, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
6, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 105, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
7, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 105, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
8, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 1=1.0
9, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 130, 140, true, 1=1.0
10, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 1=1.0
11, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 105, 100, 110, true, 1=1.0
12, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
13, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 110, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
14, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
15, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
16, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
17, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
18, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
19, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
20, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
21, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
22, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 110, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
23, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
24, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
25, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
26, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
27, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
28, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
29, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
30, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
31, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
32, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
33, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
34, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
35, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
36, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
37, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
38, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
39, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
40, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
41, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
42, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
43, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
44, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1











46, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
47, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
48, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
49, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
50, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
51, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
52, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
53, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
54, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
55, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
56, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
57, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
58, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
59, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
60, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
61, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
62, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
63, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
64, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
65, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
66, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
67, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
68, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
69, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
70, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
71, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
72, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
73, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
74, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
75, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
76, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
77, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
78, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
79, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
80, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
81, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 0-9=0.1
82, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 0-9=0.1
83, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 0-9=0.1
84, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
85, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
86, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
87, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
88, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
89, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
90, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
91, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
92, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 15=1.0











94, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 15=1.0
95, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 15=1.0
96, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
97, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
98, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
99, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
100, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
101, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
102, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
103, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
104, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
105, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
106, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
107, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
108, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
109, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
110, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
111, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
112, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
113, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
114, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
115, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
116, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
117, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
118, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
119, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
120, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
121, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
122, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
123, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
124, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
125, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
126, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
127, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
128, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
129, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
130, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
131, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
132, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
133, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
134, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
135, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
136, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
137, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
138, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
139, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
140, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1











142, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
143, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
144, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
145, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
146, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
147, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
148, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
149, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
150, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
151, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
152, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
153, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
154, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
155, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
156, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
157, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
158, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
159, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
160, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
161, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
162, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
163, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
164, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
165, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 10-19=0.1
166, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 10-19=0.1
167, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 10-19=0.1
168, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
169, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
170, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
171, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
172, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
173, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
174, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
175, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
176, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 29=1.0
177, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 29=1.0
178, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 29=1.0
179, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 29=1.0
180, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
181, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
182, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
183, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
184, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
185, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
186, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
187, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
188, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1











190, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
191, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
192, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
193, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
194, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
195, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
196, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
197, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
198, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
199, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
200, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
201, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
202, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
203, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
204, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
205, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
206, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
207, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
208, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
209, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
210, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
211, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
212, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
213, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
214, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
215, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
216, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
217, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
218, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
219, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
220, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
221, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
222, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
223, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
224, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
225, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
226, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
227, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
228, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
229, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
230, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
231, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
232, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
233, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
234, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
235, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
236, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1











238, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
239, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
240, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
241, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
242, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
243, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
244, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
245, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
246, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
247, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
248, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
249, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, true, 20-29=0.1
250, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, true, 20-29=0.1
251, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, true, 20-29=0.1
252, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
253, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
254, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
255, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
256, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
257, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
258, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
259, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
260, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 1=1.0
261, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 1=1.0
262, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 1=1.0
263, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 1=1.0
264, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
265, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
266, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
267, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
268, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
269, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
270, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
271, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
272, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
273, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
274, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
275, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
276, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
277, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
278, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
279, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
280, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
281, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
282, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
283, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
284, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1











286, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
287, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
288, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
289, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
290, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
291, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
292, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
293, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
294, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
295, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
296, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
297, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
298, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
299, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
300, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
301, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
302, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
303, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
304, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
305, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
306, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
307, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
308, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
309, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
310, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
311, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
312, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
313, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
314, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
315, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
316, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
317, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
318, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
319, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
320, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
321, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
322, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
323, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
324, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
325, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
326, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
327, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
328, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
329, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 0-9=0.1
330, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
331, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
332, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1











334, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 0-9=0.1
335, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 0-9=0.1
336, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
337, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
338, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
339, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
340, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
341, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
342, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
343, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
344, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 15=1.0
345, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 15=1.0
346, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 15=1.0
347, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 15=1.0
348, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
349, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
350, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
351, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
352, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
353, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
354, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
355, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
356, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
357, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
358, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
359, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
360, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
361, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
362, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
363, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
364, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
365, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
366, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
367, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
368, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
369, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
370, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
371, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
372, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
373, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
374, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
375, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
376, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
377, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
378, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
379, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
380, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1











382, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
383, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
384, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
385, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
386, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
387, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
388, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
389, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
390, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
391, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
392, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
393, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
394, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
395, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
396, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
397, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
398, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
399, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
400, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
401, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
402, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
403, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
404, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
405, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
406, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
407, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
408, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
409, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
410, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
411, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
412, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
413, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
414, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
415, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
416, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
417, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 10-19=0.1
418, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 10-19=0.1
419, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 10-19=0.1
420, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
421, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
422, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
423, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
424, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
425, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
426, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
427, 100, 1.3, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
428, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 29=1.0











430, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 29=1.0
431, 100, 1.3, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 29=1.0
432, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
433, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
434, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
435, 100, 1.0, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
436, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
437, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
438, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
439, 100, 0.7, 0.06, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
440, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
441, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
442, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
443, 100, 0.7, 0.15, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
444, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
445, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
446, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
447, 100, 0.7, 0.0, HIGH, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
448, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
449, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
450, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
451, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
452, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
453, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
454, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
455, 100, 1.3, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
456, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
457, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
458, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
459, 100, 1.3, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
460, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
461, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
462, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
463, 100, 1.0, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
464, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
465, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
466, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
467, 100, 0.7, 0.06, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
468, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
469, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
470, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
471, 100, 0.7, 0.15, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
472, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
473, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
474, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
475, 100, 0.7, 0.0, MID, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
476, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1











478, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
479, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
480, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
481, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
482, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
483, 100, 1.3, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
484, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
485, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
486, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
487, 100, 1.3, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
488, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
489, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
490, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
491, 100, 1.0, 0.0, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
492, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
493, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
494, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
495, 100, 0.7, 0.06, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
496, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
497, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
498, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
499, 100, 0.7, 0.15, LOW, 100, 100, 110, false, 20-29=0.1
500, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1
501, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 130, 140, false, 20-29=0.1
502, 100, 0.7, 0.0, LOW, 120, 100, 150, false, 20-29=0.1











This input data serve to describe the 504 items in such a manner that they are each
intended to test the model in the following way:
0: An early item (scheduled with confidence), contractor
reasonably confidently expects the final quantity to be 30%
more than that captured in the Bills of Quantities, it
falls into a workgroup that has a high expected escalation
(12%) of which forecast the contractor is relatively
confident; there are 100 units in the Bills of Quantities
and the contractor estimates their cost to be R110.00 per
unit.  Prices of less than R100.00 are considered to be at
(16%) risk of being unacceptable and, similarly, prices of
more than R150.00 are likely unacceptable.
1: Ditto, except that the client is likely to only find
prices between R130 and R140 to be acceptable.
2: Same as Item 0 (to test whether the model will price
them the same)
3: Ditto, but with a narrow range of acceptable prices
(R100 – R110), relatively low compared to the contractor’s
estimated cost (R110).
4: Same as Items 0 and 2 except that the estimated unit
cost is R100 and the contractor is far less confident of
the estimate of the quantity variation.
5: Same as Item 1 except that, as with Item 4, the
contractor is not confident of the estimate of the quantity
variation.
6: Same as Item 4 except that the estimated cost is
marginally higher (R105).
7: Ditto, except that the band of acceptable prices is
again narrow (R100-R110) which is also worth comparing as
being similar to Item 3.
8: Same as Item 0, except that this item is scheduled to be
built even earlier – and be built quickly, all in the
second month of the project.
9: Similarly, the same as Item 1 except that this item is
scheduled to be built even earlier – and be built quickly,











10: Similarly, the same as Item 0 except that this item is
scheduled to be built all in the second month of the
project.
11: Similarly, the same as Item 7 except that this item is
scheduled to be built all in the second month of the
project, and the contractor more confident of the expected
increase in the quantity that is to be built.
12: The same as Item 0 except the contractor is certain
that the quantity built will remain as specified in the
Bills of Quantities.
13: Similarly, this item is otherwise the same as Item 1
although the estimated cost is R110 and not R100.
14: This item is the same as Item 12 except that the
estimated cost is R120 and not R100.
15: This item is similar to Items 3 and 7 except that the
estimated cost is R100 also that the contractor is certain
that the quantity built will remain as specified in the
Bills of Quantities.
16: This item is similar to Item 12 except that the
estimated cost is R120 and also that the contractor thinks
it fairly likely that the final quantity will be 30% less
than in the Bills of Quantities.
17: This item is similar to Items 1, 5 and 13 except that
the estimated cost is R120 and also that the contractor
thinks it fairly likely that the final quantity will be 30%
less than in the Bills of Quantities.
18: This item is the same as Item 16.
19: This item is similar to Item 15 except that the
contractor thinks it fairly likely that the final quantity
will be 30% less than in the Bills of Quantities.
20: Similar to Items 16 and 18 except that the contractor
is less certain that the final quantity will be 30% less
than in the Bills of Quantities.
21: The same as Item 17 except that the contractor is less
certain that the final quantity will be 30% less than in











22: The same as Item 20 except that the estimated unit cost
is R110 and not R120.
23: The same as Item 19 except that the contractor is less
certain that the final quantity will be 30% less than in
the Bills of Quantities.
24: The same as Item 18 except that the contractor is
absolutely certain that the final quantity will be 30% less
than in the Bills of Quantities.
25: The same as Item 21 except that the contractor is
absolutely certain that the final quantity will be 30% less
than in the Bills of Quantities.
26: The same as Item 24.
27: The same as Item 23 except that the contractor is
absolutely certain that the final quantity will be 30% less
than in the Bills of Quantities.
28: The same as Item 0 except that the estimated cost is
R120 and not R110 and the item is part of a workgroup that
has an average rate of expected escalation and not a high
rate.
29: The same as Item 1, ditto.
30: The same as Item 28.
31: The same as Item 3 except that the estimated cost is
R100 and not R110 and the item is part of a workgroup that
has an average rate of expected escalation and not a high
rate.
32: The same as Item 20 except the item is part of a
workgroup that has an average rate of expected escalation
and not a high rate, and the contractor expects variations
will increase the final quantity built and not decrease it.
33: The same as Item 29 except that the contractor is less
confident of the estimates of variations.
34: The same as Item 30, ditto.











36: The same as Item 28.
37: The same as Item 29.
38: The same as Item 30.
39: The same as Item 31.
40: The same as Item 14, except that the item is part of a
workgroup that has an average rate of expected escalation
and not a high rate.
41: The same as Item 13, except that the unit cost is R120
and not R110 and that the item is part of a workgroup that
has an average rate of expected escalation and not a high
rate.
42: The same as Item 40.
43: The same as Item 15, except that the item is part of a
workgroup that has an average rate of expected escalation
and not a high rate.
44: The same as Item 18, ditto.
45: The same as Item 17, ditto.
46: The same as Item 44.
47: The same as Item 43, except that the contractor expects
variations to the effect that the final quantity will be
30% less than in the Bills of Quantities, of which he is
reasonably certain.
48: Same as Item 46, except that the contractor is less
certain of the likelihood of the variation orders.
49: Same as Item 45, ditto.
50: Same as Item 48.
51: Same as Item 47, except that the contractor is less
certain of the likelihood of the variation orders.
52: Same as Item 50, except that the contractor is












53: Same as Item 49, ditto.
54: Same as Item 52.
55: Same as Item 51, except that the contractor is
absolutely certain of their expectation of variation
orders.
56-83: Same as Items 28-55 respectively, except that this
item falls belong to a workgroup that has a low expected
rate of escalation.
84-91: Same as Items 0-7 respectively, except that this
item is scheduled to be built over the duration of the
middle-third of the overall project.
92-95: Same as Items 8-11 respectively, except that this
item is scheduled to be built in the one month halfway
through the construction of the overall project.
96-167: Same as Items 12-83 respectively, except that this
item is scheduled to be built over the duration of the
middle-third of the overall project.
168-175: Same as Items 0-7 and 84-91 respectively, except
that this item is scheduled to be built over the duration
of the last-third of the overall project.
176-179: Same as Items 8-11 and 92-95 respectively, except
that this item is scheduled to be built in the last month
of the project.
180-251: Same as Items 12-83 and 96-167 respectively,
except that this item is scheduled to be built over the
duration of the last-third of the overall project.
252-503: Same as Items 0-251 respectively, except that with
all these items the contractor is not as certain of the











APPENDIX C. TEST RESULTS
This appendix presents a tiny fraction of the amount of data produced by the system in
this same manner.  If all this data were printed, it would amount to many thousands of
pages.
This data contains the following fields of information:
- a reference to the interation
- the amount of reward generated from this pricing scenario
- the amount of risk, ditto
- the value of utility, ditto
(The first three iterations are special test cases in which it is not appropriate to measure
the utility.)
0, 5193081, 605469, 0.0
1, 6642313, 648812, 0.0
2, 5913542, 147376, 0.0
3, 5950630, 258974, 4437.0527
4, 6006796, 74761, 15610.713
5, 5924198, 313583, 1295.2406
6, 5961782, 294542, 5134.8276
7, 5982144, 215779, 8413.034
8, 6014881, 306075, 9584.956
9, 6019512, 367678, 8361.63
10, 5998339, 344908, 7371.4644
11, 6012852, 57001, 17474.47
12, 5980918, 254603, 7579.921
13, 5997399, 220435, 9934.121
14, 6012852, 57001, 17474.47
15, 6005916, 153630, 12595.879
16, 5994205, 185348, 10391.61
17, 5998666, 180852, 11007.707
18, 5997591, 191880, 10616.291
19, 5988319, 233836, 8712.873
20, 6004957, 133073, 13110.495











22, 6013570, 427083, 6267.318
23, 6020525, 380445, 8076.447
24, 6006883, 300456, 9044.109
25, 6006062, 179418, 11883.755
26, 6015091, 237151, 11319.868
27, 6012857, 56991, 17475.85
28, 6012852, 57001, 17474.47
29, 6012274, 370410, 7786.8267
30, 6012601, 445490, 5602.1147
31, 5991493, 473454, 3640.5415
32, 5994060, 339104, 7162.1426
33, 6012857, 56991, 17475.85
34, 6012836, 56995, 17472.404
35, 6012839, 56986, 17473.443
36, 6012840, 56596, 17496.965
37, 6011338, 56549, 17266.598
38, 5944774, 286010, 3576.7942
39, 5981576, 208516, 8489.531
40, 6009386, 412525, 6466.1743
41, 6004004, 168517, 11945.488
42, 6008847, 178976, 12210.357
43, 5979159, 263387, 7255.5557
44, 6015890, 386014, 7615.1724
45, 6003196, 282193, 9131.213
46, 5971288, 232958, 6954.1924
47, 5974654, 240586, 7183.877
48, 6010793, 317174, 8981.024
49, 5984477, 199418, 8989.765
50, 6005547, 185388, 11666.105
51, 6040742, 309851, 11594.073
52, 5925309, 176817, 1947.3417
53, 6003624, 307479, 8610.395
54, 6017242, 297389, 9998.399
55, 5960480, 246681, 5616.3804
56, 5917995, 312371, 602.93506
57, 5988172, 205649, 9269.428
58, 5999218, 181693, 11049.228
59, 6010620, 138886, 13628.749
60, 5991663, 211086, 9532.51
61, 5989104, 260198, 8276.325











APPENDIX D. SYSTEM FEEDBACK
This appendix presents a tiny fraction of the amount of data produced by the system in
this same manner.  If all this data were printed, it would amount to several hundred
pages.
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence A) to
4437.052806405739 after 3 efforts, increasing the reward to
5950629 (a 52% improvement on the profit from a balanced
bid) whilst reducing the total risk to 258974(riskReaction
= 130796, riskOfBeingWrong = 28179 & riskRejection = 99998)
-1+0-0+0-1+1-0+1-1+1-1+0-0+0…
+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f+f…
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence D) to
15610.713190934639 after 4 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6006796 (a 130% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to
74760(riskReaction = 4704, riskOfBeingWrong = 28410 &
riskRejection = 41645)
-0+2-0+0-2+2-0+2-0+1-1+2-0+0-1+1-0+2-0+2-0+2-0+1-0+0-0…
+j+j+j+j+j+j+j+j+f+f+j+j+f+f+j+j+j+j+j+j+j+j h h h h h…
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence E241) to
17474.470264835185 after 11 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012851 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to




Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence C) to
17475.850384954552 after 27 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012857 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to














Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence A) to
17496.965589301093 after 36 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012839 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to
56596(riskReaction = 5534, riskOfBeingWrong = 28437 &
riskRejection = 22623)
+5-5+8+5-7+9-8+7-5-3+5+6-2+9-8+0+5-3-3+8-3-2-8-8+9+5+0…
 e e+f+f e e e e e-f+f+f+f+f e+f+f e-f-f-f-f-f e e e-f…
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence D) to
17508.607479864142 after 76 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012905 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to




Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence E137) to
17512.43667075178 after 86 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012880 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to




Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence A) to
17514.364388233993 after 87 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012931 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to




Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence D) to
17516.13128856958 after 88 efforts, increasing the reward
to 6012939 (a 138% improvement on the profit from a
balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to
56534(riskReaction = 5473, riskOfBeingWrong = 28437 &
riskRejection = 22623)
+1-2+9+6+3-7+2-3-5+1+3-2-6-6+3-6+5+5-7-9-6-1+4-5-3-3-6-7…
+h-h g g g g g-h-h g+h+j+j+j+h-h-h-j+h+h g-h-h+j+j+j-h-h…
Improvement (due to item pricing priority sequence E125) to
17516.286975221807 after 170 efforts, increasing the reward











balanced bid) whilst reducing the total risk to
56527(riskReaction = 5466, riskOfBeingWrong = 28437 &
riskRejection = 22623)
-4+9-4+2-2+9-4+9+6-8+0+1-3-3-7-9-6-3+2-7+8-7-3+0-8…











APPENDIX E. ITEM PRICES
This appendix presents the prices and corresponding mark-ups that the system has
identified for the hypothetical project as best suited to this contractor (considering their
risk profile).
         0   R138.92    26.29%
         1   R137.50    37.50%
         2   R138.44    25.85%
         3   R107.72    -2.07%
         4   R138.42    38.42%
         5   R137.46    37.46%
         6   R139.20    32.57%
         7   R108.09     2.94%
         8   R139.02    26.38%
         9   R137.54    37.54%
        10   R139.03    26.39%
        11   R108.06     2.91%
        12   R135.92    23.56%
        13   R133.26    21.15%
        14   R133.75    11.46%
        15   R103.97     3.97%
        16   R109.60    -8.67%
        17   R132.12    10.10%
        18   R109.63    -8.64%
        19   R102.48     2.48%
        20   R112.33    -6.39%
        21   R132.40    10.33%
        22   R109.64    -0.33%
        23   R102.28     2.28%
        24   R112.51    -6.24%
        25   R132.49    10.41%
        26   R112.39    -6.34%
        27   R102.49     2.49%
        28   R139.73    16.44%
        29   R137.58    14.65%
        30   R138.69    15.58%
        31   R108.09     8.09%
        32   R139.82    16.52%
        33   R137.60    14.67%
        34   R139.58    16.32%











        36   R137.80    14.83%
        37   R137.55    14.63%
        38   R139.44    16.20%
        39   R108.10     8.10%
        40   R134.46    12.05%
        41   R133.07    10.89%
        42   R123.31     2.76%
        43   R103.65     3.65%
        44   R109.88    -8.43%
        45   R132.49    10.41%
        46   R110.43    -7.98%
        47   R102.41     2.41%
        48   R111.96    -6.70%
        49   R131.98     9.98%
        50   R109.60    -8.67%
        51   R101.98     1.98%
        52   R109.60    -8.67%
        53   R132.49    10.41%
        54   R112.40    -6.33%
        55   R102.28     2.28%
        56   R138.97    15.81%
        57   R137.51    14.59%
        58   R138.88    15.73%
        59   R107.99     7.99%
        60   R140.30    16.92%
        61   R137.55    14.63%
        62   R139.11    15.93%
        63   R108.01     8.01%
        64   R138.46    15.38%
        65   R137.58    14.65%
        66   R140.22    16.85%
        67   R108.09     8.09%
        68   R112.69    -6.09%
        69   R132.49    10.41%
        70   R112.42    -6.32%
        71   R102.58     2.58%
        72   R109.60    -8.67%
        73   R131.92     9.93%
        74   R109.43    -8.81%
        75   R102.10     2.10%
        76   R109.59    -8.68%
        77   R132.48    10.40%
        78   R109.59    -8.68%
        79   R102.36     2.36%
        80   R109.27    -8.94%
        81   R132.27    10.23%
        82   R112.40    -6.33%











        84   R140.53    17.11%
        85   R137.51    14.59%
        86   R140.13    16.78%
        87   R108.09     8.09%
        88   R139.98    16.65%
        89   R137.52    14.60%
        90   R140.42    17.02%
        91   R108.00     8.00%
        92   R140.34    16.95%
        93   R137.52    14.60%
        94   R140.23    16.86%
        95   R108.12     8.12%
        96   R137.38    14.48%
        97   R137.37    14.48%
        98   R132.38    10.32%
        99   R104.49     4.49%
       100   R112.38    -6.35%
       101   R132.48    10.40%
       102   R109.64    -8.63%
       103   R102.48     2.48%
       104   R109.58    -8.68%
       105   R132.48    10.40%
       106   R110.50    -7.92%
       107   R102.48     2.48%
       108   R111.34    -7.22%
       109   R132.53    10.44%
       110   R109.58    -8.68%
       111   R102.49     2.49%
       112   R140.11    16.76%
       113   R137.55    14.63%
       114   R139.42    16.18%
       115   R107.97     7.97%
       116   R140.41    17.01%
       117   R137.60    14.67%
       118   R138.70    15.58%
       119   R108.09     8.09%
       120   R140.40    17.00%
       121   R137.53    14.61%
       122   R140.42    17.02%
       123   R108.07     8.07%
       124   R137.46    14.55%
       125   R136.52    13.77%
       126   R137.33    14.44%
       127   R106.49     6.49%
       128   R112.44    -6.30%
       129   R132.28    10.23%
       130   R109.76    -8.53%











       132   R112.17    -6.53%
       133   R132.48    10.40%
       134   R112.36    -6.37%
       135   R101.92     1.92%
       136   R110.05    -8.29%
       137   R132.48    10.40%
       138   R112.21    -6.49%
       139   R102.49     2.49%
       140   R138.47    15.39%
       141   R137.51    14.59%
       142   R138.48    15.40%
       143   R107.82     7.82%
       144   R139.96    16.63%
       145   R137.54    14.62%
       146   R138.62    15.52%
       147   R107.51     7.51%
       148   R138.14    15.12%
       149   R137.51    14.59%
       150   R139.70    16.42%
       151   R108.03     8.03%
       152   R112.82    -5.98%
       153   R132.48    10.40%
       154   R112.43    -6.31%
       155   R102.48     2.48%
       156   R109.51    -8.74%
       157   R132.48    10.40%
       158   R112.26    -6.45%
       159   R102.48     2.48%
       160   R110.44    -7.97%
       161   R132.17    10.14%
       162   R109.80    -8.50%
       163   R101.94     1.94%
       164   R109.60    -8.67%
       165   R132.29    10.24%
       166   R111.01    -7.49%
       167   R102.12     2.12%
       168   R140.41    17.01%
       169   R137.67    14.73%
       170   R140.05    16.71%
       171   R108.10     8.10%
       172   R140.42    17.02%
       173   R137.59    14.66%
       174   R140.19    16.83%
       175   R108.09     8.09%
       176   R139.03    15.86%
       177   R137.50    14.58%
       178   R140.72    17.27%











       180   R137.31    14.43%
       181   R137.08    14.23%
       182   R123.90     3.25%
       183   R102.62     2.62%
       184   R112.40    -6.33%
       185   R132.48    10.40%
       186   R112.38    -6.35%
       187   R102.48     2.48%
       188   R112.34    -6.38%
       189   R132.48    10.40%
       190   R112.35    -6.38%
       191   R102.48     2.48%
       192   R112.39    -6.34%
       193   R132.48    10.40%
       194   R110.17    -8.19%
       195   R102.49     2.49%
       196   R140.75    17.29%
       197   R137.53    14.61%
       198   R140.76    17.30%
       199   R108.11     8.11%
       200   R140.23    16.86%
       201   R137.51    14.59%
       202   R140.05    16.71%
       203   R108.09     8.09%
       204   R140.77    17.31%
       205   R137.52    14.60%
       206   R140.61    17.18%
       207   R108.09     8.09%
       208   R135.62    13.02%
       209   R135.37    12.81%
       210   R125.67     4.73%
       211   R103.01     3.01%
       212   R112.40    -6.33%
       213   R132.48    10.40%
       214   R109.97    -8.36%
       215   R102.48     2.48%
       216   R112.36    -6.37%
       217   R132.47    10.39%
       218   R112.36    -6.37%
       219   R102.48     2.48%
       220   R112.39    -6.34%
       221   R132.49    10.41%
       222   R112.38    -6.35%
       223   R102.48     2.48%
       224   R137.77    14.81%
       225   R136.42    13.68%
       226   R137.09    14.24%











       228   R138.44    15.37%
       229   R137.50    14.58%
       230   R138.69    15.58%
       231   R107.78     7.78%
       232   R137.93    14.94%
       233   R137.44    14.53%
       234   R138.36    15.30%
       235   R107.85     7.85%
       236   R112.34    -6.38%
       237   R132.48    10.40%
       238   R112.38    -6.35%
       239   R102.50     2.50%
       240   R112.39    -6.34%
       241   R132.44    10.37%
       242   R109.23    -8.98%
       243   R101.85     1.85%
       244   R109.24    -8.97%
       245   R132.41    10.34%
       246   R109.25    -8.96%
       247   R102.26     2.26%
       248   R109.23    -8.98%
       249   R132.41    10.34%
       250   R109.20    -9.00%
       251   R101.85     1.85%
       252   R140.42    17.02%
       253   R137.60    14.67%
       254   R139.19    15.99%
       255   R108.07     8.07%
       256   R138.53    15.44%
       257   R137.62    14.68%
       258   R140.19    16.83%
       259   R108.09     8.09%
       260   R140.41    17.01%
       261   R137.51    14.59%
       262   R140.24    16.87%
       263   R108.03     8.03%
       264   R131.73     9.78%
       265   R137.36    14.47%
       266   R122.44     2.03%
       267   R105.38     5.38%
       268   R112.40    -6.33%
       269   R132.48    10.40%
       270   R110.06    -8.28%
       271   R102.43     2.43%
       272   R109.92    -8.40%
       273   R132.48    10.40%
       274   R109.60    -8.67%











       276   R109.60    -8.67%
       277   R132.39    10.33%
       278   R109.60    -8.67%
       279   R102.49     2.49%
       280   R139.88    16.57%
       281   R137.64    14.70%
       282   R138.30    15.25%
       283   R108.04     8.04%
       284   R140.41    17.01%
       285   R137.55    14.63%
       286   R138.91    15.76%
       287   R108.15     8.15%
       288   R140.34    16.95%
       289   R137.61    14.68%
       290   R138.46    15.38%
       291   R108.09     8.09%
       292   R135.89    13.24%
       293   R137.43    14.53%
       294   R116.90    -2.58%
       295   R102.49     2.49%
       296   R112.36    -6.37%
       297   R132.47    10.39%
       298   R109.38    -8.85%
       299   R102.40     2.40%
       300   R109.62    -8.65%
       301   R132.50    10.42%
       302   R112.39    -6.34%
       303   R102.48     2.48%
       304   R109.63    -8.64%
       305   R132.55    10.46%
       306   R109.65    -8.62%
       307   R102.49     2.49%
       308   R139.80    16.50%
       309   R137.51    14.59%
       310   R138.61    15.51%
       311   R108.05     8.05%
       312   R139.59    16.33%
       313   R137.51    14.59%
       314   R138.62    15.52%
       315   R108.08     8.08%
       316   R138.45    15.38%
       317   R137.50    14.58%
       318   R140.26    16.88%
       319   R107.97     7.97%
       320   R112.40    -6.33%
       321   R132.49    10.41%
       322   R112.42    -6.32%











       324   R109.59    -8.68%
       325   R132.48    10.40%
       326   R112.40    -6.33%
       327   R102.23     2.23%
       328   R110.51    -7.91%
       329   R132.48    10.40%
       330   R109.52    -8.73%
       331   R101.93     1.93%
       332   R109.60    -8.67%
       333   R132.45    10.38%
       334   R109.57    -8.69%
       335   R102.49     2.49%
       336   R139.66    16.38%
       337   R137.68    14.73%
       338   R139.45    16.21%
       339   R108.08     8.08%
       340   R140.40    17.00%
       341   R137.59    14.66%
       342   R140.01    16.68%
       343   R108.09     8.09%
       344   R138.68    15.57%
       345   R137.54    14.62%
       346   R140.43    17.03%
       347   R108.09     8.09%
       348   R136.26    13.55%
       349   R134.94    12.45%
       350   R112.93    -5.89%
       351   R106.99     6.99%
       352   R112.37    -6.36%
       353   R132.48    10.40%
       354   R112.38    -6.35%
       355   R102.48     2.48%
       356   R112.36    -6.37%
       357   R132.48    10.40%
       358   R112.34    -6.38%
       359   R102.50     2.50%
       360   R110.26    -8.12%
       361   R132.48    10.40%
       362   R111.93    -6.72%
       363   R102.25     2.25%
       364   R140.41    17.01%
       365   R137.62    14.68%
       366   R139.48    16.23%
       367   R108.07     8.07%
       368   R139.79    16.49%
       369   R137.54    14.62%
       370   R140.41    17.01%











       372   R139.44    16.20%
       373   R137.61    14.68%
       374   R140.39    16.99%
       375   R108.08     8.08%
       376   R128.06     6.72%
       377   R134.57    12.14%
       378   R122.50     2.08%
       379   R104.80     4.80%
       380   R112.38    -6.35%
       381   R132.48    10.40%
       382   R111.73    -6.89%
       383   R102.45     2.45%
       384   R112.36    -6.37%
       385   R132.48    10.40%
       386   R112.02    -6.65%
       387   R102.18     2.18%
       388   R109.59    -8.68%
       389   R132.14    10.12%
       390   R111.22    -7.32%
       391   R102.48     2.48%
       392   R138.21    15.18%
       393   R137.51    14.59%
       394   R138.55    15.46%
       395   R107.82     7.82%
       396   R138.59    15.49%
       397   R137.52    14.60%
       398   R139.82    16.52%
       399   R107.84     7.84%
       400   R138.55    15.46%
       401   R137.53    14.61%
       402   R138.47    15.39%
       403   R107.79     7.79%
       404   R111.76    -6.87%
       405   R132.48    10.40%
       406   R112.40    -6.33%
       407   R104.77     4.77%
       408   R110.72    -7.73%
       409   R132.50    10.42%
       410   R109.60    -8.67%
       411   R101.85     1.85%
       412   R111.59    -7.01%
       413   R132.48    10.40%
       414   R109.60    -8.67%
       415   R101.85     1.85%
       416   R109.47    -8.78%
       417   R132.46    10.38%
       418   R109.61    -8.66%











       420   R140.64    17.20%
       421   R137.62    14.68%
       422   R140.77    17.31%
       423   R108.10     8.10%
       424   R139.87    16.56%
       425   R137.62    14.68%
       426   R140.77    17.31%
       427   R108.09     8.09%
       428   R140.54    17.12%
       429   R137.57    14.64%
       430   R140.71    17.26%
       431   R108.16     8.16%
       432   R121.01     0.84%
       433   R136.37    13.64%
       434   R138.29    15.24%
       435   R107.67     7.67%
       436   R112.37    -6.36%
       437   R132.48    10.40%
       438   R112.38    -6.35%
       439   R102.48     2.48%
       440   R111.10    -7.42%
       441   R132.48    10.40%
       442   R109.96    -8.37%
       443   R102.48     2.48%
       444   R112.38    -6.35%
       445   R132.48    10.40%
       446   R110.90    -7.58%
       447   R102.48     2.48%
       448   R140.26    16.88%
       449   R137.59    14.66%
       450   R140.73    17.28%
       451   R108.07     8.07%
       452   R140.74    17.28%
       453   R137.52    14.60%
       454   R140.77    17.31%
       455   R108.09     8.09%
       456   R140.77    17.31%
       457   R137.56    14.63%
       458   R140.67    17.23%
       459   R108.07     8.07%
       460   R124.65     3.88%
       461   R132.69    10.58%
       462   R138.24    15.20%
       463   R104.16     4.16%
       464   R109.92    -8.40%
       465   R132.48    10.40%
       466   R112.50    -6.25%











       468   R110.88    -7.60%
       469   R132.63    10.53%
       470   R112.34    -6.38%
       471   R102.48     2.48%
       472   R112.38    -6.35%
       473   R132.48    10.40%
       474   R112.43    -6.31%
       475   R102.61     2.61%
       476   R138.22    15.18%
       477   R137.42    14.52%
       478   R138.31    15.26%
       479   R107.50     7.50%
       480   R137.53    14.61%
       481   R137.52    14.60%
       482   R138.53    15.44%
       483   R106.05     6.05%
       484   R138.68    15.57%
       485   R137.38    14.48%
       486   R138.51    15.43%
       487   R107.44     7.44%
       488   R112.36    -6.37%
       489   R132.48    10.40%
       490   R112.70    -6.08%
       491   R102.48     2.48%
       492   R112.41    -6.33%
       493   R132.36    10.30%
       494   R109.24    -8.97%
       495   R101.85     1.85%
       496   R109.88    -8.43%
       497   R132.36    10.30%
       498   R109.33    -8.89%
       499   R101.86     1.86%
       500   R109.31    -8.91%
       501   R132.48    10.40%
       502   R109.28    -8.93%
       503   R102.48     2.48%Un
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